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PRIVATE EQUITY REGULATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS: IS TITLE IV OF THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT THE RIGHT ANSWER? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DODD-FRANK AND THE CASE 




ABSTRACT    
 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules set out a major reform of the 
private investment fund industry and establish a new framework for regulatory and supervisory 
oversight of private investment funds. Title IV eliminated the private adviser exemption 
previously available under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and required the SEC to 
establish rules and regulations requiring advisers to "private investment funds", including 
private equity funds, to register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 
Through the elimination of the private adviser exemption, Title IV and its implementing rules 
now require that investment advisers to private equity funds, hedge funds and certain other 
funds with assets under management of $150 million or more register with the SEC, comply with 
certain SEC books, records, disclosure and reporting requirements, and be subject to extensive 
periodic SEC examination, unless they qualify for specific exemptions. This new regulatory 
regime is designed to bring transparency and oversight to the activities of private investment 
funds, control the build-up of systemic risk in the financial system and address the market and 
regulatory failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis.   
In this paper, I will i) analyze the political economy of the Dodd-Frank Act and its impact 
on the regulation of the private equity sector; ii) critically assess and challenge the Dodd-Frank 
and its implementing rules approach to the regulation of private equity funds; iii) evaluate the 
underlying economic theory of regulation and its relevance to the private equity sector; iv) 
challenge Title IV’s reliance on disclosure as the primary method of reducing systemic risk and 
protecting fund investors; v) examine the relationship between private equity funds and systemic 
risk; vi) analyze the use of leverage by private equity funds and the risk of excessive leverage; 
and vii) offer an alternative approach to the regulation of the private equity industry and the 
risks associated with leveraged lending to private equity funds. Additionally, this paper will 
specifically explore the political economy of financial regulation following the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC and the importance, role and application of cost benefit 
analysis in financial regulation and particularly private equity regulation under Title IV and its 
implementing rules. Choosing whether and how to regulate is generally a question of regulators 
and the implementing agency evaluating tradeoffs and whether society, the financial system and 
the economy gain enough from the regulation to justify its costs. The goal is for regulators to 
ensure they adequately consider the effectiveness and consequences of their regulatory actions. 
In other words, the benefits must justify and exceed the costs of the proposed legislative action. 
This paper will further examine the costs and benefits of Title IV and its implementing rules, in 
light of the decision in Business Roundtable, and demonstrate how cost benefit analysis, when 
used properly, provides a fundamental decision making tool that helps regulators to ensure that 
regulatory efforts produce a net positive effect on society and the economy as a whole.   
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I will argue in this paper that the decision of regulators  to regulate private equity funds 
and subject them to extensive SEC registration and reporting requirements (as reflected in Title 
IV of the Dodd-Frank Act) is inadequate, unnecessarily costly, inconsistent with the intended 
purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and its underlying theory of regulation, too disclosure-focused, 
based on fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of private equity and does not properly 
address the risk of too much leverage. Furthermore, this paper will take the position that Title 
IV’s implementing rules do not meet the economic analysis and cost benefit justification 
standards set by the D.C. Circuit Court in the Business Roundtable decision. The SEC, in 
implementing  Title IV, failed to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis and to consider the 
impact of this legislation on efficiency, competition and capital formation in the context of 
private equity funds. It failed to articulate a satisfactory and reasoned explanation for its 
regulatory actions, including a rational connection between the pre-crisis conduct and failures 
it was trying to address and the regulatory choices made. This paper will argue that Title IV and 
its implementing rules are  not supported by i) the cost benefit analysis that would survive 
judicial scrutiny after the decision in Business Roundtable, and ii) any other compelling 
argument demonstrating that the benefits of Title IV are greater than its costs.  
Like any other post-crisis reform legislation, Title IV may have satisfied a political need, 
but it will not benefit the financial market or the economy as a whole, will not improve investor 
welfare and will not reduce the risks that private equity funds may pose to the financial system. I 
argue, instead, that since private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk, they play 
a critical role as a driver of economic growth and their investors have the resources and 
sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, these funds and their advisers should be subject to a 
reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC registration, reporting and disclosure 
requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules. The concerns associated 
with the use of leverage by private equity funds and the risk of excessive leverage should be 
addressed through more substantive rules like leveraged lending regulation and tighter 
underwriting practices, standards and policies. By setting new standards for underwriting of 
leveraged loans by banks and other lenders, regulators and policymakers can ensure that 
private equity funds will have to meet higher standards when seeking buyout loans, therefore, 
reducing the risk of high leverage and the remote probability of a systemic financial crisis. Also, 
this paper will conclude that overall financial regulators, and particularly the SEC should 
ground their rulemaking in rigorous cost benefit analysis and standards, consistent with the 
Business Roundtable decision, to arrive at more rational decision-making and efficient 
regulatory actions that advance the public interest. This legislative approach, unlike Title IV of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules, will avoid hasty regulation that fails to achieve 
its goals and imposes costs that exceed its benefits. It will ensure that society and the economy 
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As the U.S. economy experienced the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, 
regulators and policy-makers started to recognize the need for a comprehensive regulatory 
reform of the financial sector. The near-collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, followed by the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and the bailout of American 
International Group on September 16, 2008, clearly demonstrated that the regulatory framework 
in place prior to the financial crisis was inadequate. Thus, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
U.S. regulators have sought to bring enhanced transparency to the financial sector, protect 
investors, improve the stability and integrity of the market and reduce systemic risk in the 
financial system through the introduction of a comprehensive regulatory reform.1  
 
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, representing the most comprehensive and far-reaching overhaul 
of the nation’s financial regulatory system since the 1930s.2 The Dodd-Frank Act dramatically 
changes the regulatory landscape for all financial services companies in the U.S. and seeks to fill 
the gaps in the pre-crisis regulatory framework. Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its 
implementing rules set out a major reform of the private investment fund industry and establish 
a new framework for regulatory and supervisory oversight of private investment funds.3 Title IV 
eliminated the private adviser exemption previously available under the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 and required the SEC to establish rules and regulations requiring advisers to 
"private investment funds", including private equity funds, to register with the SEC under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.4 Through the elimination of the private adviser exemption, 
Title IV and its implementing rules now require that investment advisers to private equity funds, 
hedge funds and certain other funds with assets under management of $150 million or more 
register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), comply with certain 
SEC books, records and reporting requirements, and be subject to extensive periodic SEC 
 
1 See Viral V. Acharya et al, Regulating Wall Street: The  Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global 
Finance, (NYU Stern School of Business 1st ed 2011). 
2  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter the “Dodd-Frank Act” or simply “Dodd-Frank”]. 
3  See Acharya et al, supra  note 1. 
4 See Mary L. Schapiro, SEC Chairman, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act Amendments To Investment Advisers Act, 
Washington DC, June 22, 2011, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm. These rules and 
rule amendments are designed to give effect to the provisions of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act that, among other 
things, increase the statutory threshold for registration by investment advisers with the SEC, require advisers to 
hedge funds, private equity funds and other private funds to register with the SEC, and require reporting by certain 
investment advisers that are exempt from registration. The new SEC rules are of particular importance to private 
fund managers and others evaluating whether they must register as investment advisers with the SEC or whether 
they can rely on an exclusion from the definition of “investment adviser” in the Investment Advisers Act or on 
certain exemptions from registration created by the Dodd-Frank Act. The SEC rules are described in two adopting 
releases. The “Registration Release” sets forth final rules implementing certain amendments to the Investment 
Advisers Act required by the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC registration requirements. The second release, the 
“Exemption Release” sets forth final rules implementing new exemptions, created by the Dodd-Frank Act, from the 
registration requirements of the Investment Advisers Act, including: i) defining “venture capital funds” for purposes 
of the new Investment Advisers Act exemption for advisers to venture capital funds; ii) exempting from registration 
certain private fund advisers with less than $150 million in private fund assets under management in the United 
States; and iii) clarifying the meaning of certain terms used in the new exemption for foreign private advisers. 




examination, unless they qualify for specific exemptions.5 This new registration and reporting 
regime is designed to bring transparency and oversight to the activities of private investment 
funds and their advisers.6 The primary objectives of this legislation are to control the build-up of 
systemic risk in the financial system, enhance financial stability, address the market and 
regulatory failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis and reduce the likelihood of a major 
financial crisis in the future.7  
In this paper, I will: i) analyze the political economy of the Dodd-Frank Act, its impact 
on the regulation of the private equity sector and the argument that financial reforms introduced 
after a financial crisis are usually flawed, overbroad and excessive;8 ii) critically assess and 
challenge the Dodd-Frank and its implementing rules approach to the regulation of private equity 
funds; iii) evaluate the underlying economic theory of regulation and its relevance to the private 
equity sector; iv) challenge Title IV’s reliance on disclosure as the primary method of reducing 
systemic risk and protecting fund investors; v) examine the relationship between private equity 
funds and systemic risk; vi) analyze the use of leverage by private equity funds and the risk of 
excessive leverage; and vii) offer an alternative approach to the regulation of the private equity 
industry and the risks associated with leverage lending to private equity funds. Additionally, this 
paper will specifically explore the political economy of financial regulation following the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC9 and the importance, role and application of 
cost benefit analysis in financial regulation and particularly private equity regulation under Title 
IV and its implementing rules. Choosing whether and how to regulate is generally a question of 
regulators and the implementing agency evaluating alternative regulatory approaches, tradeoffs 
and whether society, the financial system and the economy gain enough from the regulation to 
justify its costs. The goal is for regulators to ensure they adequately consider the effectiveness 
and consequences of their regulatory actions and determine the best course of action. In other 
words, the benefits must justify and exceed the costs of the proposed legislative action.  
 
In Business Roundtable v. SEC the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck 
down the SEC’s proxy access rule10 which had been promulgated under the Securities Exchange 
 
5  See §§ 401-419 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 403 of the Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the "private adviser 
exemption" contained in Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and introduced the requirement 
for advisers to "private funds", including private equity funds to register with the SEC. The amended Section 
203(b)(3) reads as follows: (b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to— (1) any investment adviser, 
other than an investment adviser who acts as an investment adviser to any private fund, all of whose clients are 
residents of the State within which such investment adviser maintains his or its principal office and place of 
business, and who does not furnish advice or issue analyses or reports with respect to securities listed or admitted to 
unlisted trading privileges on any national securities exchange.   
 
6  Id. 
7  See Acharya et al, supra  note 1. 
8 See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance (September 25, 
2004). NYU, Law and Econ Research Paper 04-032; Yale Law & Econ Research Paper 297; Yale ICF Working 
Paper 04-37; ECGI - Finance Working Paper 52/2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.596101 
9 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
10 Compulsory proxy access has been debated for more than seventy years in what a former SEC Commissioner has 
called “a knockdown, drag-out political brawl.” See  Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: 
Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 Bus. Law. 361, 378 (2009).  
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Act of 1934, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act.11 The court held that the rulemaking process 
was “arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law” and that the SEC had failed to 
perform an adequate cost benefit analysis of the rule.12 The court vacated the rule on the basis 
that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act13 and that the SEC “failed adequately to 
consider the rule’s effect upon efficiency, competition and capital formation”.14 In concluding 
that the SEC had failed to meet its cost benefit analysis obligations, the court made clear that the 
rule required “a far more rigorous economic analysis and cost benefit justification than the SEC 
had assumed was necessary.”15 In the words of Judge Ginsburg, “the SEC fell far short of its 
statutory obligation to determine as best it could the economic implications of the rule”.16 
Business Roundtable has become one of the most important financial regulation decisions since cost 
benefit analysis was developed in the early 1970s by holding financial regulators strictly accountable 
for the quality of their cost benefit analysis.17 The decision is significant as it was the first 
challenge of a rule adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act, based on the implementing agency’s 
failure to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis.18 It also represents a turning point indicative 
of an unprecedented level of judicial scrutiny of financial regulation, forcing the SEC and other 
regulators poised to issue rules and regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act, to take a whole new 
look at their rulemaking process.19 Despite extensive criticism, the decision appears to have 
mandated more demanding and strict standards of judicial review of the cost benefit analysis of 
financial regulation. Depending on one’s view, such a powerful approach or filter of financial 
regulation could either “further ossify the financial rulemaking process20 or make the rules that 
emerge from the process more rational, efficient, and transparent.”21 
 
11 Rule 14a-11 or the Proxy Access Rule (adopted by the SEC in 2010) required that prior to board elections, public 
companies must include in the proxy statement a limited number of candidates for director positions nominated by 
certain large shareholders. The purpose of the rule was to loosen management’s control over the company’s 
directors.    
12 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, supra  note 9.  
13 Pub.L. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237, enacted on June 11, 1946. 
14 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, supra  note 9. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 See Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking (2013). Seattle 
University Law Review, Vol. 36, P. 695 (2013); U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 12-34. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164423.  
18 See Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation (April 22, 2014). University of 
Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 660. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2346466 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2346466   
19 See Jessica Holzer, Corporate News: Court Deals Blow to SEC, Activists, Wall St. J., July 23, 2011, at B3 
(arguing that “the court’s holding could have far-reaching implications for all Dodd-Frank rulemaking”); See also 
Ben Protess, Court Ruling Offers Path to Challenge Dodd-Frank, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2011) http://dealbook.ny 
times.com/2011/08/17/court-ruling-offers-path-to-challenge-dodd-frank (explaining that “Business Roundtable 
exposes many Dodd-Frank rules to challenge since the economic analysis in the SEC’s proxy access rule is better 
than most other final rules”). 
20 See Recent Case, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1088, 1092, 
1095 (2012) (arguing that “the Business Roundtable approach creates a judicial blockade that will result in 
ossification of SEC regulations”) 
21 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 122, 185–90 (2006); See 
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. 165, 225–26 (1999); See Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 461, 476 (2003) (arguing that “requirements obliging agencies to explain their decision making process and 
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This paper will further examine the costs and benefits of Title IV and its implementing 
rules, in light of the decision in Business Roundtable, and demonstrate how cost benefit analysis, 
when used properly, provides a fundamental decision making tool that helps regulators to ensure 
that regulatory efforts produce a net positive effect on society and the economy as a whole. It 
will evaluate whether Title IV and its implementing rules i) are supported by the cost benefit 
analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after the decision in Business Roundtable; ii) 
represent the best regulatory choice and are tailored to impose the least burden on society, the 
financial system and the economy; and iii) reflect a regulatory approach that maximizes net 
benefits. 
 
I will argue in this paper that the decision of regulators to regulate private equity funds 
and subject them to extensive SEC registration and reporting requirements is inadequate, 
unnecessarily costly, inconsistent with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and its 
underlying theory of regulation, too disclosure-focused, based on fundamental misconceptions as 
to the nature of private equity and does not properly address the risk of too much leverage. It will 
not accomplish the legislation’s purpose of helping identify and reduce systemic risk in the U.S. 
financial system and will not make the financial system more stable or less risky. It follows the 
traditional post-crisis legislative pattern which is usually excessive, burdensome, flawed and 
populist in nature. It tries to prevent the rise of systemic risk in investment vehicles that are not a 
major source of systemic risk problems.  
 
Furthermore, this paper will take the position that Title IV’s implementing rules do not 
meet the economic analysis and cost benefit justification standards set by the D.C. Circuit court 
in the Business Roundtable decision. The SEC in implementing Title IV, failed to perform an 
adequate cost benefit analysis and to consider the impact of this legislation on efficiency, 
competition and capital formation in the context of private equity funds. It failed to articulate a 
satisfactory and reasoned explanation for its regulatory actions, including a rational connection 
between the pre-crisis conduct and failures it was trying to address and the regulatory choices 
made. This paper will argue that Title IV’s implementing rules are not supported by i) the cost 
benefit analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after the decision in Business Roundtable, 
and ii) any other compelling argument demonstrating that the benefits of Title IV’s 
implementing rules are greater than their  costs. 
 
Like any other post-crisis financial reform legislation, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act 
may have satisfied a political need, but will not benefit the financial market or the economy as a 
whole, will not improve investor welfare and will not reduce the risks that private equity funds 
may pose to the financial system. It goes beyond the concerns that led to the 2008 financial crisis 
and does not represent the proper legislative response that is geared toward correcting and 
mitigating the problems and failures that actually led to the 2008 financial crisis. This 
government intervention in the private equity sector was driven by the political pressure on 
Congress to quickly launch a comprehensive reform of the financial system, following the 2008 
financial crisis. It reflects a questionable public policy decision that does not adequately address 
the propensity of the financial sector to put the entire system at risk, and fails to protect the 
 
justify their decisions ensure rational decision making”); See, Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 68 U. Chi L. Rev. 1137, 1185–93 (2001). 
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benefits that private equity funds bring to the national economy. Its targeting of the private 
equity industry is simply misguided. 
 
This paper also offers a conceptual framework for examining whether private equity 
funds create a systemic risk problem, what risks are truly “systemic”, in the context of private 
equity funds and the use of leveraged buyout techniques, how (if at all) those risks should be 
regulated and whether Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules through their 
disclosure-based regulatory solution are the right answer.  
 
I further argue in this paper, that since private equity funds are not a major source of 
systemic risk, they play a critical role as a driver of economic growth and their investors have 
the resources and sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, these funds and their advisers should 
be subject to a reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC registration and reporting 
requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules. The concerns 
associated with the use of leverage by private equity funds and the risk of excessive leverage 
should be addressed through more substantive rules like leveraged lending regulation and tighter 
underwriting practices, standards and policies. By setting new standards for underwriting of 
leveraged loans by banks and other lenders, regulators and policymakers can ensure that private 
equity firms will have to meet higher standards when seeking buyout loans, therefore, reducing 
the risk of high leverage and the remote probability of a systemic financial crisis. This approach 
will: i) eliminate the unnecessary, costly and burdensome compliance requirements of Title IV 
and its implementing rules; ii) reduce and mitigate the potential risk posed by private equity 
funds and their use of leverage; and iii) protect the benefits that private equity funds bring to the 
economy.  
This paper will also conclude that overall financial regulators and particularly the SEC 
should ground their rulemaking in rigorous cost benefit analysis and standards, consistent with 
the Business Roundtable decision, to arrive at more rational decision-making and efficient 
regulatory actions that advance the public interest. This legislative approach, unlike Title IV of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules, will avoid hasty regulation that fails to achieve 
its goals and imposes costs that exceed its benefits. It will ensure that society and the economy 
gain enough from the regulation to justify its costs. In the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, a 
leading academic commentator on cost benefit analysis, “rigorous cost benefit analysis creates 
confidence in the ability of regulators to craft effective and appropriate solutions to market 
problems. It also deters regulators from proceeding with rules that promise to impose big 
economic burdens without corresponding gains.”22  This approach is important especially now 
that the Dodd-Frank Act has significantly increased the amount of financial rulemaking. The 
scale and scope of Dodd-Frank regulations have made it critical for regulators to apply rigorous 
cost benefit analysis to the rulemaking process and ensure they adequately consider the 
effectiveness and consequences of their regulatory actions. 
From this Introduction, this paper proceeds as follows. Part II describes the private 
investment funds industry and compares private equity to hedge funds and venture capital funds. 
It also examines the regulation of private investment funds, before and after the Dodd-Frank 
 




Act. Part III examines the case against the regulation of private equity funds under the Dodd-
Frank Act and challenges the Dodd-Frank and its implementing rules approach to the regulation 
of private equity funds. It analyzes the political economy of the Dodd-Frank Act, the nature of 
post-crisis financial reforms and their tendency to be excessive, overbroad, populist in nature 
and heavily influenced by the post-crisis political and economic environment. It also explores 
the political economy of financial regulation following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business 
Roundtable v. SEC and the importance, role and application of cost benefit analysis in financial 
regulation and particularly private equity regulation under Title IV and its implementing rules. It 
examines whether Title IV’s implementing rules are supported by the cost benefit analysis that 
would survive judicial scrutiny after the decision in Business Roundtable. Part III also evaluates 
the underlying economic theory of regulation and Title IV’s reliance on disclosure as the 
primary method of reducing systemic risk and protecting fund investors. Part IV examines the 
relationship between private equity and systemic risk and looks more closely at the question of 
whether private equity funds create a systemic risk problem through their use of leverage. Part V 
then outlines a set of recommendations for establishing more substantive rules like leveraged 
lending regulation and tighter underwriting practices, standards and policies. It looks at recent 
legislative initiatives and offers an alternative approach to the regulation of private equity funds 
and the risk of excessive leverage. It also evaluates the challenges of leveraged lending 
regulation. The paper closes, in Part VI, with a brief summary of the research and conclusion.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 
 
Private equity is a broad term that refers to any type of equity investment in an asset in 
which the equity is not freely tradable on a public stock market.23 Private equity funds are 
closed-end pooled investment vehicles, most frequently organized as limited partnerships that 
invest in privately held operating businesses.24 In essence, these are investment funds which: i) 
buy, own and sell controlling positions in mature companies; ii) finance a substantial part of their 
investments through the use of debt; iii) employ fund managers paid by performance; and  
iv) have a finite life span of usually 10-12 years.25    
 
A private equity fund typically is controlled by its general partner, which makes 
investment decisions for the fund and is affiliated with the private equity firm that advises the 
fund.26 The private equity fund obtains capital commitments, at the beginning of its term though 
private placement transactions, from sophisticated institutional investors who agree to become 
 
23 See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 172, 191 (2008). 
24 See Testimony of Douglas Lowenstein, former President & CEO, Private Equity Growth Capital Council 
(PEGCC), before the House Financial Services Committee, Washington DC, October 6, 2009 available at 
www.house.gov/apps/list /hearing/...dem/lowenstein_testimony.pdf; and PEGCC Comment Letter by Douglas 
Lowenstein to the SEC (April 12, 2011) available at  www.sec.gov/comments/s7-05-11/s70511-26.pdf. 
25 See Jeffrey A. Blomberg, Private Equity Transactions – Understanding Some Fundamental Principles, 17 Bus. L. 
Today 51 2007-2008. 
26 See Lowenstein, supra note 24.  
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limited partners of the fund.27 The limited partners contribute capital to the fund over its term 
(usually between ten to twelve years) and are not involved in the management and control of the 
fund. After committing their capital, the limited partners, have little say as to how the general 
partner uses the investment funds, as long as the basic covenants of the fund partnership 
agreement are followed. It is also customary for the general partner to provide at least one 
percent of the total capital committed.  
 
Limited partners of private equity funds usually include corporate pension funds, public 
retirement plans, foundations, endowments, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies and to 
a lesser extent high net worth individuals.28 This general partner-limited partner structure gives 
investors in the fund the opportunity to benefit from the experience and expertise of the fund 
manager and therefore achieve greater returns on investment than if they otherwise invested on 
their own. The investment strategies of private equity funds are mostly long-term “buy and hold” 
strategies, as opposed to trading strategies which are more associated with hedge funds. They 
purchase highly illiquid securities and are typically prohibited, by the terms of their partnership 
agreements or other governing documents, from: i) hedging for speculative purposes; ii) 
purchasing commodities or derivatives; and iii) investing in hedge funds or publicly traded 
securities.29  
 
Private equity funds pursue a variety of investment strategies (e.g., venture capital, 
growth capital, real estate, buyout, distressed and mezzanine investing) and invest in a broad 
range of industries and geographic regions.30 They seek to acquire a controlling interest in 
undervalued or under-managed companies that they can grow or improve with a view toward 
eventual sale or public offering.31 The goal is to transform these under-performing and 
undervalued companies into capital efficient and profit generating companies.  
 
Private equity funds typically have a fixed life, usually ten to twelve years, but can be 
extended for up to three additional years. The private equity firm normally has up to five years to 
invest the fund’s committed capital into companies, and then has an additional five to seven 
years to return the capital to its investors.32 Once in control, private equity funds tend to alter the 
structure of their target companies by disposing of assets that the target companies do not use 
efficiently, streamlining the operations of the target companies and replacing or restructuring 
management and the targets business plan to enhance value. They typically hold companies for 
 
27 See Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt, A Primer on Private Equity At Work, Center for Economic and Policy 
Research, Washington DC, February 2012, available at www.cepr.net/documents/publications/private-equity-2012-
02.pdf    
28 Id. 
29 See Houman B. Shadab, Coming Together After the Crisis: Global Convergence of Private Equity and Hedge 
Funds, 29 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 603 2009. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340731.  
30 See Brian Cheffins and John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity,  33 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 200, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982114.  
31 See Felix Barber and Michael Goold, The Strategic Secret of Private Equity, Harvard Business Review, 
September 2007, available at http://hbr.org/2007/09/the-strategic-secret-of-private-equity/ar/1;  See Robert Shapiro 
& Nam Pham, The Role of Private Equity in US Capital Markets, (2008) available at 
http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/Role-ofPEinUSCapitalMarkets-FINAL.pdf (“the strategic objective of all 
private equity transactions and subsequent operations is to raise the value of the acquired company, which normally 
involves steps to raise its earnings.”).   
32 See Appelbaum and Batt, supra note 27. 
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3-5 years and then sell them or take them public hoping to realize a gain as a result of the 
increased value they have created through their restructuring and reorganization efforts during 
their period of ownership. As a “closed-end” vehicle, investors in the fund cannot withdraw their 
funds until the fund is terminated (as opposed to mutual funds where investors can withdraw 
their funds whenever they like).33 Therefore, private equity investments are very illiquid with 
investors committing their capital for the full investment window.  
 
The private equity firm or general partner is usually compensated in three ways. First, the 
general partner earns an annual management fee, typically a percentage of capital committed, 
and then, as investments are realized, a percentage of capital employed.34 This management fee 
is usually two percent. Second, the general partner earns a share of the profits of the fund, 
referred to as “carried interest,” that almost always equals twenty percent (once a hurdle rate of 
return has been achieved).35 Finally, some general partners charge deal and monitoring fees to 
the companies in which they invest. The extent to which these fees are shared with the limited 
partners is a somewhat contentious issue in fundraising negotiations. These fees are commonly 
split 50–50 between general and limited partners. 
 
The role of leverage is central in the private equity investment strategy and the use of 
debt has always been a substantial part of private equity transactions as it increases the return on 
equity. Private equity funds usually acquire companies through the use of leveraged buyout 
financing, taking advantage of the cheaper cost of debt and the deductibility of interest 
expenses.36 They use the assets of the target company as collateral to borrow the funds necessary 
to acquire the company and the debt remains on the target company’s balance sheet as part of its 
capital structure. Therefore, private equity funds seek companies that can generate sufficient cash 
flow to service the debt that is incurred to acquire them.37 A typical private equity investment 
will utilize a relatively small portion of equity and a large pool of debt financing, with the 
objective being to deliver superior risk-adjusted returns by improving the financial performance, 
operations and growth profile of the acquired companies.38 Because such a large portion of the 
fund’s investment is paid for with debt, the fund realizes a greater return on its own equity 
investment when it liquidates that interest in the future.39 Assuming the return on the total value 
invested by the fund is higher than the interest the fund pays on the borrowed debt, leverage 
increases return on equity. In a traditional private equity transaction the deal is usually financed 
 
33 See Jeremy Stein, “Why Are Most Funds Open-End? Competition and the Limits of Arbitrage,” (2005), Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 120, February, 247-272. 
34 See Eileen Appelbaum and Batt, supra note 27. 
35 Id. 
36 See Lowenstein, supra note 24. [The cost of servicing the debt is reduced by virtue of the fact that interest 
payments are tax deductible, whereas dividend payments are not. Thus, every dollar paid to the company’s senior 
lenders and bondholders in fact only costs the company a fraction of that amount. The benefits of this tax treatment 
ultimately accrue to the fund that owns the company and its investors]. 
37 See Josh Lerner and Ann Leamon, A Note on European Private Equity, (May 6, 2011). Harvard Business School 
Finance Case No. 811-103. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012738   
38 See Arthur B. Laffer et al, The Private Equity Edge: How Private Equity Players and The World’s Top Companies 
Build Value and Wealth, (1st Ed. 2009). 




with anywhere between seventy and ninety percent debt and the remaining portion is financed 
with equity commitments of the private equity fund.40   
 
Private equity funds buy businesses the way that individuals purchase houses, namely 
with a down payment or deposit supported by a mortgage.41 A major difference, however, is that 
homeowners pay their own mortgages, whereas private equity funds require the companies they 
buy for their portfolios to take out these loans, thus making them, not the private equity fund or 
its investors, responsible for the loans.42 The only money that the private equity fund and its 
investors have at risk is the initial equity they put up as a down payment.43 In essence, leveraged 
buyout financing is very similar to a nonrecourse mortgage in which an acquirer buys an asset 
borrowing funds against this asset. 
 
Consider the individual who purchases a house for $100,000 with a $10,000 down 
payment and a mortgage for $90,000. If the house appreciates in value by $30,000 to $130,000, 
the buyer will have a net gain of $20,000 (the $30,000 appreciation less the down payment of 
$10,000) reflecting a 200% return on the initial investment of $10,000. If the house declines in 
value by $30,000 and the homeowner defaults on the loan, the bank will foreclose on the house. 
In this scenario, the individual will lose only his or her initial investment of $10,000. The bank 
will lose $20,000. A very similar logic applies when private equity funds acquire companies 
putting up very little equity and financing the rest of the purchase through the use of debt. The 
use of leverage by private equity funds simply magnifies the return to the fund investors from its 
successful investments while minimizing the losses from its unsuccessful efforts. 
 
Because such a large percentage of a typical private equity investment is financed with 
debt, the more debt that a private equity fund can secure (typically loans from banks or other 
financial lenders) and the cheaper it is to secure the debt, the less of its own capital it will have to 
use to purchase the initial interest in the portfolio company. Therefore, when the fund eventually 
sells the interest, the investment will be more profitable because the fund will internalize more of 
the gains from the sale, resulting in greater return on equity. The debt used by private equity 
funds almost always includes a loan portion that is senior and secured and is arranged by a bank 
or an institutional investor. The debt component in leveraged buyout transaction also often 
includes a junior, unsecured portion that is financed by either high yield bonds or “mezzanine 
debt (debt which is subordinated to the senior debt).44  
 
By way of illustration, suppose a new private equity fund begins with $1,000,000 of its 
own capital obtained through capital commitments from limited partners. Then suppose that the 
private equity fund can borrow $15,000,000 from banks or other lenders at an interest rate of 6%. 
Then the private equity fund invests the entire $16,000,000 in a single investment, which the 
general partner is confident will generate an annual return of 15%. The private equity fund plans 
to return the borrowed capital plus interest at the end of the year. Therefore, the value of the 
 
40 Id. 
41 See Appelbaum and Batt, supra note 27. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Harvard Business Review (Sept.-Oct. 1989), revised 
1997. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=146149 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.146149. 
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investment at the end of the year will be $18,400,000 and the fund will pay back the banks and 
other lenders $15,900,000 ($15,000,000 in principal and $900,000 in interest). The fund would 
be then left with a total of $2,500,000 and a net positive gain of $1,500,000 once it subtracts the 
initial investment of $1,000,000. This example reflects a 150% return on an investment that had 
an unleveraged return of 15%. This financing technique is reinforced by the fact that after the 
private equity fund liquidates its position in a portfolio company the debt that was used to 
purchase the fund’s initial controlling interest ultimately remains on that company’s balance 
sheet as a part of its capital structure. This is the primary reason for the use of leverage and 
leveraged buyout financing techniques by private equity funds. 
 
It is important to note that the use of leverage by private equity funds may have a 
significant impact on investment results because, while it may enhance investment gains as 
described above, it may also magnify investment losses.45 It magnifies the potential positive or 
negative impact that any change in a company’s earnings may have on the return on equity.46 
  
As the use of leveraged buyout financing has accelerated since the 1980s, mainly as a 
result of low interest rates and innovative financial engineering, concerns about financial 
stability and the risk associated with excessive leverage have been raised. Much of the criticism 
of the private equity industry has been focused on this concept and the use of leverage, namely 
that the use of leverage increases the risk of insolvency and that in many cases “companies will 
need to devote at least half their yearly cash flow to meet interest payments on their debt.”47 
Regulators, policymakers and commentators argue that there is a cost to using massive debt in a 
company’s capital structure. That cost is the fact that financial risk increases when a company 
uses extensive leverage because debt and interest must be paid regardless of whether a company 
is profitable and generates sufficient operating cash flows. 
 
Additionally, if a portfolio company of a private equity fund experiences distress or 
enters bankruptcy, the equity partners in the fund will lose their stake in this company and 
creditors can seize the property or business, but the private equity firm that sponsored the private 
equity investment is not liable for the fund’s losses. Therefore, the occasional bankruptcy of a 
portfolio company will have very little effect on the fund returns and even less on the private 
equity firm that sponsored the investment, although it may be devastating for the failed company, 
its employees, creditors, supplies, vendors and sometimes the economy as a whole.   
 
B. HEDGE FUNDS 
 
 Despite the prevalence of hedge funds and the massive attention that hedge funds have 
received over the last several years, neither U.S. nor European regulators have been able to 
formulate a legal or statutory definition of what constitutes a “hedge fund”.48 There is also no 
 
45 See Andreas Heed, "Regulation of Private Equity." Journal of Banking Regulation 12 (2010): 24-47. 
46 Id. 
47 See Julie Creswell, Profits for Buyout Firms as Company Debt Soared, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2009, at A1 
(explaining that the Simmons Bedding Company had been driven into bankruptcy by private equity firms that “were 
able to buy companies like Simmons with borrowed money and put down relatively little of their own cash”); See 
also Serena Ng, Buyout Bonanza Compels Firms To Pile on Debt, WALL ST J., Dec. 27, 2006, at C1 (“Private-
equity investors . . . are pushing companies further out on a limb.”). 
48 See Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. Davis Bus. L. J. 323, 366 (2007). 
15 
 
definition of the term “hedge fund” under U.S. securities laws. Rather, “hedge funds are typically 
described as lightly regulated private investment vehicles that try to maximize risk-adjusted 
returns for investors as compared to simply beating some index or the market as a whole.”49  
 
A hedge fund is a private pool of capital through which investments are made using a 
strategy designed to “hedge” against risks in equity investments.50 The term “hedge fund” comes 
from the funds’ traditional role as a hedging vehicle against downturns in more conventional 
investments.51 These funds tend to trade actively and usually try to exploit market inefficiencies 
by taking positions based on market moves. In recent years the term has been expanded to cover 
funds that employ very complex investment strategies and financial instruments. Hedge funds 
have regularly been structured as limited partnerships or limited liability companies, to benefit 
from the flow-through tax treatment with fund investors being limited partners or LLC members, 
respectively, who acquire their interests in the fund in private placements that are exempt from 
the registration requirements of the federal securities laws.52 Hedge fund managers usually 
charge a management fee equal to 2% of the total asset value of the fund and a performance 
incentive fee equal to 20% of any profits earned by the fund.  
   
Although private equity and hedge funds are often lumped together, it is important to 
distinguish between the two categories, particularly for the purpose of understanding and 
evaluating Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. Hedge funds are short-term investors which seek to 
profit from short-term speculative investments, much of which is not even directed at company 
stock.53 They usually have holding periods of weeks or months, not years. Hedge funds differ 
from private equity in that hedge funds implement investment strategies while private equity is 
an asset class in itself. A hedge fund typically engages in short-term trading of financial 
instruments and compensates its managers on an annual or quarterly basis.54 Hedge funds 
generally implement a wide array of investment strategies including long or short positions in 
equity securities, arbitrage, emerging markets and event driven investments. They usually invest 
in stocks, bonds, currencies, options or commodities (or any combination of these categories) 
and aim to capitalize on short-term gains, using a variety of trading strategies and derivative 
financial instruments. The goal is to produce risk-adjusted positive returns from various market 
opportunities.55 They also seek to maintain relative liquidity so that their investors may invest 
and disinvest at regular intervals ranging from monthly to annually. Unlike mutual funds that 
own very diversified portfolios, hedge funds sometimes invest a large amount of money in one 
single position.  
 
 
49 See Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and 
Mission, (March 24, 2006). Washington U. School of Law Working Paper No. 06-03-02. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=893190 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.893190. 
50 See Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and The Collapse of Long Term Capital Management, 13 J. Econ. Persp. 
189, 190 (1999); Ralph S, Janvey, Hedge Funds, 21 REV. Of SEC & COMMODITIES REG. 91, 91 (1998). 
51 Id. 
52 See Paredes, supra note 49; See also Alexander Ineichen and Kurt Silberstein, AIMA’S Roadmap to Hedge Funds, 
53, 132 (Nov 2008). 
53 See Davidoff supra  note 23.  
54 Id. 
55 See Paredes, supra note 49. 
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By contrast, a private equity fund typically takes long-term management positions in 
mature companies and compensates the fund managers once every several years upon the sale of 
the fund’s assets. Hedge funds may be activist investors that try to influence corporate 
governance, but they typically do not acquire controlling interests. They use extensive leverage 
and trade complex financial instruments such as derivatives and credit default swaps. In contrast, 
private equity funds nearly always acquire a controlling interest in an operating business and 
implement restructuring and reorganization measures with the objective of a future public 
offering or sale of the business. 
 
Hedge funds traditionally combine long and short positions. They concentrate rather than 
diversify and they borrow and leverage their portfolio.56 These strategies allow them to hedge 
their bets on stock or commodity prices. By combing these two strategies (“long” bets that some 
positions will rise with “short” bets that some positions will fall), “hedge funds essentially try to 
minimize the risk of loss in any one position.”57 This strategy “allows for capital appreciation 
while hedging against the risk of loss due to different events in the market.”58 In other words, by 
shorting stocks, a hedge fund can limit its exposure if the market, or a particular industry or 
geographic region dropped, while at the same time reaping gains in other positions if the market 
rose.59 Under this hedge fund model, the primary objective is to generate absolute returns 
regardless of market conditions.60         
 
C.  VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS  
Venture capital is a subset of private equity and the key difference between the two types 
of funds lies in their investment focus.61 Whereas venture capital funds usually invest in early-
stage pre-revenue startup companies, private equity funds invest in companies along all stages of 
a company’s life-cycle (usually more mature operating companies with an established business 
model and track record of performance). Venture capital funds usually finance new companies 
and then take on an active role as the advisor or director to help the new company grow and 
mature, unlike private equity funds which usually acquire controlling positions in their portfolio 
companies and restructure/reorganize existing businesses.62  
 
In all other respects, however, private equity funds and venture capital funds are not so 
different and share the same characteristics. Both are pools of capital assembled by professional 
investment teams from institutional investors and wealthy individuals in private offerings, 
exempt from the registration requirements of U.S. securities laws. The primary objective of both 
venture capital and private equity funds is to build and develop companies for an initial public 
offering or an acquisition. 
 
 
56 See Ordower, supra note 48. 
57 See Lydie Pierre-Louis, Hedge Fund Fraud and the Public Good, (December 21, 2009). Fordham Journal of 
Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. 15, No. 21, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531364 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1531364.  
58 See Alan Murray, Hedge Funds Need to Open Up, Wall St. J., April 5, 2006. 
59 See Pierre-Louis, supra note 57. 
60 Id. 
61 See Valentina Elzon, What’s Private Equity Got To Do With It?, 30 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 691 2010-2011. 
62 See Stephen M. Tuuk, Formation and Operation of Venture Capital Companies, 69 Mich. B. J. 40 1990.  
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Venture capital funds typically do not assume operating control of the businesses they 
invest in. They are active investors but not managers. Private equity funds, on the other hand, 
typically see themselves not as supporting but rather as taking over management of the 
businesses they invest in.63 Additionally, venture capital funds typically do not use leverage or 
borrowed capital. Private equity funds, on the other hand, use debt and usually leverage their 
equity investments by having the target company take on debt that substantially exceeds the 
amount of equity the private equity firm invested. Thus, most private equity investments are in 
the form of leveraged buyouts, as discussed above.  
 
Venture capital investments in high growth and technology companies have had many 
successes over the last three decades. In fact, “some of the best known and most successful 
technology or growth companies and brands in the world are venture backed, including Apple, 
Google, FedEx, Intel, Cisco, Starbucks, eBay, Yahoo, Facebook, Home Depot and many 
others.”64 Throughout its history, venture capital investments have established and built entire 
industry sectors by funding breakthrough technologies and innovations. From “biotechnology to 
information technology to clean technology, thousands of start-up ventures have been brought to 
life, improving the way we live and work each day.”65  
 
The venture capital industry, similar to the private equity sector, is a major driver of 
economic growth and job creation by helping entrepreneurs turn innovative ideas and 
breakthrough technologies into products and services that change the way we live and work.66 
Venture capital funds simply provide the funding and guidance and assume the risks necessary 
for building high-growth companies capable of bringing these technologies and innovations to 
market.67 Making investments at the earliest stages of a company’s development, often before 
the company has any product or revenues, involves significant risk, which severely limits the 
funding sources for such companies.68 Yet, venture capital funds assume this risk together with 
the company founders and other investors by providing capital in exchange for an equity stake in 
the company.69 These features and particularly the willingness to take these risks at an early 
stage of the business make venture capital a very unique asset class. Among the key features that 
venture capital fund managers look for when investing in a portfolio company are a growing 
market for the company's products or technologies, an effective management team, proprietary 
 
63 See Lowenstein, supra  note 24.   
64 See Money Tree Report. 2008. Historical trend data. https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ 
ns/nav.jsp?page=definitions. See also Bygrave, W. and Hunt, S. 2005. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 2004 
Financing Report. Babson Park, MA; London, UK: Babson College-London Business School. 
65 See Venture Impact: The Economic Importance of Venture Backed Companies to the U.S. Economy, 2011 Pages 
6-7, also available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?Itemid=95&id=67&option=com_content &view=article. 
66 Id. 
67 See Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, Venture Capital Investment Cycles: The impact of public markets. Journal of 
Financial Economics 87, no. 1 (January 2008): 1-23. 
68 Id. 
69 See Andrew Zacharakis and Jeffery McMullen, Venture capitalists’ decision making across three countries: An 
institutional theory perspective, (2007) Journal of International Business Studies 38(5): 691-708. 
18 
 
product or technology, a compelling technical or business advantage over competitors, a solid 
business model and an exit strategy.70  
 
During this investment stage, venture capital funds provide more than just funding to the 
growing companies they invest in.71 Typically, they sit on the board of directors and provide 
strategic counsel regarding development and production, making connections to commercialize 
the company’s product and bring technologies to market, aid sales and marketing efforts, 
develop an exit strategy and assisting in hiring key management.72 Additionally, venture capital 
funds also guide the company through multiple rounds of financing to fund its growth and 
operations until the company reaches profitability. The venture capital fund goal is to develop 
and grow the company to a point where it can go public or be acquired by a larger corporation at 
a price that far exceeds the amount of capital invested.73 Once all the investments of a particular 
fund have been liquidated and the proceeds have been distributed to the fund investors, the fund 
ends. In most cases, however, the investors reinvest these earnings in a new fund and the same 
process begins again.74 Once the structure, nature and activities of private equity funds, hedge 
funds and venture capital funds are understood, one can begin to examine how private equity 
funds are regulated.  
D.  THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUNDS 
In reaction to the 2008 financial crisis Congress and the SEC introduced a major 
regulatory reform of the private investment funds industry through the enactment of Title IV of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules75. Title IV has significantly changed the 
regulatory landscape for private investment funds and their managers (fund advisers).76 It 
imposes significant new registration and compliance burdens on managers of private equity 
funds, hedge funds and other private investment funds with assets under management of $150 
million or more.77 Title IV and its implementing rules also establish onerous recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements for registered investment funds and their advisers. Under Dodd-Frank and 
its implementing rules, these funds and their managers must register with the SEC, screen 
potential investors and track information pertaining to such things as their use of leverage, 
including off-balance sheet leverage, their counterparty risk exposure, the amount of assets under 
management, their trading and investment practices and positions, their asset valuation policies 
and practices, the type of assets they hold and side arrangements with different investors in the 
fund.78 The information is to be made available for SEC inspection and for potential filing with 
the SEC.79 Additionally, Title IV and its implementing rules require advisers to private equity 
and hedge funds to maintain records of such other information as the SEC, in consultation with 
 
70 See Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, 76 Harv. Bus. Rev 131, 133-134 (1998). 
71 Id. 
72 See Gompers and Lerner, supra note 67.  
73 Id. 
74 See supra note 65. 
75 See Schapiro, supra  note 4. 
76 See Seth Chertok, A Detailed Analysis of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, 6 VA Law & Bus. Rev. No. 1 Spring 2011.  
77 See supra  note 5. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
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the Financial Stability Oversight Council, determines is necessary and appropriate in the public 
interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.80 Since private 
investment funds like private equity and hedge funds often carry substantial risk and manage 
large assets, this enhanced supervision, SEC registration and record keeping are expected to 
allow regulators to analyze and evaluate the systemic risk associated with these funds, and hold 
fund managers to more stringent reporting and registration requirements.81 The overall objective 
is to monitor systemic risk through increased transparency. This paper will demonstrate that in 
the context of private equity funds, this legislative approach is inadequate, unnecessary and 
inefficient. It falls short of achieving the intended purpose of Title IV and its costs exceed its 
benefits. The discussion that follows examines the pre and post Dodd-Frank regulatory 
environment for private equity funds.  
i) PRE-DODD-FRANK REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, there was very little supervision of private equity funds as 
private investment funds along with their investment advisers were historically exempt from 
registering with the SEC. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”)82 requires 
any person falling within the definition of an “investment adviser” to register with the SEC and 
comply with certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements, unless they qualify for an 
exemption.83 Managers of private investment funds typically are considered to be “investment 
advisers” for purposes of the Advisers Act. Hence, absent an express exemption from 
registration, advisers to private equity funds would need to register with the SEC. However, prior 
to the Dodd-Frank Act, many private equity fund managers avoided registration with the SEC 
under the Advisers Act by relying on the “private investment adviser” exemption which 
exempted firms that: i) had fewer than 15 clients over the course of the preceding 12 months and 
ii) neither had held themselves out generally to the public as an investment adviser nor acted as 
an investment adviser to any registered investment company.84 Private equity fund managers 
relied on this exemption to avoid having to comply with the numerous requirements associated 
with registration, including increased fiduciary burdens, the adoption of compliance policies, 
required record maintenance, various reporting requirements, periodic examination by the SEC 
and restrictions relating to fees and custody of assets.  
 
Under this exemption, private investment advisers (the actual fund managers) could 
manage up to fourteen funds (regardless of the number of investors in the fund), without 
 
80 See Section 404 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The financial stability oversight council was created under the Dodd-
Frank Act to, among other things, “identify risks to the financial stability of the US”. Under Title IV the SEC is 
required to make available to the financial stability oversight council “copies of all reports, documents, records and 
information filed with or provided to the SEC by private equity and hedge fund advisers as the council may consider 
necessary for the purpose of assessing the systemic risk posed by private funds.” 
81 See Chertok, supra note 76. 
82 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C § 80b-1 to -21 (2006). 
83 The term “Investment Adviser” is broadly defined to include “any person, who, for compensation, engages in the 
business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to 
the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular 
business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.” § 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers 
Act. The registration requirement for investment advisers is contained in  
§ 203(a).   
84 See § 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 
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registering with the SEC, since each fund counted as one “client” for purposes of the exemption 
under the Advisers Act.85 The SEC tried to eliminate this provision in 2004 through the 
enactment of the Hedge Fund Rule, which required fund managers to look through to private 
fund investors when counting the number of clients they advise. As a result most private equity 
and hedge fund advisers were no longer able to rely on the “private investment adviser” 
exemption, thereby forcing them to register with the SEC. This effort by the SEC to regulate 
private investment funds was driven primarily by the failure of Long-Term Capital Management 
in 1998. Long-Term Capital Management was a hedge fund specializing in high-risk arbitrage 
trading strategies. The fund used extensive leverage and at its height in 1998, it had $5 billion in 
assets, controlled over $100 billion and had positions whose total worth was over a $1 trillion.86 
Due to its highly leveraged nature and a financial crisis in Russia, the fund sustained massive 
losses and was in danger of defaulting on its loans.87 Had LTCM gone into default, it would have 
triggered a global systemic failure of the financial system and a major financial crisis, caused by 
the massive write-offs the fund’s creditors would have had to make.88 In September 1998, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York stepped in and arranged a $3.6 billion private bailout in 
order to avoid the potential widespread impact of the fund’s collapse and a major financial crisis 
that could have had disastrous consequences to the financial system and the economy as a whole. 
A systematic meltdown of the financial market was thus prevented.  
 
Despite the efforts of the SEC to regulate private investment funds through the Hedge 
Fund Rule, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in the 2006 case of Goldstein v. SEC 
rejected the SEC initiative to eliminate this exemption, thus letting fund managers count their 
private funds as single clients and continue to rely on the private investment adviser exemption.89 
The court held that the rule adopted by the SEC exceeded the SEC’s rule-making authority and 
was thus invalid. This was the first of many attempts by regulators to increase private fund 
regulation, supervision and transparency. Although the Hedge Fund Rule was eventually 
invalidated and rejected by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Goldstein v. SEC, it provides 
an important insight as to the SEC’s view regarding the risks associated with private investment 
funds and private equity funds in particular.90 In enacting the Hedge Fund Rule the SEC was 
more concerned with defining private investment funds so as to exclude private equity and 
venture capital funds from SEC regulation and the registration requirements.91 From the Hedge 
Fund Rule release it is clear that the SEC was simply not concerned with fraud associated with 
private equity funds the way that it was concerned with hedge fund fraud.92 In addition, the SEC 
 
85 Id. 
86 See Barbara George, Lynn Dymally & Maria Boss, The Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge Fund Industry: 
Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U.J.L & Bus. 359, 369, 399 (2009); See also Lydie 
Pierre-Louis, supra note 57.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. (“We propose to define a “private fund” by reference to three characteristics shared by virtually all hedge 
funds, and that differentiate hedge funds from other pooled investment vehicles such as private equity funds or 
venture capital funds”). 
92 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.Reg. 72054 (Dec. 10, 2004), 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279), ("[T]he Commission has not encountered significant enforcement problems 
with advisers with respect to their management of private equity or venture capital funds. In contrast, the 
Commission has developed a substantial record of frauds associated with hedge funds. A key element of hedge fund 
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was also concerned with diverting its limited and already-overburdened resources. It therefore 
decided to focus on hedge funds and allocate its resources to address the more serious problem 
that could potentially lead to a systemic failure and a global financial crisis, like the LTCM 
debacle.93  
 
Additionally, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity funds were able to avoid 
extensive SEC regulation by relying on exemptions from SEC registration under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (the “ICA”).94 The ICA regulates both the organization of companies, 
such as “mutual funds that engage in investing, reinvesting, and trading in securities, and whose 
own securities are offered to the investing public,” as well as what these companies may 
ultimately invest in. Investment companies are usually registered with the SEC pursuant to 
Section 3(a) of the ICA which mandates SEC registration for any “issuer which is or holds itself 
out as being engaged primarily…in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in 
securities.”95 Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity funds were exempt from such 
registration either under: i) Section 3(c)(1) of the ICA, because they had no more than 100 
beneficial owners and did not offer their securities to the public, or ii) Section 3(c)(7) of the ICA, 
because their investors were all “qualified purchasers”, namely individuals or family entities 
with not less than $5 million in investments, or institutions with not less than $25 million in 
investments.96 Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity funds, along with venture capital and 
hedge funds used to fall within the scope of one of these exemptions and avoid the SEC 
registration and reporting requirements.  
ii) POST-DODD-FRANK REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules introduced the most 
significant regulatory change in the history of the private investment fund industry in the United 
States, taking the regulatory oversight of this industry to an unprecedented level.97 Title IV and 
its SEC implementation rules introduced a registration requirement for private investment fund 
managers with the SEC and increased the reporting and disclosure requirements pertaining to 
confidential and proprietary information. These legislative measures focus primarily on 
eliminating excessive risk through SEC supervision and oversight.  
 
Title IV and its implementing rules have replaced the “private investment adviser” 
exemption with new, more narrow exemptions, thereby broadly expanding the Advisers Act’s 
 
advisers' fraud in most of our recent enforcement cases has been the advisers' misrepresentation of their funds' 
performance to current investors, which in some cases was used to induce a false sense of security for investors 
when they might otherwise have exercised their redemption rights."). 
93 Id. ("Because hedge funds are where we have seen a recent growth in fraud enforcement actions, we will focus 
our examination resources on their advisers, rather than on advisers to private equity or venture capital funds, at this 
time."). 
94 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 - 80a-64 (2006). The registration requirements for qualifying investment companies are 
contained in Section 8(a) of the Investment Company Act, codified as 15 USC §§ 80a-1 - 80a-64 (2006). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See Wulf Kaal, Barbara Luppi and Sandra Paterlini, “Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund 
Performance?” (February 1, 2014). University of St. Thomas (Minnesota) Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-09. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2389416.  
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registration requirements for private investment funds and their advisers.98 Through the 
elimination of the private investment adviser exemption, Title IV and its implementing rules  
introduced a general requirement that an investment adviser to any private equity fund or other 
private pool of capital, with assets under management of $150 million or more, must register 
with the SEC, thus bringing the private equity fund managers within the purview of SEC 
regulation. Title IV removed the previous exemptions discussed above in furtherance of 
“providing transparency and preventing potential dangers for systemic risk and investor abuse.”99 
In place of the “private investment adviser exemption”, Title IV and its implementing rules 
added several much more limited exemptions from registration with the SEC. Most importantly, 
advisers to private funds with less than $150 million under management are exempt,100 as well as 
“foreign private advisers”101 and advisers to venture capital funds.102 If a fund adviser is not 
exempt, registration with the SEC will be required and this fund and its advisers will become 
subject to extensive regulatory and supervisory oversight by the SEC.    
 
The primary purpose of Congress in repealing the private investment adviser exemption 
was to require advisers to private investment funds who had previously been considered exempt 
from SEC registration, to register under the Advisers Act.103 This SEC registration requirement 
is intended to limit and control systemic risk, prevent fraud, provide more transparency and 
information to investors and help the SEC to control the activities of “market participants 
operating in the shadows of our markets.”104 Title IV and its implementing rules also 
significantly increase the record-keeping and reporting obligations applicable to fund managers 
of private equity funds. Under Title IV and its implementing rules, these funds and their 
managers (fund advisers) must also screen potential investors and track information pertaining to 
such things as their use of leverage, including off-balance sheet leverage, their counterparty risk 
exposure, the amount of assets under management, risks metrics, products used by the fund 
managers, their trading and investment practices and positions, their asset valuation policies and 
practices, the type of assets they hold and side arrangements with different investors in the 
fund.105 The information is to be made available for SEC inspection and for potential filing with 
the SEC.106 Additionally, Title IV and its implementing rules require advisers to private equity 
and hedge funds to maintain records of such other information as the SEC, in consultation with 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council, determines is necessary and appropriate in the public 
interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment and analysis of systemic risk.107 
They require the SEC to examine various factors including the investment strategy, size, and 
governance of investment advisers in order to assess and determine the systemic risk associated 
with private investment funds and their activities. 
 
 
98 See § 403 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
99 Id. 
100 See § 408 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
101 See § 403 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
102 See § 407 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
103 See Chertok, supra note 76. 
104 See 155 Cong. Rec. H14419-20 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski); See also 156 CONG. 
REC.S5925 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). 
105 Id. See also SEC Form PF 2012 and SEC Form ADV 2012. 
106 Id.  
107 See Section 404 of the Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 80.  
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The data collected by the SEC under Title IV will be shared with the systemic risk 
regulator and the SEC will report to Congress annually on how it uses this data to reduce 
systemic risk in the financial system and protect investors and market integrity.108 In effect, these 
new standards seek to fill the regulatory gap that previously existed by extending the registration, 
disclosure and reporting requirements under the Advisers Act.109 SEC former Chairman Mary L. 
Schapiro stated with regard to Title IV that: “these rules will fill a key gap in the regulatory 
landscape…in particular, our proposal will give the SEC, and the public, insight into hedge funds 
and other private fund managers who previously conducted their work under the radar and 
outside the vision of regulators.”110 By requiring private equity fund managers to register with 
the SEC as investment advisers, Title IV and its implementing rules effectively seek to end the 
“shadow” financial system.111  
 
To register with the SEC, fund advisers must complete Form ADV, which requires 
substantial disclosures to the SEC and to the adviser’s clients.112 This form is the main data 
collection tool the SEC uses to oversee investment advisers. Form ADV must be updated at least 
annually and, with respect to certain key information, at the time of certain changes in the 
reported information. Form ADV is divided into Part 1 and Part 2 and is updated by the 
registered investment adviser at the end of each year.113 Part 1 requires “information about the 
investment adviser’s business, ownership, clients, employees, business practices, affiliations, and 
any disciplinary events of the adviser or its employees.”114 Part 2 requires registered advisers to 
provide new and prospective clients with a brochure and brochure supplements containing most 
of the information provided in form ADV’s Part 1.115 All of the information disclosed under 
form ADV is fully available to the public. The goal is to provide a level of transparency that will 
assist investors in making their due diligence, and will deter fraud and facilitate earlier discovery 
of potential misconduct.116  
 
 
108 See Kaal, Luppi and Paterlini, supra note 97. 
109 See H.R. Rep. No 111-517, at 865 (2010) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Conf.), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrp517/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt517.pdf; [“By expanding the reporting 
requirements  of private equity fund advisers to the SEC, Title IV is intended to provide greater protections for 
investors and the financial system”]. 
110 See Press Release, U.S. Sec & Exchange Commission, “SEC Adopts Dodd Frank Act Amendments to Investment 
Advisers Act”, (June 22, 2011), available at:  http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm.  
111 See Davidoff, supra note 23, [“Shadow – in terms of the fact that hedge funds and private equity funds were 
always viewed as financial institutions operating behind the scenes, in the shadows, outside the purview of the SEC 
and with very little regulation or oversight”]. 
112 Id. 
113 See PWC, “A Close Look – The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Reporting by 




116 See SEC Release No. IA-3308 (Oct. 31, 2011) (SEC-CFTC joint adopting release). The SEC implementing rules 
were presented in two adopting releases: Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
Release No. IA-3221 (Jun. 22, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3221.pdf; and Exemptions 
for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under 




In addition to mandatory registration requirements, the amended Form ADV, under Title 
IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules, requires substantial disclosure of 
information regarding the fund structure, ownership, the gross asset value, the investment 
strategy, investment products used by the fund, the scope of services provided and the fund’s use 
of consultants. In addition to the filing requirements under the amended Form ADV, Title IV and 
its implementing rules also require registered fund advisers to file periodic reports on Form PF. 
The reporting requirement in Form PF is intended to enable the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council to monitor and control systemic risk in the U.S. financial markets and to facilitate 
investigations and examinations by the SEC and the CFTC. 
 
Another important change under Title IV and its implementing rules comes in the form of 
increased state supervision, as it raised the assets under management threshold for federal 
regulation of investment advisers.117 Title IV and its implementing rules modify the allocation of 
responsibility for mid-sized fund advisers between state regulators and the SEC. They establish 
the requirements for investment advisers to register with the state authorities if they have assets 
under management above $100 million.118 The sections that follow examine the case against the 
regulation of private equity funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing 
rules and analyze whether Title IV represents the right approach to the regulation of private 
equity funds.  
 
III. THE CASE AGAINST THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS UNDER TITLE IV OF 
THE DODD-FRANK ACT – IS TITLE IV THE RIGHT ANSWER? 
 
The following section of this paper will: i) analyze the political economy of the Dodd-
Frank Act and its impact on the regulation of the private equity sector; ii) examine the political 
economy of financial regulation following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable  
v. SEC and the importance, role and application of cost benefit analysis in financial regulation 
and particularly private equity regulation under Title IV and its implementing rules; iii) examine 
the economic theory of regulation underlying the Dodd-Frank Act and its relevance to the private 
equity sector; and iv) challenge Title IV’s reliance on disclosure as the primary method of 
reducing systemic risk and protecting fund investors. This section of the paper will argue that the 
regulation of private equity funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing 
rules is inadequate, unwarranted and flawed. It is unnecessarily costly, inconsistent with the 
intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and its underlying theory of regulation, too disclosure-
focused, based on fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of private equity and does not 
properly address the risks and problems that led to the 2008 financial crisis. It will not 
accomplish the legislation’s purpose of helping identify and reduce systemic risk in the U.S. 
financial system and will not make the financial system more stable or less risky. It follows the 
traditional post-crisis legislative pattern which is usually excessive, burdensome, flawed and 
populist in nature.  
 
 
117 See Kaal, Luppi and Paterlini, supra note 97. 
118 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (Dodd-Frank Act § 410). 
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Furthermore, this section of the paper will take the position that Title IV of the Dodd-
Frank Act and its implementing rules do not meet the economic analysis and cost benefit 
justification standards set by the D.C. Circuit court in the Business Roundtable decision. The 
SEC in implementing Title IV, failed to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis and to 
consider the impact of this legislation on efficiency, competition and capital formation. It failed 
to articulate a satisfactory and reasoned explanation for its regulatory actions, including a 
rational connection between the pre-crisis conduct and failures it was trying to address and the 
regulatory choices made. This section of the paper will argue that Title IV and its implementing 
rules are not supported by i) the cost benefit analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after 
the decision in Business Roundtable, and ii) any other compelling argument demonstrating that 
the benefits of Title IV are greater than its costs. 
 
Like any other post-crisis financial reform legislation, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act 
and its implementing rules may have satisfied a political need, but will not benefit the financial 
market or the economy as a whole, will not improve investor welfare and will not reduce the 
risks that private equity funds may pose to the financial system. They go beyond the concerns 
that led to the 2008 financial crisis and do not represent the proper legislative response that is 
geared toward correcting and mitigating the failures that actually led to the 2008 financial crisis. 
Additionally, the economic theory of regulation underlying the Dodd-Frank Act does not support 
the regulation of private equity funds or any government intervention in the private equity sector. 
 
This section of the paper will further argue that this government intervention in the 
private equity sector was driven by the political pressure on Congress to quickly launch a 
comprehensive reform of the financial system, following the 2008 financial crisis. It is a 
reflection of the political and economic environment following the 2008 financial crisis. It 
represents a questionable public policy decision that does not adequately address the propensity 
of the financial sector to put the entire system at risk, and fails to protect the benefits that private 
equity funds bring to the national economy. It is too broad, excessive, disclosure-focused and its 
targeting of the private equity industry is simply unwarranted and misguided. 
 
 
A. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
 
The history of financial regulation in the U.S. suggests that financial reforms are usually 
adopted after a major financial crisis or market crash.119 The Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were adopted following the 1929 stock market collapse and the 
Great Depression.120 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted following the collapse of 
Enron and WorldCom and the corporate accounting scandals of the early 2000s.121 Finally, the 
Dodd-Frank Act was enacted following the 2008 financial crisis and the near-collapse of the 
 
119 See John Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and 
Systemic Risk Perpetuated (January 9, 2012). Cornell Law Review, 2012; Columbia Law and Economics Working 
Paper No. 414. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1982128.  
120 Id. 
121 Id. For a description of the financial irregularity and accounting restatements in the era leading to the enactment 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see John Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and Economic History of 
the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269 (2004). 
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entire financial system.122 In the words of Professor John Coffee, “In the world of financial 
regulation, experience has shown – since at least the time of the South Seas Bubble three 
hundred years ago – that only after a catastrophic market collapse, can legislators and regulators 
overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive “reform” 
legislation.”123 Professor Coffee further explains that regulatory intensity increases after a market 
crash and that “in each of these cases, the comprehensive reform legislation that followed in the 
wake of the market collapse showed hints of the public’s desire for retribution.”124 These post-
crisis reforms are usually a response to public outrage prompted by a financial crisis or market 
crash. Professor Stephen Bainbridge also describes the phenomenon that financial reforms tend 
to follow market turmoil as the “boom-bust-regulate pattern that characterizes U.S. financial 
regulation.”125  
 
Before we examine the political economy of the Dodd-Frank Act and its impact on the 
regulation of the private equity sector under Title IV and its implementing rules, it is worth 
pausing to consider why is it that financial reform legislation seems only to be introduced after a 
market crash or financial crisis. Professor Coffee further explains this legislative pattern by 
reference to a basic theory of political science.126 U.S. Investors and shareholders, in Professor 
Coffee’s view, are naturally “dispersed, poorly organized, have limited or diffused political 
power and so constitute a classic latent group”.127 In contrast, the financial services industry is 
well organized, has greater resources, can focus on the important issues concerning this industry 
and has an incentive to maintain a powerful lobbying effort and presence.128 Therefore, “such 
latent groups of shareholders or investors tend to be dominated by smaller, but more cohesive 
and better funded special interest groups, (representing the financial industry) in the competition 
to shape legislation and influence regulatory and public policy.”129 Professor Coffee further 
explains that “groups representing U.S. investors and shareholders are likely to be at a severe 
disadvantage in competing with well-funded business lobbies.”130 However, this relationship and 
domination by the financial services industry, in Professor Coffee’s view, changes following a 
market crash or financial crisis and creates political pressure for new regulation.131 This change 
and political pressure create the right environment for the introduction of a financial reform as 
well as opportunities for “political entrepreneurs” to promote their agenda. In the words of 
 
122 See Acharya et al, supra  note 1.  
123 See Coffee, supra note 119. For the view that securities regulation, over the last 300 years, has depended on 
market crashes to fuel it, See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years of Evidence,75 
Wash. U. L. Q. 849 (1997). 
124 Id. In the case of Sarbanes-Oxley certain criminal penalties are set forth in Section 902 to 906 of the Act. In the 
case of Dodd-Frank Act, Section 748 sets forth elaborate provisions to protect and subsidize “whistle-blowers” who 
report misconduct to the SEC. Both provisions seek to detect and punish misconducts.  
125 See Stephen Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II (September 7, 2010). 
UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1673575; 
See Stephen Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings (November 2005). NYU, Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 05-31. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=849585 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.849585 (noting that “only after a scandal arises does the SEC and Congress typically 
move forward with new comprehensive sets of regulations”). 





131 See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hou. L. Rev. 77,79 (2003). 
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Professor Coffee, “In crises, including market crashes, political entrepreneurs gain attention and 
electoral success, by exploiting the popular discontent. Essentially, these entrepreneurs assume 
the transaction costs of organizing otherwise latent interest groups in order to secure election (or 
re-election) by assisting the public to overcome entrenched business interests.”132 In other words, 
the occurrence of a market crash or financial crisis simply interrupts the domination of the latent 
groups by smaller groups representing the powerful financing industry and creates the right 
environment for political entrepreneurs to take action, promote their agenda and push for 
financial reform legislation.    
 
Professor Bainbridge also examines this legislative pattern of post-crisis financial reforms 
and emphasizes the populist pressure for new regulation following the occurrence of a market 
crash or financial crisis.133 It is this public and political pressure for action that drives post-crisis 
reform legislation. In the words of Professor Bainbridge, “When the bubble inevitably bursts, 
investigators reviewing the rubble begin to turn up evidence of speculative excess and even 
outright rampant fraud. Investors burnt by losses from the breaking of the bubble and outraged 
by evidence of misconduct by corporate insiders and financial bigwigs create populist pressure 
for new regulation.”134 Professor Bainbridge also refers to the populist outrage that drives 
Congress to take action after a market crash or financial crisis. In his words, “It is in the post-
bubble environment, when scandals and economic reversals occur and when corporate 
transactions grab the attention of the American public and the U.S. Congress, that Congress often 
acts.”135 He further explains that because such post-crisis periods usually involve “an upswing in 
populist anger and accompanying intense public pressure for action, they offer “windows of 
opportunity to well-positioned policy entrepreneurs to market their preferred, ready-made 
solutions when there is little time for reflective deliberation”. 
 
Professor Larry Ribstein and Professor Roberta Romano have also demonstrated that this 
post-crisis legislative pattern is a reoccurring phenomenon in U.S. financial regulation going 
back even before the Nineteenth Century.136 Professor Stuart Banner also analyzes this post-
crisis legislative pattern and explains that: “the reason for the association is that deep-seated 
popular suspicion of speculation comes in bad financial times to dominate otherwise popular 
support for markets, resulting in the expansion of regulation. That is to say, financial exigencies 
embolden critics of markets to push their regulatory agenda. They are able to play on the strand 
of popular opinion that is hostile to speculation and markets because the general public is more 
amenable to regulation after experiencing financial losses.”137 The Dodd-Frank Act is clearly the 
latest example of this post-crisis legislative pattern driven by the political pressure and public 
outrage following the 2008 financial crisis and the near-collapse of the entire financial system.  
 
Several commentators and academic scholars have criticized this post-crisis legislative 
pattern and argued that financial reforms adopted after a financial crisis or market crash are 
 
132 Anthony Downs argues that only during periods of intense public pressure for change, can legislative inertia and 
interest group veto power be overcome and reform legislation passed. See Anthony Downs, Up and Down with 
Ecology – “The Issue-Attention Cycle”, 28 Pub. Int. 38 (1972). 
133 See Bainbridge, supra note 125. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. See also Mark J. Roe, Washington and Delaware as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 17 (2009). 
136 See Ribstein, supra note 131 and Romano, supra note 8. 
137 See Banner, supra note 123. 
28 
 
usually flawed, misdirected, overbroad and excessive. They are not supported by a compelling 
cost-benefit argument and result in “quack corporate governance”138 or “bubble laws”.139 These 
scholars argue that such post-crisis legislation is undesirable and should be discouraged because 
it tends to be hasty, rushed, populist in nature and enacted in an environment of political pressure 
that does not facilitate careful consideration of its unintended consequences.140 Such post-crisis 
legislation is heavily influenced by the post-crisis political and economic environment and often 
goes beyond the measures necessary and adopts unwarranted substantive rules, reflecting poor 
public policy. The claim is that Congress can do substantial harm when it legislates in haste, 
right after a market crash or financial crisis. The excessive influence over the political process in 
the aftermath of a market crash or financial crisis usually goes too far and prevents capital 
markets from realizing their full potential.141 The result of this legislative pattern is usually over-
regulation which is costly, inefficient, unnecessary and counter-productive to the economy as a 
whole. Additionally, the sense of urgency that is usually associated with “the need to make 
significant reforms in the near-term greatly increases the chance that policymakers will make 
consequential mistakes and overlook potential implications.”142  
 
This criticism has been specifically directed at the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-
Frank Act.143 This part of the paper will examine this criticism in the context of private equity 
regulation and Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. It will analyze the political economy of Title IV 
and demonstrate that like any other post-crisis legislation, Title IV may have satisfied the 
political need of the political entrepreneurs and interest groups pushing for private fund 
regulation, but it will not benefit the financial market or the economy as a whole and will not 
improve investor welfare. Title IV is an example of this legislative pattern and the notion that 
legislating in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis is a formula for poor public policy 
making as well as excessive, costly, unnecessary, inefficient and overbroad legislation, which is 
often not supported by any empirical academic literature. It goes beyond the concerns that led to 
the 2008 financial crisis and does not represent the proper legislative response that is geared 
toward correcting and mitigating the actual problems and failures that led to the 2008 financial 
crisis. 
   
  In 2005 Professor Roberta Romano described the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as flawed 
legislation and “quack corporate governance.”144 She observed that post-crisis financial reforms 
are usually excessive and that “despite Enron and WorldCom being the claimed rationale, the 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act bear absolutely no relation to the source of the firm's 
demise.”145 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act appeared to be nothing more than a rush and hasty response 
 
138 See Romano, supra note 8. 
139  See Bainbridge, supra note 125. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See Saule Omarova and Adam Feibelman. Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A process for reforming Financial 
Regulation , 39 U. Mem. L. Rev . 881-882 (2009) (discussing the risks of a broad regulatory response to the current 
financial crisis). 
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of regulators “triggered by the immediacy of politics and the panic of American investors”.146 
She also argued that the corporate governance provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were not 
supported by any empirical academic literature and resulted in a hasty, burdensome and 
unwarranted legislation which falls short of achieving its stated objectives.147 She further 
suggested that the political pressure after a market crash or financial crisis “tends to give 
advantages to interest groups and other policy entrepreneurs who have prepackaged purported 
solutions that can be readily adapted into legislative form.”148 She explained that “many of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions were recycled ideas that had been advocated for quite some time by 
corporate governance entrepreneurs.”149 Professor Bainbridge goes further, and suggests that 
“Unfortunately, because the policy entrepreneurs tend to be critics of markets and corporations, 
bubble laws often impose regulation that penalizes or outlaws potentially useful devices and 
practices and more generally discourages risk-taking by punishing negative results and reducing 
the rewards for success.”150 Both Professor Romano and Professor Bainbridge agree that this 
post-crisis legislative pattern has real adverse economic consequences. They raise concerns that 
the U.S. dominant position in the global capital markets has eroded and that U.S. capital markets 
are becoming overly regulated and less competitive.151 Other scholars have also argued that the 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created significant new compliance costs that have had a 
major negative effect on the economy and the competitiveness of the U.S. capital market.152 
These compliance costs are the reason for a major increase in the number of public companies 
deciding to go private and private companies contemplating a public offering in Europe rather 
than the U.S.153 In the wake of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act “capital flight” was documented in 
several studies as precipitated by increased regulation and compliance costs in the U.S.154 It was 
also observed that U.S. capital markets were likely to be penalized for over regulation.155 
 
In 2010 Professor Stephen Bainbridge criticized post-crisis financial reforms and used the 
corporate governance provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act to demonstrate the concerns associated 
 
146 See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 52 (2002) (describing the apparent panic that existed at the time of the passage of the 
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Potential Issues with Reliance on Independent Directors for Prevention of Corporate Fraud, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 641, 641 (2005) (arguing that the public outcry stemming from the corporate scandals “triggered a response 
by Congress that in some ways favored the immediacy of politics over long-standing policy”). 
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Paper No. 11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=956987.  
153 Id. 
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with the post-crisis legislative pattern. He argued that the corporate governance provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act are excessive, too broad, misdirected and also qualify for the description of 
“quack corporate governance” or “bubble laws.”156 He noted that “bubble laws often impose 
regulations that penalize or outlaw potentially useful devices and practices as a result of the 
political climate in which they are introduced.”157 He further defined the terms “quack corporate 
governance” and “bubble laws” and identified “eight key characteristics of post-crisis financial 
reforms: 1) the new law is a bubble act, enacted in response to a major negative economic event; 
2) it is enacted in a crisis environment; 3) it is a response to a populist backlash against 
corporations and/or markets; 4) it is adopted at the federal rather than the state level; 5) it 
transfers power from the states to the federal government; 6) interest groups that are strong at the 
federal level but weak at the Delaware level support it; 7) typically, it is not a novel proposal, but 
rather a longstanding agenda item of some powerful interest groups; and 8) the empirical 
evidence cited in support of the proposal is, at best, mixed and often shows the proposal to be 
unwise.”158 Professor Bainbridge uses the corporate governance provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Act to demonstrate how post-crisis financial reforms are burdensome, excessive, too broad, fall 
short of achieving their stated objectives and result in “quack corporate governance” or “bubble 
laws.”159 For example, one of the provisions he is using in his criticism of the post-crisis 
legislative pattern is Section 953 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
 
Section 953 requires additional disclosure about certain compensation matters, including 
pay-for-performance and the ratio between the CEO’s total compensation and the median total 
compensation for all other company employees.160 This requirement is extremely cumbersome. 
In the words of Professor Bainbridge, “it practically means that for every employee, the company 
would have to calculate and analyze the salary, bonus, stock awards, stock option awards, non-
equity incentive plan compensation, change in pension value and all other forms of 
compensation. This information would be extremely time-consuming to collect and analyze, 
making it almost impossible for a company with tens of thousands of employees worldwide to 
comply with this section.”161 The cost of compliance with Section 953 will be enormous with 
little benefit to investors, the financial system or the economy as a whole.162 Congress, in 
adopting Section 953, clearly sought to correct some of the executive compensation abuses 
believed to have contributed to the 2008 financial crisis (which is a valid and legitimate goal by 
itself).163 However, the end result is simply a burdensome and unfeasible provision as well as a 
great example of Congress’s tendency to over-legislate and over-regulate in the aftermath of a 
financial crisis.164 Congress clearly did not take into consideration the unintended negative 
consequences of Section 953 and adopted a substantive rule which is simply too broad, 
unnecessary and driven by political considerations and agendas.165 In the words of Professor 
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Bainbridge: “this provision is part of a key interest group’s agenda and should also be seen as 
part of the populist backlash against corporations and markets……the law taps into public anger 
at the increasing disparity between the faltering incomes of middle America and the largely 
recession-proof multimillion-dollar remuneration of the typical corporate chief.”166  
 
The following section of this paper will apply Professor Romano’s and Professor 
Bainbridge’s criticism of the post-crisis legislative pattern and the theory of “quack corporate 
governance” and “bubble laws” to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the regulation of the 
private equity sector. It will demonstrate that Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act actually reflects the 
same legislative pattern of excessive, overbroad, unnecessary and misdirected post-crisis 
financial reforms or “bubble laws”. It was enacted in the aftermath of a massive populist 
backlash and motivated by the political pressure and public outrage resulting from one of the 
worst financial crisis in American history. It satisfies all or substantially all of Professor 
Bainbridge’s criteria and represents an example of the danger of hasty, populist and overbroad 
legislation. It goes beyond the concerns that led to the 2008 financial crisis and the pre-crisis 
private equity funds’ conduct. As this paper demonstrates, in the context of private equity 
regulation, legislating in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis is a formula for poor public 
policy making as well as excessive, inefficient and costly legislation that falls short of achieving 
the Dodd-Frank’s primary objectives of increasing transparency, reducing systemic risk and 
promoting the stability of the financial system.  
 
i) TITLE IV OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT – THE SAME LEGISLATIVE PATTERN 
 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules are an example of the same 
post-crisis legislative pattern, driven by the political pressure and public outrage following the 
2008 financial crisis and the near-collapse of the entire financial system. As such, it has the 
typical characteristics of a post-crisis legislative reform and suffers from the same problems, as 
discussed by Professor Romano and Professor Bainbridge. It is a reflection of financial market 
reform legislation that goes beyond the concerns that led to its enactment and represents a 
mismatch between the actual legislation and the pre-crisis concerns it was trying to address. As 
this paper shows, by virtue of eliminating the private adviser exemption, Title IV brings the 
private equity industry within the regulatory purview of SEC scrutiny and oversight in a way that 
is unnecessary, excessive, costly, has many negative implications and targets more than the pre-
crisis private equity activities.167 The way Congress and the SEC chose to regulate private equity 
funds under Title IV (through the SEC registration and reporting requirements) demonstrates 
how in the aftermath of a major financial crisis, regulators and legislators are driven by political 
pressure and sometimes regulate beyond the pre-crisis conduct and the problems that have to be 
addressed. This part of the paper will examine the legislative history of Title IV and the 
 
166 See Bainbridge, supra  note 125. 
167 See Romano, supra note 8 (describing the Future Trading Act of 1921 passed in response to the agricultural crisis 
of the 1920s as “not a solution even remotely addressing the problem at hand”); id. at 1593 (explaining that the 
1930s securities acts were not targeted toward remedying the economic turmoil of the Great Depression); See also 
Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of The United States 1867-1960 at 299–407 
(1963) (explaining that “the economic problems that attended the Great Depression were caused by mistakes in 
monetary policy as opposed to fraud in the securities markets and the inappropriate legislative response”). 
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Congressional and SEC response to the financial crisis to ascertain the justification (if any) 
behind the regulation of private equity funds under Title IV.  
 
 The enactment of Title IV was very controversial and produced under enormous public 
pressure and outrage, following the 2008 financial crisis. Despite reservations on both sides, the 
regulation of private equity funds and particularly the SEC registration and reporting 
requirements were eventually included within the scope of Title IV. However, an examination of 
the legislative history of Title IV indicates very clearly that regulators, including the SEC, were 
not too concerned about private equity funds and not directly focused on the private equity sector 
when they analyzed the 2008 financial crisis and spoke against the systemic risk concerns of 
private investment funds.168  
 
During the testimony of Neal S. Wolin, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, given together 
with Paul Volcker with regard to private investment funds regulation, Mr. Wolin spoke 
extensively about the need to adopt the Volcker Rule169 and the need to control systemic risk in 
the financial system and systemically risky behaviors.170 However, the focus of his testimony 
was the risks associated with hedge funds and nowhere in his testimony did he discuss the risks 
or concerns associated with the private equity sector. He only mentions private equity funds 
once, after discussing at length the risky nature of hedge funds and their contribution to the 2008 
financial crisis: 
 
“The activities targeted by our proposal tend to be volatile and high risk. Major firms saw their 
hedge funds and proprietary trading operations suffer large losses in the financial crisis. Some of 
these firms “bailed out” their troubled hedge funds, depleting the firm’s capital at precisely the 
moment it was needed most. The complexity of owning such entities has also made it more 
difficult for the market, investors, and regulators to understand risks in major financial firms, and 
for their managers to mitigate such risks. Exposing the taxpayer to potential risks from these 
activities is ill-advised. . . . [Thus], we have concluded that proprietary trading, and the ownership 
or sponsorship o[f] hedge funds and private funds, should be separated, to the fullest extent 
practicable, from the business of banking—and from the safety net that benefits the business of 
banking.”  
 
Additionally, the grouping of hedge funds and private equity funds together as private 
funds or private pools of capital throughout the legislative hearings on Title IV suggests that the 
private equity sector was not a major concern of regulators:  
 
 
168 See Lowenstein, supra note 24 (explaining that private equity funds did not contribute to the financial crisis and 
do not contribute to systemic risk in part because “PE firms are not deeply interconnected with other financial 
market participants through derivatives positions, counterparty exposures or prime brokerage relationships”). 
169 The Volcker Rule targets this systemic risk in two ways: 1) it limits proprietary trading and 2) it tries to eliminate 
excessive risk taking by restricting investment in private funds. The Volcker rule does this by not only restricting 
banking entities from investing in private investment funds, but also preventing them from otherwise sponsoring 
such funds as well; See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 
§§ 619(a)(1)(B), 619(d), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
170 See Examining Recent Restrictions Placed on Commercial Banks and Bank Holding Companies’ High-Risk 
Investment Activities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 55 
(2010) (prepared statement of Neal S. Wolin, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury). 
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“the financial crisis that erupted in the fall of 2008 exposed numerous vulnerabilities in our 
present regulatory system for the financial services industry, including a lack of oversight of, and 
transparency with respect to, private pools of capital. These pools take many forms, including 
hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds and family officers, among others. While 
they offer the promise of increased market efficiency and job creation, these pools also pose 
potential dangers for systemic risk and investor abuse.”171  
 
In the very next sentence, the section goes on to discuss growing trends in the hedge fund 
industry that justify further regulation and government intervention.172 In this report, 
Representative Barney Frank never once discusses the risks associated with the private equity 
sector. He explains the growth in the hedge fund industry, the lack of transparency associated 
with the activities of hedge funds, the “retailization” of hedge funds that has led to the exposure 
of ordinary investors, and fraud actions that have been brought against hedge funds and their 
managers in recent years.173 Private equity funds are only mentioned as an afterthought and 
while being lumped together with hedge funds. The focus of this report and the primary concern 
of regulators after the financial crisis were clearly the activities of hedge funds and their 
contribution to the buildup of systemic risk as opposed to private equity funds.174 
 
The essence of this report is that “hedge funds are unregulated and because of minimal 
transparency in this sector of the financial market, government authorities have limited ability to 
monitor and constrain systemic risks”.175 While private equity funds and hedge funds share 
certain characteristics, they have very different business models and distinguishing features, as 
discussed in Part II of this paper. The legislative history of Title IV  indicates that there was a 
real and legitimate concern for overall lack of transparency in the private funds industry and 
particularly hedge funds. The specific fundamental difference between hedge funds and private 
equity funds, as well as the lack of specific instances in which private equity funds created 
systemic risk concerns prior to the financial crisis tend to suggest that there was nothing about 
these private equity funds that warranted any government intervention in the private equity 
sector or their inclusion within the scope of Title IV and its SEC registration and reporting 
requirements. Instead, the legislative history of Title IV indicates a major concern regarding 
systemic risk and lack of transparency in the hedge fund sector.  
 
 In a 2009 white paper, the Treasury Department supported the SEC registration and 
reporting requirements of Title IV for the hedge fund industry to “ensure that financial 
institutions that are critical to market functioning are subject to strong oversight”.176 SEC 
Commissioner Louis Aguilar also commented: “We're totally unable to discern what is going on 
in [the hedge fund] market, [we] have no idea how many dollars are involved, [. . .] what type of 
risk-taking is happening, [we] don't know if they're investing in vanilla securities or investing in 
 





176 See Department of the Treasury. 2009. Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial 
Supervision and Regulation. Available on http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
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the riskiest instruments."177 Still, nothing indicates any specific concern with regard to private 
equity funds and their pre-crisis conduct that justifies bringing these funds within the purview of 
SEC registration and reporting. In the word of Professor John W. O’Brien of the Haas School of 
Business at the University of California - Berkeley: “I don’t think private equity and venture 
capital have been an important part of the problem. It has mainly been the leverage and rapid-
trading strategies, and those strategies are primarily housed in hedge funds. I don’t think 
Congress has a clear understanding of the problem so they wrap everybody into the net.”178  
 
As this paper will show in Part IV, private equity funds pose minimal systemic risk to the 
financial system and present no threat to the financial stability of the financial system or the 
economy as a whole. No demonstrable market failure was identified in the context of the private 
equity industry to justify such regulatory intervention and broad provisions. Additionally, there is 
no empirical academic literature to support any specific regulatory concern associated with the 
private equity sector and its pre-crisis conduct in the context of systemic risk and a potential 
financial crisis. The 2008 financial crisis had very little to do with private equity funds.179 Private 
equity funds did not cause the financial crisis and did not play any part in the credit crisis. They 
did not contribute to the build-up of systemic risk that eventually led to the near-collapse of the 
financial system and were simply not part of the problem or any market failure, unlike hedge 
funds.180 As this paper will show in Part IV, private equity funds present none of the systemic 
risk factors that led to the financial crisis and thus should have posed very little concern for 
regulators and policymakers seeking to develop a new regulatory regime to monitor systemic 
risk and guard against a future financial crisis.  
 
Additionally, according to a study of more than 3200 private equity-backed companies, 
“during the ‘Great Recession’ of 2008-2009 private equity-backed businesses defaulted at less 
than one-half the rate of comparable companies: 2.84 [percent] versus 6.17 [percent].”181 Also, 
while both hedge funds and private equity funds experienced losses during the 2008 financial 
crisis, research indicates that private equity funds have actually performed more than 5% better 
than hedge funds since 2007.182 Therefore, it seems very unlikely that regulators viewed private 
equity funds as excessively risky and were concerned about the risky nature of private equity 
funds. This is because, “unlike the troubled hedge funds in need of bailouts as discussed in Mr. 
Wolin’s testimony, private equity funds did not pose any unique threat to the financial system 
and the economy as a whole.”183  
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University Press, 1st Ed. 2009). 
180 See Acharya, supra note 1. 
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http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588623.pdf. 
183 As Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke stated in his testimony in front of the House Committee on 
Financial Services, he “would not think that any . . . private equity fund would become a systemically-critical firm 
35 
 
It is also important to note that the version of Title IV that was approved by the Senate on 
May 20, 2010, included an exemption from registration to investment advisers of private equity 
funds.184 The Senate explained its reasoning behind providing an exemption from registration to 
private equity advisers as follows:  
 
“The Committee believes that private equity funds characterized by long-term equity investments 
in operating businesses do not present the same risks as the large private funds whose advisers are 
required to register with the SEC under this title. Private equity investments are characterized by 
long-term commitments of equity capital - investors generally do not have redemption rights that 
could force the funds into disorderly liquidations of their positions. Private equity funds use 
limited or no leverage at the fund level, which means that their activities do not pose risks to the 
wider markets through credit or counterparty relationships. Accordingly, Section 408 directs the 
SEC to define "private equity fund" and provides an exemption from registration for advisers to 
private equity funds.” 185 
 
The Senate further explained: 
 
“Informed observers believe that in some cases the line between hedge funds and private equity  
may not be clear, and that the activities of the two types of funds may overlap. We expect the 
SEC to define the term "private equity fund" in a way to exclude firms that call themselves 
"private equity" but engage in activities that either raise significant potential systemic risk 
concerns or are more characteristic of traditional hedge funds. The section requires advisers to 
private equity funds to maintain such records, and provide to the SEC such annual or other 
reports, as the SEC determines necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the 
protection of investors.”186 
 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, as finally enacted, does not contain the private equity exemption 
that was included in the version approved by the Senate. Instead, it incorporates the broad 
proposal made by Senator Jack Reed (D-IR). Senator Reed advanced the most aggressive 
proposal, the Private Fund Transparency Act of 2009, which basically required the registration of 
all private investment funds, regardless of size, by eliminating the private investment adviser 
exemption.187 Senator Reed offered very little reasoning, evidence and support for the inclusion 
of private equity funds in his proposal.188 He stated in his proposal that “"[hedge funds, private 
equity, and venture capital funds' . . . role has grown so have the risks they pose," while at the 
same time he acknowledged that there is "no reliable data on the number and nature of these 
firms or ability to calculate the risks they may pose to America's broader economy."189 
 
individually” but rather it remains important for regulators to monitor systemic risk in the financial industry as a 
whole. Lowenstein, Written Testimony, supra note 24. 
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Furthermore, reviewing the SEC adopting releases implementing Title IV and the 
amendments to the Advisers Act, indicates the same legislative pattern and provides an important 
insight as to the SEC’s view regarding the risks associated with private investment funds and 
what the SEC was trying to accomplish.190 It seems from the adopting releases that the activities 
targeted by the SEC were primarily hedge funds and the systemic risk concerns associated with 
hedge funds.191 The adopting releases indicate that there was a real and legitimate concern about 
the activities of hedge funds, their use of leverage, their trading strategies, their involvement in 
the 2008 financial crisis and their overall lack of transparency.192 The focus of the SEC was 
mainly hedge funds and the need for more oversight over the activities of hedge funds. Private 
equity funds were not a concern mentioned in the SEC adopting releases and nowhere in the 
adopting releases was there any discussion about private equity funds and their potential risks to 
the financial system or the economy as a whole.193 From the SEC adopting releases it also seems 
that the SEC was simply not concerned with fraud associated with private equity funds the way 
that it was concerned with potential hedge fund fraud. Overall, the SEC adopting releases offer 
very little reasoning, evidence and support for the inclusion of private equity funds within the 
scope of Title IV and its implementing rules. Additionally, there is no empirical academic 
literature or other sources mentioned in the SEC adopting releases to support any specific 
regulatory concern associated with the private equity sector and its pre-crisis conduct in the 
context of systemic risk and a potential financial crisis.194 
 
  The specific fundamental differences between hedge funds and private equity funds (as 
discussed in Part II of this paper), as well as the lack of specific instances in which private equity 
funds created systemic risk concerns prior to the financial crisis or caused any market failure 
tend to suggest that there was nothing about these private equity funds that warranted any 
government or regulatory intervention in the private equity sector or their inclusion within the 
scope of Title IV and its implementing rules. As discussed later in this paper, the SEC should 
have implemented Title IV in a way that exempts private equity funds from the SEC registration 
and reporting requirements. In other words, this paper takes the position that since private equity 
funds are not a major source of systemic risk, they play a critical role as a driver of economic 
growth, they had no involvement in the 2008 financial crisis and their investors have the 
resources and sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, these funds and their advisers should be 
subject to a reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC registration, reporting and 
disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act. The SEC should have included a carve-out 
for private equity funds exempting these funds from the requirements of Title IV while focusing 
on hedge funds. 
This section of the paper has offered a brief overview of the legislative history of Title IV 
and its implementing rules and how they  follow the traditional post-crisis legislative pattern. An 
examination of the legislative history of Title IV and its implementing rules  indicates that this 
piece of legislation reflects the same legislative pattern of excessive, overbroad, unnecessary and 
misdirected post-crisis financial reforms or in the words Professor Romano and Professor 
Bainbridge “bubble laws”. It was enacted in the aftermath of a massive populist backlash and 
 







motivated by the political pressure and public outrage resulting from one of the worst financial 
crisis in American history. It is not supported by any evidence, research or analysis to justify this 
government and regulatory intervention and the need to regulate the private equity industry. It 
satisfies all or substantially all of Professor Bainbridge’s criteria and represents an example of 
hasty, populist and overbroad legislation. It goes beyond the concerns that led to the 2008 
financial crisis and the pre-crisis private equity funds’ conduct, as clearly, regulators had no 
specific concerns with regard to the activities of private equity funds or the potential systemic 
risk associated with the private equity sector. The only reason private equity funds were 
eventually included within the scope of Title IV is the unique political and economic 
environment following the 2008 financial crisis, the “emotionally charged” climate, as well as 
the public outrage and political pressure on Congress to take action, satisfy angry constituents 
and introduce a comprehensive reform of the financial system. Title IV and its implementing 
rules are  not calibrated to the circumstances that led to the enactment of the legislation as there 
is very little ‘nexus’ between private equity activities and the systemic risk concerns underlying 
the enactment of Title IV.   
 
As discussed in Part II of this paper, Title IV tries to eliminate excessive risk through 
SEC supervision and oversight. While increased transparency and oversight in the context of 
private investment funds, and particularly hedge funds, may reduce and control the systemic risk 
that led to the 2008 financial crisis and the near collapse of the entire financial system, these 
provisions, insofar as they apply to the private equity industry, go beyond the objectives of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and the actual concerns that regulators were trying to address. They simply 
reflect an inadequate, costly and unnecessary legislative response which is inconsistent with the 
intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act. It was all made possible due to the tremendous political 
pressure on Congress and sense of urgency to introduce a comprehensive reform of the financial 
system which created the right opportunity for “political entrepreneurs” to push their agenda. 
The following section of this paper will examine the political economy of financial regulation 
following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC195 and the importance, role 
and application of cost benefit analysis in financial regulation and particularly private equity 
regulation under Title IV and its implementing rules. 
 
 
B.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL RULEMAKING AFTER BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE 
 
  We now turn to explore the political economy of financial regulation following the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable and the importance, role and application of cost 
benefit analysis in financial regulation as well as private equity regulation under Title IV and its 
implementing rules. Choosing whether and how to regulate is generally a question of regulators 
and the implementing agency evaluating alternative regulatory approaches, tradeoffs and 
whether society, the financial system and the economy gain enough from the regulation to justify 
its costs. The goal is for regulators to ensure they adequately consider the effectiveness and 
consequences of their regulatory actions and determine the best course of action. In other words, 
the benefits must justify and exceed the costs of the proposed legislative action.  
 
 
195 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, supra note 9. 
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In Business Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit, in striking down the proxy access rule held that 
the rulemaking process was “arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law” and that 
the SEC had failed to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis of the rule.196 The court vacated 
the rule on the basis that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act197 and that the SEC “failed 
adequately to consider the rule’s effect upon efficiency, competition and capital formation”.198 In 
concluding that the SEC had failed to meet its cost benefit analysis obligations, the court made 
clear that the rule required “a far more rigorous economic analysis and cost benefit justification 
than the SEC had assumed was necessary.”199 In the words of Judge Ginsburg, “the SEC fell far 
short of its statutory obligation to determine as best it could the economic implications of the 
rule”.200  
 
Business Roundtable has become one of the most important financial regulation decisions 
since cost benefit analysis was developed in the early 1970s by holding financial regulators 
strictly accountable for the quality of their cost benefit analysis.201 It established a far more 
rigorous standard of review than the financial regulators had previously used. The decision 
appears to require courts to “police the quality of regulators cost benefit analysis and directs 
judges to look more closely at the analysis to determine whether the relevant regulator has 
adequately considered and ascertained the rule’s costs and benefits based on all the alternatives 
available.”202 
 
The decision in Business Roundtable is also significant as it was the first challenge of a 
rule adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act, based on the implementing agency’s failure to perform 
an adequate cost benefit analysis.203 It also represents a turning point indicative of an 
unprecedented level of judicial scrutiny of financial regulation, forcing the SEC and other 
regulators poised to issue rules and regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act, to take a whole new 
approach to their rulemaking process.204 Despite extensive criticism, the decision appears to have 
mandated more demanding and strict standards of judicial review of the cost benefit analysis of 
financial regulation.205 Depending on one’s view, such a powerful approach or filter of financial 
regulation could either “further ossify the financial rulemaking process206 or make the rules that 
emerge from the process more rational, efficient, and transparent.”207 
 
This section of the paper will examine the costs and benefits of Title IV’s  implementing 
rules, in light of the decision in Business Roundtable, and show the deficiencies in the cost 
benefit analysis performed by regulators and particularly the SEC in connection with private 
equity regulation and the implementation of Title IV. It will demonstrate how cost benefit 
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analysis, when used properly, provides a fundamental decision making tool that helps regulators 
to ensure that regulatory efforts produce a net positive effect on society and the economy as a 
whole. It will evaluate whether Title IV’s implementing rules i) are  supported by the cost benefit 
analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after the decision in Business Roundtable; ii) are 
tailored to impose the least burden on society, the financial system and the economy; and iii) 
reflect a regulatory approach that maximizes net benefits. This section of the paper will also 
discuss how the rigorous cost benefit analysis standards established in the Business Roundtable 
decision may affect the political economy of financial regulation and how actors in the political 
economy of financial rulemaking may respond to the Business Roundtable decision. Before we 
examine the political economy of financial regulation following the Business Roundtable 
decision and whether Title IV’s implementing rules are  in fact supported by a cost benefit 
analysis that is consistent with the standards established in Business Roundtable, it is worth 
pausing to consider the history of cost benefit analysis and its specific application to financial 
regulation.  
i. THE HISTORY OF COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
Cost benefit analysis is considered to be one of the most important decision-making tools 
in the context of modern regulation. For more than three decades, under both Democratic and 
Republican administrations, cost benefit analysis has been a fundamental tool of effective 
regulation, ensuring that regulators maximize the benefits of the proposed regulatory actions and 
that these regulatory actions produce a net positive effect on society and the economy as a 
whole.208 Both Congress and the Executive have taken numerous steps over the years to require 
regulators and federal agencies to engage in cost benefit analysis when deciding how to regulate. 
In the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, “In the past 30 years in particular, cost benefit analysis 
has become a fundamental part of how federal agencies think about and ultimately select 
regulatory approaches, with all three branches of government participating in the creation of the 
cost benefit state.”209 As early as 1902, Congress requested federal agencies to compare costs 
and benefits of proposed regulatory actions210, and the New Deal reflected the first large-scale 
implementation of this regulatory tool, when “the Flood Control Act of 1936 required that the 
Army Corps of Engineers take regulatory action only where benefits were greater than the 
costs.”211 The practice of using cost benefit analysis in the context of adopting regulations 
became more common as a public policy tool in the 1950s and 1960s “with the growth of the 
administrative state and the development of welfare economics concepts that supported the use 
of cost-benefit analysis in determining how to implement government policies.”212 The use of 
cost benefit analysis was in many ways a response to a wave of safety, health and environmental 
regulations.213  
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Supporters of cost benefit analysis argue that it is “a natural filtering tool that makes 
federal regulations more rational and efficient.”214 It is simply a regulatory tool to ensure that the 
costs of regulatory actions do not exceed the benefits of such regulatory actions. Opponents of 
cost benefit analysis argue that it is not a “natural filtering tool but a mechanism designed to 
further a deregulatory agenda by creating regulatory gridlock, imposing an impossible burden of 
proof on the regulators or making it prohibitively expensive for agencies to issue regulations.”215 
Despite criticism of cost benefit analysis over the years, in the context of regulation, cost benefit 
analysis has become a major regulatory tool used by regulators, policymakers, Presidents of both 
parties and members of Congress.  
 
However, it is important to note that the implementation of this major regulatory tool is 
extremely complicated as the quality of the cost benefit analysis depends on “the good faith of 
the regulator or agency performing the analysis and on the existence of an effective enforcement 
mechanism to challenge and invalidate rules that are not supported by an adequate cost benefit 
analysis.”216 Without an effective mechanism for ensuring the quality or adequacy of cost benefit 
analysis, this regulatory tool may become “a political cover rather than a genuine check on costly 
regulations”.217  
 
Regulatory cost benefit analysis requirements were usually limited to executive agencies 
and social regulations and substantial or robust cost benefit analysis requirements were not 
imposed on financial regulations until 1996. It then took nearly a decade for the first challenge of 
a financial regulation based on the adequacy of its cost benefit analysis to reach the courts.218 We 
now turn to examine how cost benefit analysis has evolved as a regulatory tool used by 
regulators, policymakers and Presidents of both parties to manage and control the rulemaking 
process by executive agencies. We will also look at the main Congressional mandates governing 
cost benefit analysis reviews of financial regulations and examine the quality or adequacy of the 
cost benefit analysis of financial regulation.   
 
Executive Branch Programs 
 
Almost every President since Richard Nixon has had a cost benefit analysis process to 
review and filter regulations proposed by executive agencies and has urged independent agencies 
to use cost benefit analysis as well.219 However, this cost benefit analysis review process had 
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only limited impact on financial regulations since most of the federal financial regulatory 
agencies are independent agencies.220 President Reagan established the most rigorous cost 
benefit analysis review program of all the presidents in Executive Order 12,291.221 The Reagan 
order prohibited executive agencies “from undertaking any regulatory action . . .unless the 
potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs” and required them to 
choose the “alternative involving the least net cost to society of all available alternatives.”222 In 
other words, when an agency regulates, it must find that the benefits justify the costs of the 
proposed regulatory action. It also gave the power to enforce compliance with the program and 
these cost benefit analysis requirements to a powerful new Presidential Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief.223   
 
The Bush Administration continued this approach, but transferred enforcement authority 
to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) within the Office of Management 
and Budget (“OMB”).224 President Clinton replaced the Reagan and Bush cost benefit analysis 
approach with a less robust process outlined in Executive Order 12,866, which remains in effect 
today.225 Still, cost benefit analysis remained the central requirement of these orders. The Clinton 
approach is less demanding than the Reagan and Bush approach in two elements. First, it 
“directed agencies to consider qualitative measures of cost and benefit in addition to quantitative 
measures.”226  Second, it “required an executive agency only to provide a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs,” rather than “showing that the 
benefits outweigh the costs.”227 Still, regulators and agencies have to choose the regulatory 
approach that maximizes net benefits.228  
 
The Obama Administration has continued to follow the standards for cost benefit analysis 
set forth by the Reagan Administration and reconfirmed by the Clinton Administration, which 
“require an executive agency to adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the 
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs”; “base decisions on the best reasonably 
obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information concerning the need for, and 
consequences of, the intended regulation”; and “tailor its regulations to impose the least burden 
on society.”229 Additionally, by issuing Executive Order 13,563, the Obama Administration has 
enhanced the use of cost benefit analysis as a regulatory tool, underscoring that “the benefits 
must justify the costs of the proposed agency action, that unless the law provides otherwise the 
chosen approach must maximize net benefits, and that the agency must use the best available 
techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and costs as accurately as 
 
very limited.”  Presidents Ford and Carter implemented more rigorous and effective cost benefit analysis review and 
enforcement programs. See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1974); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 
(1978). 
220 See Guynn, supra note 217. 
221 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, §§ 3503–3504, 94 Stat. 2812, 2814–15 (codified at 
44 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (2006)). 
225 See Executive Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 See Guynn, supra note 217. 
229 See supra  note 225. 
42 
 
possible.”230 President Obama also issued Executive Order 13,579,231  which “urges independent 
agencies to comply with the cost benefit analysis requirements in Executive Orders 12,866 and 
13,563, although they are not binding on independent agencies.232 
 
Statutes and Financial Regulations 
 
Despite the major support for the rigorous use of cost benefit analysis as a fundamental 
regulatory tool and its general recognition and acceptance by all three branches of the federal 
government, financial market regulators have been slower in adopting this approach than their 
executive agency counterparts.233 The reasons for this approach are primarily historical, in that 
the executive orders requiring cost benefit analysis by federal agencies expressly do not apply to 
independent agencies such as many financial regulators.234 
 
The first government regulatory action to impose cost benefit analysis standards in the 
context of financial regulation was the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, or UMRA, 
(although it is limited to executive agencies).235 It requires “all federal agencies other than 
independent regulatory agencies to conduct a cost benefit analysis of significant regulatory 
actions—that is, regulatory actions that could impose annual costs on the public or private 
sectors of $100 million or more—and is expressly subject to judicial review.”236 In this 
legislation Congress actually required agencies to “prepare a qualitative and quantitative 
assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits of the federal mandate”.237  
 
The first statute to impose cost benefit analysis requirements on an independent financial 
regulatory agency was the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.238 Section 106 
of that Act added certain cost benefit analysis requirements to Section 2(a) of the Securities Act 
of 1933239, Section 3(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934240  and Section 2(c) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.241  These mandates all require the SEC, when engaged in 
financial rulemaking under a particular act, to “consider whether the action will promote 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”242 Congress also added a similar cost benefit 
analysis requirement to Section 15(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act243 in Section 119 of the 
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Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.244 This cost benefit analysis requirement 
provides that “before promulgating a regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission must consider the costs and benefits of the action and 
evaluate them in light of a variety of factors including the efficiency, competitiveness, and 
financial integrity of futures markets.”245 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act has brought the regulatory tool of cost benefit analysis in financial 
regulation to the forefront by requiring financial regulators and agencies to promulgate hundreds 
of new rules affecting the U.S. financial market. The Dodd-Frank Act also imposes a number of 
cost benefit analysis requirements on a wide range of financial regulations. As this legislation 
was drafted and structured to amend existing laws, the general cost benefit analysis requirements 
included in the organic acts of each financial regulator (like the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934) apply as well to any Dodd-Frank financial rulemaking since they were not altered or 
eliminated.246 Also the Dodd-Frank Act does not exempt any of the regulations issued under the 
amended provisions from the preexisting cost benefit analysis requirements in the respective 
securities laws or other financial regulations. Therefore, any regulations implementing the Dodd-
Frank Act rules or amendments are subject to the same preexisting cost benefit analysis 
requirements. The Dodd-Frank Act also incorporates as a structural matter all of the cost benefit 
analysis requirements that apply to financial rulemaking by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (“OCC”), including the one in UMRA. Therefore, any time the OCC issues any 
financial regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act, such as its regulations implementing the 
Volcker Rule247, the OCC must comply with the cost benefit analysis requirements of the 
UMRA. 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act specifically imposes a cost benefit analysis requirement on all 
financial rulemaking by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) under the 
consumer protection provisions in Title X.248 It also imposes an express cost benefit analysis 
requirement on the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) in issuing regulations 
governing the designation of financial activities as systemically important under Section 120.249 
Additionally, it imposes a cost benefit analysis requirement on the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) in issuing rules governing “the recovery of compensation from officers 
and directors who are responsible for the failure of a systemically important financial 
company.”250 
 
Additionally, in 2012, Congress passed the JOBS Act, in which it placed a similar cost 
benefit analysis requirement on the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), a 
self-regulated body whose proposed rules are subject to SEC review and approval before taking 
effect. The JOBS Act provides that any PCAOB rules adopted after its enactment “shall not 
apply to an audit of any emerging growth company, unless the Commission determines that the 
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application of such additional requirements is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, 
after considering the protection of investors and whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.”251  We now turn to examine the quality and standards of 
cost benefit analysis reviews of financial regulation.   
 
The Quality of Cost Benefit Analysis Reviews of Financial Regulation 
 
The quality of the cost benefit analysis performed in the context of financial regulation 
has historically been, to some extent, low and almost never included any empirical evidence to 
support the proposed regulatory actions.252 Financial regulators seem as if they were simply 
going through the motions of performing some form of cost benefit analysis rather than going 
through a comprehensive and robust analysis of the actual costs and benefits of the proposed 
regulatory action that actually evaluates whether society and the economy as a whole gain 
enough from the regulation to justify its costs.253 This lack of robust cost benefit analysis of 
financial regulations is consistent with the Business Roundtable decision and the D.C. Circuit’s 
conclusion that the SEC had failed to meet minimum quality standards in the cost benefit 
analysis review of the proxy access rule.254 It is also consistent with views recently expressed by 
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (“CCMR”), which is an independent and 
nonpartisan body dedicated to improving the regulation of U.S. capital markets. The CCMR 
submitted a letter to the majority and minority leaders of the Senate Banking Committee and the 
House Financial Services Committee on the lack of adequate cost benefit analysis in the Dodd-
Frank rulemaking.255 The CCMR reviewed 192 of the proposed and final rules that have been 
issued under the Dodd-Frank Act so far. It found that “fifty-seven of these rules contained no 
cost benefit analysis at all; eighty-five contained cost benefit analysis, but they were entirely 
qualitative, and not quantitative; and only fifty rules contained quantitative cost benefit 
analysis.”256 In the last category, “the most instances of cost benefit analysis were limited to 
administrative costs like the costs of paperwork, legal and compliance review, technological 
enhancements, and the like, without any analysis of the broader economic implications of the 
proposed rules.”257 
 
Additionally, the Inspectors General of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) have found “major deficiencies in the 
financial regulators’ use of cost-benefit analysis after the Dodd-Frank”258, and the Government 
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Accounting Office (GAO), Congress’s investigative arm has also “faulted financial regulators for 
failing to monetize or quantify costs and benefits of proposed regulatory actions.”259 
 
There may be different possible explanations for the low average quality of these 
instances of cost benefit analysis of financial regulation. First, as explained above, cost benefit 
analysis requirements are relatively new in the context of financial regulations. The financial 
regulatory agencies may need more experience using this regulatory tool or more economists 
rather than lawyers on their staffs.260 Second, “the financial agencies may view cost benefit 
analysis as an intrusion into the exercise of their expert discretion rather than a useful regulatory 
tool to sort out the best regulatory alternative.”261 Third, some of the financial agencies may lack 
sufficient resources to hire the economists they need to conduct an adequate and robust cost 
benefit analysis, consistent with the requirements of the Business Roundtable decision. Fourth, 
“the lack of any independent enforcement body similar to the enforcement arms that have existed 
in the executive branch may give independent financial regulatory agencies the sense that they 
are not accountable to anyone except themselves and their allies in Congress.”262 
 
Academic Reaction to Costs Benefit Analysis 
 
Cost benefit analysis and its importance as a regulatory filter has been the subject of 
extensive academic debate. Opponents of cost benefit analysis argue that “cost benefit analysis 
promotes a deregulatory agenda under the cover of scientific objectivity.”263  They further argue 
that “the motivating factor behind cost benefit analysis in this context is a political bias against 
regulation.”264 Cost benefit analysis opponents “want to prevent economic considerations from 
eclipsing other important values that ought to inform agency decision making.”265 In contrast, 
Professors Matthew Adler and Eric Posner argue that, “when properly used by regulators, cost 
benefit analysis is consistent with a broad array of popular theories of the proper role of 
government and is capable of satisfying every political theory that holds that the government 
should care about the overall well-being of its citizens.”266 In other words, opponents of cost 
benefit analysis as a regulatory tool use the term “ossification” since they believe that rigorous 
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review of cost benefit analysis may overpower or take over other important parameters that 
ought to determine regulatory choices.267 Proponents of costs benefit analysis, on the other hand, 
describe the use of costs benefit analysis as a regulatory tool as the “rationalization of the 
regulatory process”, since they believe that the filtering effect is critical for securing efficient 
regulatory actions.268 The following section of this paper will examine the many policy 
considerations that favor the use of cost benefit analysis as a regulatory tool for more efficient 
regulatory actions. 
 
ii. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
As the history of cost benefit analysis discussed above demonstrates, cost benefit analysis 
has developed over the past three decades as one of the most important tools for effective 
regulation. The acceptance of cost benefit analysis by regulators as a major decision-making tool 
in the context of modern regulation reflects the many policy considerations that favor its use. 
These considerations are based on two major premises and can be divided into two groups. First, 
“cost benefit analysis promotes more rational decision-making and more efficient regulatory 
actions.”269 It is a tool to measure the economic consequences of a proposed regulatory action 
and ensure that regulatory actions are the product of reasoned decision-making. Second, “cost 
benefit analysis promotes good public governance as a transparent, democratic, and accountable 
regulatory methodology.”270 
 
Cost benefit analysis improves the regulatory process and ensures that regulators 
maximize the benefits of the proposed regulatory actions. In the words of Professor Sunstein, “at 
its core, cost benefit analysis is a tool of rational decision-making.”271 As explained, for example, 
in a 1772 letter that Benjamin Franklin wrote to his friend Joseph Priestley, “listing the pros and 
cons of a solution on a piece of paper and carefully weighing them against one another provides 
a practical method for solving difficult problems.”272 Over the years Franklin’s approach has 
developed into a powerful tool for rational decision-making and efficient rulemaking.273 
 
As a matter of policy, cost benefit analysis provides a decision-making process that helps 
to produce effective regulations and ensures that regulatory efforts produce a net positive effect 
on society and the economy as a whole.274 In other words “society and the economy have to gain 
enough from the proposed regulation to justify its costs.”275 Choosing whether and how to 
regulate is generally a question of regulators and the implementing agency evaluating alternative 
regulatory approaches, tradeoffs and whether society, the financial system and the economy gain 
enough from the regulation to justify its costs. The goal is for regulators to ensure they 
adequately consider the effectiveness and consequences of their regulatory actions and determine 
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proposed legislative action. Cost benefit analysis provides regulators a tool that keeps them 
focused on the following “critical questions in the rulemaking process: What are the actual, 
quantifiable costs and benefits of the proposed regulation? How do these factors weigh against 
other values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, 
fairness, and distributive impacts? In light of these costs and benefits, how does this regulation 
compare to other possible solutions?”276 Cost benefit analysis provides regulators a structured 
method for addressing these questions ensuring they choose the best regulatory solution and that 
this choice is in fact justified. 
 
In choosing the best regulatory approach and considering all the relevant factors in the 
rulemaking process, regulators and agencies also minimize the risks of unintended consequences 
that may result from a particular regulatory action.277 As discussed in Part III of this paper, 
financial reforms are usually adopted after a major financial crisis or market crash. These 
reforms tend to be hasty, rushed, populist in nature and enacted in an environment of political 
pressure that does not facilitate careful consideration of its unintended consequences.278 
 
Such post-crisis legislation is heavily influenced by the specific post-crisis political and 
economic environment as regulators have to respond to a crisis quickly and effectively. For 
example, a need for regulatory action may present itself because of a major financial crisis or a 
high-profile securities fraud case in which it is clear that the existing regulatory regime was 
inadequate. In these circumstances of political and economic urgency and pressure on regulators 
to act, cost benefit analysis provides an efficient regulatory tool for a measured response and a 
more rational decision-making process and balanced approach. By conducting a cost benefit 
analysis of a specific regulatory solution, regulators or agencies “force themselves to quantify 
risks and reduce the likelihood that cognitive biases will negatively affect regulatory efforts. 
Cost-benefit analysis thus helps bring to light potential unintended consequences that may result 
from a particular regulatory action.”279 Cost benefit analysis is designed to solve the problem of 
hasty regulation that fails to achieve its goals or imposes costs that outweigh its benefits.280 
 
Additionally, “cost benefit analysis helps promote rational decision-making by focusing 
regulators on the need to properly allocate their supervisory and enforcement resources.”281 
Regulators must ensure not merely that their regulations provide benefits and justify the costs, 
but also that they make the most efficient use of their limited resources. In practice, regulators 
address this task by evaluating regulatory alternatives and ensuring that the most efficient 
alternative is in place, both from the perspective of the rule’s impact on society and the economy 
and from the perspective of the regulator’s own resources, supervisory and enforcement 
capabilities.282  
 
In essence, if a regulator or agency can produce similar regulatory outcomes in multiple 
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itself.283 Without some form of cost benefit analysis, the regulator has no grounds for making 
such a decision or regulatory choice. For this reason, the OMB’s cost benefit analysis guidelines 
require regulators and agencies to “compare leading alternatives to the regulator’s chosen 
regulatory solution, including the option of not regulating at all.”284 This process of comparison 
is critical to efficient regulation and resource allocation.285 It ensures that the proposed regulatory 
action reflects the best and most efficient course of action.  
 
In the words of Professor Sunstein, “By requiring regulators to account for and attempt to 
quantify the anticipated costs and benefits of the rules they promulgate, cost benefit analysis 
increases the likelihood that rules will take into account all relevant considerations, produce net 
positive outcomes, protect and enhance agency legitimacy, avoid unintended consequences, and 
distribute resources efficiently.”286  
 
Furthermore, the use of cost benefit analysis as a regulatory tool also promotes good 
governance and democratic accountability. Proper cost benefit analysis reveals to the public the 
decision making process by which regulators adopt rules. In the words of Professor Posner, “cost 
benefit analysis opens the decision-making process to public comment and thus encourages the 
regulatory agency to consider the view of experts outside of the agency and helps mitigate the 
likelihood of agency capture.”287 Cost benefit analysis when used properly, simply enhances 
governmental accountability, transparency and legitimacy of the proposed regulatory action.  
 
Among the stated goals of Executive Order 12,866 as discussed above, is “to make the 
regulatory process more accessible and open to the public.”288 Cost benefit analysis helps bring 
transparency to the regulatory process in several ways. At the most fundamental level it requires 
a regulator or agency to formally present and quantify its rulemaking reasoning process.289 This 
process reveals what aspects of a regulatory problem the regulator or agency have taken into 
account and how they address the costs and benefits of a proposed regulatory action. It opens up 
the rulemaking process to public scrutiny.290 Cost benefit analysis provides a significant “check” 
by requiring the regulator or agency to disclose the factors or considerations that underlie their 
analysis and regulatory decision making. If interest-group pressure has distorted the regulators’ 
or agency’s calculations, discretion or consideration of costs and benefits of a specific regulatory 
proposal, the analysis is likely to reflect such influence and provide Congress, the president, the 
courts, and the public at large with an opportunity to demand corrections.291 It is a major tool to 
monitor and control regulators and agencies in their rulemaking activities.  
 
Another benefit of cost benefit analysis in terms of good governance is that it “leverages 
the technical expertise of the regulatory agencies and, applies it in a neutral fashion to a 
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particular regulatory problem.”292 Cost benefit analysis “facilitates the exercise of this expertise 
by providing agencies a framework that insulates the agencies from powerful political 
pressures.”293 One way it does so is by “staying focused on the objective effects of the policy in 
question. It does not take political or interest group preferences into account.”294 The virtue of 
cost benefit is that “it brings an agency’s assumptions and calculations into the light, where 
interested parties can raise objections, challenge the regulatory action and demand 
improvements.”295 Additionally, as financial markets and their regulations increase in 
complexity, regulatory agency expertise, and cost benefit analysis methodologies that facilitate 
and leverage the exercise of this expertise, become more important and play a critical role in the 
rulemaking process. Since cost benefit analysis provides a methodology to capture all the costs 
that can be captured in the rulemaking process, it enables regulators to determine the best course 
of action.  
 
As Professor Henry Manne recently argued in an article on cost benefit analysis in SEC 
rulemaking, “cost benefit analysis provides an analytical template for the consideration of any 
new rule.”296 Regulators will therefore be forced to “give adequate consideration to a variety of 
significant economic questions that it now regularly sloughs off or to which it simply assumes 
the answer, by making real-world quantitative comparisons.”297 This analysis provides some 
form of assurance that regulators will not adopt economically harmful rules. Importantly, cost 
benefit analysis would also serve a democratic function by making “the discussion of new 
regulations more open to truly informed community comment as opposed to special-interest 
pleading. Third parties will know that their comments will be examined by sensible and 
knowledgeable experts and not bureaucrats interested mainly in the political implications of a 
new proposal.”298 
 
In March 2012, the SEC responded to the criticism from the D.C. Circuit, Congress, and 
its own Inspector General by issuing a Guidance Memorandum outlining a new agency approach 
to cost benefit analysis in the context of financial rulemaking. Affirming that “high-quality 
economic analysis is an essential part of SEC rulemaking” and that the SEC “has long 
recognized that a rule’s potential benefits and costs should be considered” in its rulemaking, the 
memorandum provides specific advice for conducting cost benefit analysis and clarifies that it 
should be performed in every economic analysis of rulemaking.299 The SEC’s Guidance 
Memorandum explains that the use of cost benefit analysis in the rulemaking process “ensures 
that decisions to propose and adopt rules are informed by the best available evidence about a 
 
292 See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency 
Rules,96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 680-81, 686-90 (1996). 
293 Id. 
294 See Julie G. Yap, Just Keep Swimming: Guiding Environmental Stewardship Out of the Riptide of National 
Security, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1289, 1326 (2004). (“This method subjects the government to greater public 
accountability because the equation is both objective and easy to understand.”). 
295 See Adler and Posner, supra note 21.  
296 See Henry G. Manne, Will the SEC’s New Embrace of Cost-Benefit Analysis Be a Watershed Moment?, 35 
Regulation 20, 22 (2012). 
297 Id. 
298 Id. 
299 See SEC Division of Risk, Strategy and Financial Innovation and SEC Office of the General Counsel, Current 




rule’s likely consequences,” and that “economic analysis allows the Commission to meaningfully 
compare the proposed action with reasonable alternatives, including the alternative of not 
adopting a rule.”300 The SEC thus recognizes cost benefit analysis as “an important balancing 
tool for potentially harmful regulation and that effective cost benefit analysis provides a means 
of protecting against negative unintended consequences of proposed regulatory actions.”301   
 
CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia describes cost benefit analysis as “one of the 
principle ways in which the CFTC can improve its rulemaking and protect against potential 
regulatory abuses.”302 He further explains that “the failure to produce a rigorous cost benefit 
analysis hurts the credibility of this Commission and undermines the quality of our rules.”303 In 
the words of Professors Rose and Walker304, “opponents of cost benefit analysis argue that 
careful, rule-by-rule economic analysis makes it difficult for agencies to create rules, but that is 
precisely the point: it requires regulators to engage in a transparent, rigorous process that, as 
President Obama has stated, includes more input from experts, businesses and ordinary 
citizens.”305 They further explain that “regulating through a careful, focused process, which 
includes an analysis of the costs and benefits of a particular regulation, will naturally be more 
time-consuming than hastily pushing through regulations without making the effort to 
understand their costs, benefits, and effects. However, as President Obama has argued, the 
resulting rules will be more affordable, less intrusive, more effective, and the product of a more 
democratic process.”306 Clearly, rather than viewing cost benefit analysis as preventing 
regulation and slowing down the rulemaking process, rigorous cost benefit analysis creates 
confidence in the ability of regulators to craft effective and appropriate regulatory solutions to 
specific market problems.307  
 
Professor Cass Sunstein explains that when President Obama was elected, “critics of cost 
benefit analysis hoped he would jettison it. But rather than doing so, the administration doubled 
down on cost benefit analysis. First, Obama made an unprecedented commitment to 
quantification of both costs and benefits. Second, he ordered executive agencies to review all 
significant rules on the books, largely with the goal of eliminating or streamlining excessive 
requirements.”308 Professor Sunstein further notes that “the application of rigorous cost benefit 
analysis deterred agencies from proceeding with rules that promise to impose big economic 
burdens without corresponding gains.”309 He concludes that “at a time when effective regulation 
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efforts are appropriately measured and effective, but also that the public and regulated entities 
have confidence in the ability of regulators to address market problems.”310 
 
Cost benefit analysis in financial rulemaking has particular importance in the context of 
the Dodd-Frank Act that follows a “boom-bubble-bust regulate cycle of financial market 
regulation,” and which Professor Larry Ribstein characterized as “bubble laws.”311 In the words 
of Professors Rose and Walker: “The need for cost benefit analysis is thus especially critical 
when implementing the Dodd-Frank Act to not only ensure a proper balance between costs and 
benefits, but also to provide an appropriate regulatory platform for long-term economic 
prosperity.”312 The scale and scope of Dodd-Frank regulations and the amount of financial 
rulemaking have made it critical for regulators to apply rigorous cost benefit analysis to the 
rulemaking process and ensure they adequately consider the effectiveness and consequences of 
their regulatory actions. Cost benefit analysis provides a regulatory tool designed to ensure that, 
despite the accelerated pace and amount of financial rulemaking, regulators will not cut corners 
but will engage in more rational decision-making, will produce better regulations, and will 
promote good governance. 
 
In essence, from a policy perspective applying economic analysis to financial regulation 
is the only way of getting to the bottom of the issues regulators are trying to address. It improves 
the quality of regulation and increases the public confidence in the regulatory process. The 
following section of this paper will examine the Business Roundtable decision, the rigorous 
standard of review established by the D.C. Circuit and the SEC’s experience in the D.C. Circuit 
over the past decade.  
 
iii. D.C. CIRCUIT TRILOGY ON SEC COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
  Although the executive orders that require executive agencies to engage in cost benefit 
analysis have not been extended to independent financial regulators or agencies such as the SEC 
and CFTC, these financial regulators have statutory obligations under their respective organic 
statutes and the Administration Procedure Act that require these agencies to engage in cost 
benefit analysis during the rulemaking process.313 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit in three major 
decisions addressed the issue of cost benefit analysis of financial regulation extensively. These 
decisions and particularly the Business Roundtable decision are the foundation for our analysis 
of the cost benefit aspects of Title IV’s implementing rules and whether they are  supported by 
the cost benefit analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after Business Roundtable. Before 
we analyze the costs and benefits of Title IV’s implementing rules and whether they are  
consistent with the standards set by the D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable, it is worth pausing 
to consider the SEC experience in the D.C. Circuit over the last decade. In a trio of decisions, the 
D.C. Circuit has examined the SEC’s rulemaking and defined new standards and boundaries for 
economic analysis of financial regulation and the use of cost benefit analysis in financial 
rulemaking. This part of the paper explores these decisions and their approach to the economic 
analysis of financial rulemaking.  
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The first instance indicating that the standard of review of financial regulation would be 
more rigorous than the one the financial regulatory agencies expected came in Chamber of 
Commerce v. SEC.314 In Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, the rule at issue required that mutual 
fund boards of directors have no less than 75% independent directors and be chaired by an 
independent director. The D.C. Circuit rejected the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s challenge to 
the SEC’s statutory authority to adopt these two requirements as well as the Chamber’s primary 
challenges to the SEC’s reasoning for adopting the rule.315 The D.C. Circuit, however, agreed 
with the Chamber that “the SEC did violate the Administrative Procedure Act by failing 
adequately to consider the costs mutual funds would incur in order to comply with the conditions 
and by failing adequately to consider a proposed alternative to the independent chairman 
condition.”316 
 
In striking down the proposed rule for failure to conduct an adequate cost benefit 
analysis, the D.C. Circuit found that “failure to consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed 
regulatory action may be sufficient to invalidate the whole cost benefit analysis and therefore the 
rule itself.”317 The D.C. Circuit explained that under the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard, “the court must be sure the Commission has examined the 
relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the regulatory choice made.”318 The court further 
explained that a proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious if the relevant agency fails to consider 
factors under its organic statute and that the SEC’s organic statute requires it to consider costs 
and stated that “the agency should consider whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.”319 
 
The D.C. Circuit further held that “the SEC need not conduct an independent empirical 
study to meet the reasoned decision-making mandate and that it need not provide a 
comprehensive explanation for discounting or rejecting empirical studies.”320 However, it must 
“apprise itself—and hence the public and Congress—of the economic consequences of a 
proposed regulation before it decides whether to adopt the measure and adequately consider non-
frivolous alternatives to the proposed regulation.”321 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit blamed the 
SEC for failing to consider the costs of compliance that the mutual funds would suffer and found 
“incredible” the SEC’s claim that it had no “‘reliable basis for determining how funds would 
choose to satisfy the condition and therefore it was difficult to determine the costs associated 
with electing independent directors.”322 It is interesting to note that on remand, the SEC was able 
to quantify these costs in a matter of weeks. In the words of one commentator, “this rapid about-
face must call into question the Commission’s diligence with respect to cost benefit analysis 
before Chamber of Commerce v. SEC forced it to take such analysis seriously.”323 
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In 2010, the D.C. Circuit continued with the same aggressive approach with regard to the 
economic analysis of financial regulation and the use of cost benefit analysis in financial 
rulemaking. In American Equity Investment Life Insurance v. SEC the rule at issue classified 
fixed indexed annuities as securities and therefore subject to federal securities laws.324 The D.C. 
Circuit deferred to the SEC’s interpretation of the federal securities law to classify fixed indexed 
annuities as securities, but it nevertheless vacated the rule because “the SEC failed to properly 
consider the effect of the rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”325 The D.C. 
Circuit faulted the SEC for a number of errors in its cost benefit analysis. First, the court found 
the SEC’s consideration of “competition” inadequate, concluding that “the SEC purports to have 
analyzed the effect of the rule on competition, but does not disclose a reasoned basis for its 
conclusion that the rule would increase competition.”326 Second, and more importantly, the D.C. 
Circuit faulted the SEC’s cost benefit analysis for failing to make any “finding on the existing 
level of competition in the marketplace under the state law regime.”327 It similarly faulted the 
SEC with respect to its efficiency analysis as “incomplete because it fails to determine whether, 
under the existing regime, sufficient protections existed to enable investors to make informed 
investment decisions and sellers to make suitable recommendations to investors.”328 This 
criticism as to the SEC’s failure to consider the status quo goes to a fundamental principle of cost 
benefit analysis which is “the need to define a baseline.”329 The D.C. Circuit explained that 
“without an established baseline, a regulatory agency cannot truly consider the costs and benefits 
of the proposed regulation over the status quo, much less compare the proposed regulation with 
other potential alternative regulatory approaches (or no regulation at all).”330 In other words, 
“without an empirical baseline, the SEC’s assertion, even if based on common sense economic 
theory, was baseless because it was grounded on speculation alone”. 331 
  
The leading decision on the SEC’s use of cost benefit analysis in financial rulemaking is 
Business Roundtable.332 In Business Roundtable, the rule at issue was the proxy access rule, 
which required public companies to provide shareholders with information about, and their 
ability to vote for, shareholder-nominated candidates for the board of directors by including in 
the companies’ proxy materials the names of any person nominated by a qualifying shareholder 
for election to the board of directors.333 The D.C. Circuit vacated the rule based on a number of 
criticisms of the agency’s cost benefit analysis. Similar to its approach in Chamber of Commerce 
and American Equity Investment, the D.C. Circuit pointed out several steps the SEC had failed 
to take in the cost benefit analysis. In particular, the court faulted the SEC for “discounting the 
costs of the proposed rule—but not the benefits—as a mere artifact of the state law right of 
shareholders to elect directors.”334 In the words of the D.C. Circuit “this is a fundamental error in 
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cost benefit analysis: to only discount for the costs of the existing state law but not even attempt 
to estimate and discount the benefits of state law”.335 
 
The D.C. Circuit reiterated its discussion in Chamber of Commerce that “this type of 
reasoning, which fails to view a cost at the margin, is illogical and, in an economic analysis, 
unacceptable.”336 It further held that the SEC had not “sufficiently examined the relevant data 
and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between 
the facts found and the choices made”.337 The D.C. Circuit, however, went beyond its approach 
in previous cases to actually re-define the cost benefit analysis standards. The court criticized the 
SEC’s extensive review of the empirical evidence and reached its own conclusion that “the 
evidence the SEC had relied on was not enough to justify the rule”338 In the words of judge 
Ginsburg: 
 
“In view of the admittedly (and at best) “mixed” empirical evidence, we think the Commission 
has not sufficiently supported its conclusion that increasing the potential for election of directors 
nominated by shareholders will result in improved board and company performance and shareholder 
value.”339 
 
The D.C. Circuit eventually vacated the rule on the basis that the SEC “failed adequately 
to consider the rule’s effect upon efficiency, competition and capital formation.”340 It further 
concluded that “a cost benefit analysis characterized with such faults rendered the rule arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”.341 This approach to 
judicial review of the SEC’s financial rulemaking appears much more rigorous than the one the 
D.C. Circuit traditionally applied in other agency cases. Indeed, in a subsequent decision, the 
D.C. Circuit emphasized that the “evidentiary problem in Business Roundtable was not limited to 
the agency’s insufficient treatment of any one study,” but “it was the agency’s larger failure to 
deal with the weight of the evidence against it.”342 Ultimately, the court clarified that “an 
agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious if it entirely failed to consider an important aspect of 
the problem or offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency.”343 
 
Business Roundtable has become one of the most important financial regulation decisions 
since cost benefit analysis was developed in the early 1970s by holding financial regulators 
strictly accountable for the quality of their cost benefit analysis.344 It established a far more 
rigorous standard of review than the one the financial regulators had previously used. The 
decision appears to require courts to “police the quality of regulators cost benefit analysis and 
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has adequately considered and ascertained the rule’s costs and benefits based on all the 
alternatives available.”345 
 
The decision in Business Roundtable is also significant as it was the first challenge of a 
rule adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act, based on the implementing agency’s failure to perform 
an adequate cost benefit analysis.346 It also represents a turning point indicative of an 
unprecedented level of judicial scrutiny of financial regulation, forcing the SEC and other 
regulators poised to issue rules and regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act, to take a whole new 
approach to their rulemaking process.347 Despite extensive criticism, the decision appears to have 
mandated more demanding and strict standards of judicial review of the cost benefit analysis of 
financial regulation.348 Depending on one’s view, such a powerful approach or filter of financial 
regulation could either “further ossify the financial rulemaking process349 or make the rules that 
emerge from the process more rational, efficient, and transparent.”350 The following section of 
this paper will examine the SEC response to the Business Roundtable decision and the Cost 
Benefit Analysis Guidance Memorandum issued on March 16, 2012.351 
 
iv. SEC RESPONSE: 2012 COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM 
 
 Less than a year after the D.C. Circuit issued the Business Roundtable decision, the SEC 
released its Guidance Memorandum on the use of cost benefit analysis in financial rulemaking, 
embracing the cost benefit analysis fundamentals set forth in the D.C. Circuit’s trilogy discussed 
above.352 These principles are briefly discussed below: 
 
a) Define the Baseline  
 
The SEC proposed that a major step in its cost benefit analysis of financial regulation is 
to “define the baseline against which to measure the proposed rule’s economic impact.”353  The 
SEC explained that “the baseline serves as a primary point of comparison because an economic 
analysis of a proposed regulatory action compares the current state of the world to the expected 
state of the world with the proposed regulation (or regulatory alternatives) in effect.”354 The SEC 
also noted the American Equity Investment decision and its conclusion that “the SEC’s analysis 
was inadequate because it did not measure the rule’s likely effect on efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation against a baseline that included the existing level of those economic factors.”355 
 
b) Identify and Discuss Reasonable Alternatives to the Proposed Rule 
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The SEC Guidance Memorandum also proposed that the SEC’s approach to cost benefit 
analysis must “identify and discuss reasonable alternatives to the proposed rule.”356 The SEC 
further explained that “the release should identify a range of regulatory alternatives to the 
approach in the proposed rule in order to make the best regulatory choice,” and it quotes the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Chamber of Commerce for the proposition that “only reasonable 
alternatives must be considered: Such alternatives include those that are ‘neither frivolous nor 
out of bounds.”357 
 
c) Identify Relevant Benefits and Costs 
  
  The SEC Guidance Memorandum also underscores that the release must “identify 
relevant benefits and costs” and then provides a nonexhaustive list of potential benefits and 
costs.358 Although the SEC does not specifically cite the D.C. Circuit for this principle, the 
Guidance Memorandum seems to respond to the Chamber of Commerce decision (failure to 
consider certain costs) and the American Equity Investments decision (failure to provide a 
reasoned basis for consideration of a statutory factor). Later in the Guidance Memorandum, the 
SEC expressly notes that “the release should integrate the cost benefit analysis section with its 
analysis of the factors set forth in the statute— efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”359 
 
 
d) Attempt to Quantify Costs and Benefits and Provide an Explanation in Case 
Quantification is Not Possible 
 
The Guidance Memorandum also underscores that the SEC should “quantify expected 
benefits and costs to the extent feasible” and that “if not reasonably feasible, the release should 
include an explanation of the reasons why quantification is not practicable and include a 
qualitative analysis of the likely economic consequences of the proposed rule and reasonable 
regulatory alternatives.”360 This principle is consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in 
Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable and the notion that “the SEC must attempt to 
quantify anticipated costs and benefits, even where the available data is imperfect and where 
doing so may require using estimates.”361  
 
e) Frame Costs and Benefits Neutrally and Consistently  
 
The Guidance Memorandum directly responds to the D.C. Circuit’s criticism in Business 
Roundtable that “the SEC had opportunistically and inconsistently framed the costs and benefits 
of the proposed rule.”362 It explains that “the release should evaluate the costs and benefits even-
handedly and candidly, acknowledging any limitations in the data or quantifiable information. To 











benefits, consider and discuss the impact that those scenarios would have on both the costs and 
the benefits.”363 
 
f) Shift of Cost Benefit Analysis from Lawyers to Economists 
 
Finally, the SEC also responded to the D.C. Circuit’s more general criticism that the SEC 
should conduct sound empirical analysis that includes proper cost benefit analysis. At the end of 
the Guidance Memorandum, the SEC includes a separate section titled “Enhanced integration of 
economic analysis into the rulemaking process and rule releases.”364 Among other things, this 
section of the Guidance Memorandum underscores that economists from the SEC’s Division of 
Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation (RSFI) “should be fully integrated members of the rule-
writing team, and contribute to all elements of the rule-writing process.”365 The Guidance 
Memorandum also goes further and emphasizes that economists—and not just legal 
professionals —should be heavily involved in all stages of the agency’s cost benefit and other 
economic analysis in rulemaking. In summary, although the SEC’s course of action is one that 
other financial regulators can learn from and should follow, it still remains to be seen whether 
the SEC will put its Guidance Memorandum into practice in a way that is consistent with the 
Business Roundtable decision. The following section of the paper will examine the political 
economy of financial regulation following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable. It 
will discuss how the rigorous cost benefit analysis standards established in the Business 
Roundtable decision may affect the political economy of financial regulation and how actors in 
the political economy of financial rulemaking may respond to the Business Roundtable decision. 
We will then look more specifically at Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing 
rules and examine whether they are  supported by an adequate cost benefit analysis consistent 
with the Business Roundtable decision. 
 
v. THE IMPACT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE DECISION ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
We now turn to the impact of the Business Roundtable decision and the rigorous standard 
of judicial review of the cost benefit analysis of financial regulations on the political economy of 
financial rulemaking. The most immediate and apparent effect has been to increase the expected 
administrative and litigation costs of financial rulemaking and in essence, to slow down the 
rulemaking process, given the scope and nature of the cost benefit analysis regulators and 
agencies have to go through. This impact is most obvious in the context of the rulemaking 
process to implement the Dodd-Frank Act.366 By changing the costs and benefits of the cost 
benefit analysis process itself, the Business Roundtable decision has actually created incentives 
for different actors in the political economy of financial rulemaking to react in different ways. 
This part of the paper analyzes how various actors in the political economy of financial 









established by the D.C. Circuit as well as how these reactions could lead to a wide range of 
outcomes. Those key categories of actors are the financial industry, financial regulators, 
Congress and the Supreme Court.      
 
The Financial Industry  
 
The financial industry has already responded to the Business Roundtable decision by 
emphasizing the focus on regulators’ and agencies’ compliance with the cost benefit analysis 
requirements in its comment letters on proposed regulations as well as by filing lawsuits seeking 
to challenge different rules and regulations based on their failure to perform an adequate cost 
benefit analysis, consistent with the Business Roundtable decision. It is interesting to note that 
within just a few months after the Business Roundtable decision, two major financial trade 
organizations filed legal action seeking to challenge a rule issued under the Dodd-Frank Act, on 
the ground that it should be vacated because the CFTC had failed to perform an adequate cost 
benefit analysis.367 Additionally, a few other major financial trade organizations submitted a 
comment letter seeking to challenge the quality of the cost benefit analysis review in connection 
with the proposed regulations implementing the Volcker Rule.368 In this Comment Letter, these 
financial organizations actually threatened to “challenge the proposed regulations implementing 
the Volcker Rule unless the appropriate financial regulatory agencies review and re-submit the 
proposed regulations after performing a rigorous cost benefit analysis of the proposed regulatory 
actions.369 
 
The Business Roundtable decision clearly sets the foundation for effective challenges to a 
regulators' or agencies' rulemaking process. During the notice-and-comment period, Business 
Roundtable actually gives opponents of a particular rule or regulation an incentive to submit 
detailed comments identifying a wide range of costs—particularly costs that will be difficult for 
the agency or regulator to quantify and rebut. The financial industry, with its extensive resources 
and financial expertise, for example, can submit such comments in order to increase the costs 
incurred by the agency to research and address the comments, and eventually defend itself in 
court. Given the D.C. Circuit’s rigorous standard of review and willingness to intervene and 
actually second-guess an agency’s review of conflicting studies in the Business Roundtable 
decision, the financial industry is likely to include data, empirical analyses, research and expert 
witnesses that undercut any unfounded arguments, assumptions, research or reasoning upon 
which an agency tries to rely on in adopting the proposed rule. By holding regulators and 
agencies to a much higher standard of review, Business Roundtable actually gives the financial 
industry a strategic tool to challenge proposed rules the industry considers unfavorable. Business 
Roundtable in essence provides the industry with an incentive to raise every aspect of the cost 
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benefit analysis that might be poorly reasoned, insufficiently supported, or procedurally 
defective because even the smallest flaw could lead to the rule being vacated.370  
 
  The Business Roundtable decision both reduced the cost and increased the benefits of 
challenges or attempts to challenge financial regulations. It reduced the costs to challengers by 
effectively shifting the burden of proof onto the financial regulators or agencies to demonstrate 
that the quality of their cost benefit analysis satisfies the relevant statutory mandate and is 
consistent with the D.C. Circuit rigorous standards of review in Business Roundtable.371 Instead 
of having to handle the burden of proving that an agency’s cost benefit analysis is inadequate, 
challengers only have to raise sufficient doubt about whether the agency satisfied its burden of 
proof or considered all the relevant factors.372 Business Roundtable has clearly increased the 
likely benefits from such litigation or potential challenges to proposed rules. Through holding 
regulators or agencies strictly accountable for the quality and standards of their cost benefit 
analysis reviews, challengers can expect agencies to respond by creating rules that are most 
narrowly tailored to the regulatory goal and least burdensome on the financial industry, the 
public and the economy as a whole.373 This process is very much in line with the language of the 
executive orders discussed above,374 ensuring that regulators and agencies actually consider the 
effectiveness and consequences of their regulatory actions, determine the best course of action 
and propose rules that produce a net positive effect and are based on a rigorous cost benefit 
analysis and economic justification. Business Roundtable, and its unprecedented level of judicial 
scrutiny of financial regulation, also provide a powerful incentive for the financial industry to 
lobby for more statutory cost benefit analysis mandates. The industry is likely to encourage 
Congress to enact statutes imposing cost benefit analysis mandates on all financial regulations, 




The immediate effect of the Business Roundtable decision is that the financial regulators 
or agencies may not be able to adopt as many rules and regulations with their current resources. 
This new cost benefit analysis environment may drive up the costs of the rulemaking process for 
a couple of reasons. First, the cost of defending rules and regulations in court on cost benefit 
analysis grounds will become a major administrative cost for financial regulators and agencies. 
Second, the threat of litigation seeking to challenge and vacate the proposed rules over 
inadequate cost benefit analysis grounds may become a strong incentive for financial regulators 
or agencies to spend more time, money and resources in the rulemaking process, conducting 
more rigorous cost benefit analysis in order to minimize the risk of the rule being challenged or 
vacated. To avoid the risk of litigation or vacating the proposed rule, regulators or agencies may 
need to devote more resources to each rulemaking. They may need to hire more economists, or 
redirect economists already on their staffs and utilize their resources more efficiently in order to 
improve the quality of their cost benefit analysis and survive judicial scrutiny in a post-Business 
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Roundtable environment.375 As the rulemaking process is extremely expensive and time 
consuming, it is expected that agencies and regulators will reduce the number of rules and 
regulations they adopt. If rulemaking is mandated, as in the case of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
regulators and agencies are likely to continue to miss deadlines or adopt as few rules as possible, 
which to some extent defeats the purpose of the whole financial regulatory reform of the Dodd-
Frank Act.  
 
Also, it is anticipated that the pace of agency rulemaking procedures will be significantly 
reduced or slowed down. There is already evidence indicating that the financial regulatory 
agencies have slowed down the process of issuing rules under the Dodd-Frank Act as a result of 
the Business Roundtable decision.376 Clearly, financial regulators and agencies are affected and 
to some extent pressured by the Business Roundtable decision and the requirement to improve 
their cost benefit analysis system. As former CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton explained, 
“some regulators live in constant fear and are virtually paralyzed by the threat of spuriously filed 
lawsuits focusing on agency cost benefit analysis."377 He further explained that "whether 
challenges to agency rules and procedures are spurious or not, Business Roundtable will open a 
Pandora’s box of challenges to financial regulations going forward. Rules currently in the 
pipeline will be delayed so regulators can revisit the cost benefit analysis portions of their 
proposed rules. Therefore, it is better for the agencies to delay a rule and salvage it by 
performing a sufficient cost benefit analysis than to risk having the rule overturned or vacated in 
court and begin the entire process over again."378 
 
  However, it is important to note that despite these implications of the Business 
Roundtable decision, these agency responses and changes to the political economy environment 
are overall a positive outcome of the Business Roundtable decision. Agencies and regulators will 
carefully consider the effectiveness and consequences of their regulatory actions, determine the 
best course of action and adopt the best rules, based on a rigorous cost benefit analysis and 
economic justification. This approach will enable them to reach the right regulatory solution, 
ensuring that the rules will be much more sharply crafted to address the problem to be remedied 
and are least burdensome to society and the economy as a whole. This also goes to the essence of 
cost benefit analysis as a fundamental regulatory tool which is to ensure a more rational decision 
making process, efficient regulatory actions and the best regulatory choices by regulators and 
agencies. The risk, however, is that certain areas that require regulation may be left unregulated 
or subject to inadequate regulations, given the slower pace, potential delays and higher cost of 
financial rulemaking in a post-Business Roundtable environment. 
 
Still, if courts continue to hold regulators and agencies strictly accountable for the quality 
of their cost benefit analysis review, like in the Business Roundtable decision, regulatory 
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agencies are likely to continue to respond to the Business Roundtable decision by improving and 
enhancing the quality of their cost benefit analysis as well as their cost benefit analysis resources 
and capabilities. The goal would be to minimize the risk of challenges to the proposed rules and 
possibly having the rule struck down by the court. As a result, the quality of regulatory actions 
and their cost benefit backup is likely to improve, leading to much more rational, reasoned, least 
burdensome and economically efficient regulatory actions. 
 
Case Study:  Dodd-Frank Rulemaking - CFTC Positions Limit Rule 
 
  In December 2011, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA") and 
the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association ("SIFMA") filed a lawsuit against the 
CFTC, seeking to challenge the CFTC’s Rule, adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act,  imposing 
position limits on swap dealers. The complaint of ISDA focused mainly on the failure of the 
CFTC to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis, consistent with the standards of the Business 
Roundtable decision.379 An opinion granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was 
granted by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The rule was "vacated for failure 
to conduct an adequate cost benefit analysis and remanded to the CFTC for revision."380 
  
  The Dodd-Frank Act granted the CFTC the power to create position limits for futures, 
options, and swaps.381 The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPR") for the position limits rule 
included only a very short discussion of the costs and benefits of the proposed rule.382 One of the 
Commissioners who voted in favor of the CFTC’s rule stated that “no one has presented this 
agency any reliable economic analysis to support either the contention that excessive speculation 
is affecting the market we regulate or that position limits will prevent excessive speculation.”383 
Commissioner Dunn further explained, his “fear is that position limits, at best a cure for a disease 
that does not exist, are a placebo for one that does. At worst, position limits may harm the very 
markets the CFTC is intending to protect.”384 The Commissioner further stated that he had 
"voted for the position limits rule solely on the assumption that the Dodd-Frank Act required the 
establishment of position limits irrespective of cost."385 
 
  In its efforts to challenge the proposed rule, ISDA alleged that "the Commission grossly 
misinterpreted its statutory authority by finding that Congress did not require the CFTC to 
prepare a cost benefit analysis for the rule.386 ISDA alleged that "the Commodity Exchange Act, 
as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, authorized the CFTC to establish position limits only if it 
first finds that they are necessary to diminish, eliminate, or prevent an undue and unnecessary 
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burden on interstate commerce caused by excessive speculation and are otherwise 
appropriate."387 This is an important element of the ISDA’s argument because without a cost 
benefit analysis mandate, the CFTC’s alleged deficient or inadequate cost benefit analysis is 
irrelevant. The statutory language of the relevant provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act does not 
clearly require a cost benefit analysis and permits the CFTC to "adopt rules or regulations that 
are necessary or otherwise appropriate to accomplish its statutory mandate."388 However, 
although these statutory provisions do not clearly require the CFTC to perform a cost benefit 
analysis in connection with its rulemaking, this statutory language is very similar and not less 
clear than the provisions in the Business Roundtable case that were actually interpreted by the 
D.C. Circuit to mandate a rigorous cost benefit analysis.  
 
  ISDA further argued that "the CFTC failed to conduct any substantial cost benefit 
analysis, much less the rigorous cost benefit analysis required by the Business Roundtable 
decision.389 The most critical issue was "the Commission’s repeated admission that its final rule 
lacked empirical evidence for many of the CFTC’s assertions."390 ISDA also argued that “rather 
than making a genuine effort to estimate the costs, the CFTC cited its own failure to obtain 
empirical data that would enable it to assess the impact of the Position Limits Rule."391 It is 
important to note that the CFTC’s cost benefit analysis requirements are far less demanding than 
the SEC’s analysis was in Business Roundtable. Therefore, given that the CFTC’s cost benefit 
analysis of the position limits rule was generally unsupported by adequate evidence, research or 
analysis, it seems likely to also fail under the standard of review established in Business 
Roundtable, which "will not credit or accept mere speculation that insufficiently supports an 
agency’s position."392 The CFTC in this case also engaged in some of the practices that the D.C. 
Circuit heavily criticized in the Business Roundtable decision. Although ISDA’s complaint did 
not raise these rulemaking flaws, the CFTC "failed to make a good faith effort to quantify the 
consequences or costs of the rule on market participation or trading strategies."393 ISDA’s 
successful challenge to the position limits rule  demonstrates the effectiveness of challenges to 





  The Business Roundtable decision significantly impacts the incentives of lobbyists, 
political entrepreneurs and members of Congress. There are even strategies that legislative 
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budgeting, new cost benefit analysis mandates, statutory language, sunset provisions, and 
rulemaking conditions.394 Both opponents and supporters of demanding or rigorous cost benefit 
analysis are likely to engage in strategic budgeting practices or behavior. The increased costs of 
the rulemaking process resulting from the Business Roundtable decision highlight the 
effectiveness of strategic budgeting. Republicans in control of the House "are currently trying to 
starve the ability of regulatory agencies to implement a range of programs and regulations 
including the Dodd-Frank Act."395 Supporters of cost benefit analysis may try to increase fiscal 
pressure on regulatory agencies tasked with implementing the Dodd-Frank Act by reducing their 
budgets even further.   
 
  Business Roundtable highlights the importance of statutory cost benefit analysis 
mandates. Those who wish to “rationalize” the rulemaking process by driving up rulemaking 
costs will try to insert cost benefit analysis mandates into new legislation wherever possible. 
Supporters of cost benefit analysis have already succeeded in imposing cost benefit analysis 
mandates in the Dodd-Frank Act. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act created the CFPB. In 
Section 1022 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress explicitly required the CFPB to analyze each 
rule’s costs and benefits to consumers, as well as each rule’s expected broader economic 
impact.396 Supporters of strict cost benefit analysis have tried to "pass blanket cost benefit 
analysis mandates to reach future and past rules promulgated by independent and executive 
agencies."397 Bills proposing such mandates have already been introduced. For example, Senator 
Shelby introduced the Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, which tried to impose 
rigorous prospective and retroactive cost benefit analysis requirements on all financial 
regulations.398 Also, Senators Collins, Portman, and Warner introduced the Independent Agency 
Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, which would "authorize the President to require independent 
financial regulatory agencies, other than the Federal Reserve and the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), to comply with the cost benefit analysis mandates applicable to executive 
agencies under existing Executive Orders."399 In contrast, opponents of rigorous cost benefit 
analysis review are likely to try to reduce cost benefit analysis mandates given the strong 
position of the D.C. Circuit in the Business Roundtable decision. The Business Roundtable 
decision also gives both opponents and supporters of cost benefit analysis an incentive to fight 
over the precise language of cost benefit analysis mandates in the context of new legislation.  
 
  The hardest-line cost benefit analysis, which demands pure quantitative cost benefit 
analysis, will probably never prevail since even the strong proponents of cost benefit analysis 
and the Business Roundtable decision recognize that some costs and benefits associated with the 
adoption of a new rule cannot be accurately measured. However, supporters of cost benefit 
analysis would have an incentive to push for language that requires benefits to outweigh the 
costs of any proposed rule or regulation. Such language would strengthen the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding in Business Roundtable and legislatively shift or allocate the burden of proof onto the 
regulators or agencies. Opponents of cost benefit analysis, however, would have an incentive to 
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push for vague or even uncertain language in cost benefit analysis mandates requiring that 
regulators or agencies merely “consider” costs. Vague language in cost benefit analysis mandates 
may expose the Business Roundtable decision to reversal by subsequent D.C. Circuit decisions 
or by the Supreme Court itself. Opponents could even try to legislatively reverse the Business 
Roundtable decision by introducing language shifting the burden of cost benefit analysis to 
parties challenging a final rule in court. 
 
  It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has never actually addressed the proper 
scope of judicial review of financial regulation in the context of cost benefit analysis. The 
Business Roundtable decision presents the court with this opportunity. The D.C. Circuit review 
in the Business Roundtable decision was performed within the scope of the "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act,400 but as discussed above, the court's 
review was much more rigorous and comprehensive than the traditional standard of review in 
previous cost benefit analysis cases. It remains to be seen, how the Supreme Court may handle 
this question as to the review function of the court beyond the Administrative Procedure Act. 
The following sections of the paper will discuss the costs and benefits of Title IV’s 
implementing rules, whether they are  in fact supported by the rigorous cost benefit analysis that 
would survive judicial scrutiny after the Business Roundtable decision and whether they  
represent an efficient reform that is consistent with the standard of review set by the D.C. 
Circuit. 
 
vi. TITLE IV OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS AFTER BUSINESS 
ROUNDTABLE 
 
We now turn to examine the costs and benefits of Title IV’s implementing rules  and 
whether they : i) are in fact supported by the rigorous economic analysis that would survive 
judicial scrutiny after the Business Roundtable decision, ii) represent the best regulatory choice, 
and iii) represent a rational decision-making and efficient regulatory action that advance the 
public interest.   
 
  The following sections of this paper will demonstrate that Title IV’s implementing rules 
do not represent a rational decision-making or the best regulatory choice in the context of private 
equity funds. These sections of the paper will further explain that the decision of the SEC to 
include private equity funds within the scope of the regulations and subject them to extensive 
SEC registration and reporting requirements is inadequate, unnecessarily costly, inconsistent 
with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and its underlying economic theory of 
regulation, inefficient, too disclosure-focused, does not improve investor welfare, based on 
fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of private equity and does not properly address the 
risk of too much leverage. The rest of this paper will take the position that overall, Title IV and 
its implementing rules fail to achieve their intended goals and impose costs that exceed their 
benefits. Society and the economy do not gain enough from Title IV and its implementing rules 
to justify their costs. 
 
 
400 See supra note 13. 
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The following sections of this paper will also demonstrate that Title IV’s implementing 
rules do not meet the economic analysis and cost benefit justification standards set by the D.C. 
Circuit in the Business Roundtable decision. They will show that Title IV’s implementing rules 
are not supported by i) any substantial cost benefit analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny 
after the decision in Business Roundtable, and ii) any other compelling argument demonstrating 
that the benefits of Title IV are greater than its costs. This paper takes the position that the SEC, 
in implementing Title IV, had actually failed to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis, 
consistent with the Business Roundtable decision, and did not consider any regulatory 
alternatives or the impact of this legislation on efficiency, competition and capital formation. The 
SEC also failed to articulate a satisfactory and reasoned explanation for its regulatory actions, 
including a rational connection between the pre-crisis conduct and failures Title IV and its 
implementing rules were trying to address, in the context of private equity funds, and the 
regulatory choices made.  
 
  As this paper will show in Part IV, private equity funds pose minimal systemic risk to the 
financial system and present no threat to the financial stability of the financial system or the 
economy as a whole. No demonstrable market failure was ever identified in the context of the 
private equity industry to justify such regulatory intervention and broad regulations. 
Additionally, the SEC adopting releases provide no empirical academic literature or evidence to 
support any specific regulatory concern associated with the private equity sector and its pre-crisis 
conduct in the context of systemic risk and a potential financial crisis. The 2008 financial crisis 
had very little to do with private equity funds. Private equity funds did not cause the financial 
crisis and did not play any part in the credit crisis. They did not contribute to the build-up of 
systemic risk that eventually led to the near-collapse of the financial system and were simply not 
part of the problem or any market failure, unlike hedge funds. Therefore, private equity funds 
should have posed very little concern for regulators and policymakers seeking to develop a new 
regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and guard against a future financial crisis.    
 
The rest of this paper also demonstrates that like any traditional post-crisis reform 
legislation, Title IV and its implementing rules may have satisfied a political need, but they will 
not benefit the financial market or the economy as a whole, will not improve investor welfare 
and will not reduce the risks that private equity funds may pose to the financial system. I argue, 
instead, in the following sections of the paper, that since private equity funds are not a major 
source of systemic risk, they play a critical role as a driver of economic growth and their 
investors have the resources and sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, these funds and their 
advisers should be subject to a reduced and different regulatory regime and exempt from the 
SEC registration, reporting and disclosure requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Reviewing the SEC adopting releases supports this position as nowhere in these adopting 
releases was there any discussion of any concerns or risks associated with private equity funds, 
and their pre-crisis conduct or any benefit to private equity investors or the financial system as a 
result of adopting these rules.    
 
  Part III(a) of this paper has already analyzed the legislative history of Title IV and its 
implementing rules and demonstrated that the focus of the legislative history and the 
implementing rules was clearly on hedge funds and the need to address the lack of transparency 
in the hedge fund sector and control the systemic risk associated with the activities of hedge 
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funds.401 The examination of the legislative history of Title IV and its implementing rules 
indicates very clearly that regulators were not at all concerned about private equity funds and not 
directly focused on the private equity sector when they analyzed the 2008 financial crisis and 
spoke against the systemic risk concerns of private investment funds. In the implementing rules, 
there was no empirical evidence, research or analysis discussed with regard to concerns 
associated with the private equity sector, failures or risks related to the private equity industry or 
the pre-crisis conduct of private equity funds. Also, there was no analysis or evidence to support 
or justify the need for this government intervention in the private equity sector, no reasoned 
explanation for the regulatory actions and no discussion of other regulatory alternatives. In other 
words, nowhere in the legislative history and particularly the SEC adopting releases was there 
any discussion about private equity funds. The activities targeted by regulators were only hedge 
funds.  
 
This approach is inconsistent with the D.C. Circuit position in the Business Roundtable 
decision. The legislative history of Title IV and its implementing rules  demonstrates that there 
was no credible cost benefit analysis performed in the rulemaking process in the context of the 
private equity sector, (and definitely not the rigorous economic analysis required by the D.C. 
Circuit in the Business Roundtable decision) as well as no consideration of alternatives to the 
selected regulatory choice. The rulemaking process by the SEC was  deficient in terms of 
performing any adequate cost benefit analysis, analyzing the pre-crisis conduct of private equity 
funds, examining the relevant factors, articulating a reasoned explanation for the regulatory 
action, establishing the rational connection between the pre-crisis facts the SEC was trying to 
address and the regulatory choice made and recognizing that the private equity industry had very 
little to do with the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
  Additionally, as will be discussed in Part IV, this paper takes the position that there is no 
rational connection between the actual facts and the regularity choice made by the SEC as well 
as no benefit to society or the economy as a whole with respect to Title IV and its implementing 
rules. One of the primary objectives of the Dodd-frank Act is to control or reduce systemic risk 
in the financial system and enhance the stability of the financial system.402 However, as Part IV 
of the paper  demonstrates, private equity funds pose very minimal systemic risk to the financial 
system and present no threat to the financial stability of the financial system or the economy as a 
whole. No demonstrable market failure was ever identified in the context of the private equity 
industry to justify such regulatory intervention and broad regulations. Additionally, there is no 
empirical academic literature, study or evidence to support any specific regulatory concern 
associated with the private equity sector and its pre-crisis conduct in the context of systemic risk 
and a potential financial crisis. As discussed in Part IV of this paper, the 2008 financial crisis had 
very little to do with private equity funds. Private equity funds did not cause the financial crisis 
and did not play any part in the credit crisis. They did not contribute to the build-up of systemic 
risk that eventually led to the near-collapse of the financial system and were simply not part of 
the problem or any market failure, unlike hedge funds.403 As Part IV of this paper demonstrates, 
private equity funds present none of the systemic risk factors that led to the financial crisis and 
thus should have posed very little concern for regulators and policymakers seeking to develop a 
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new regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and guard against a future financial crisis. 
Therefore, from the benefits side perspective, the notion of Title IV as a tool to reduce or control 
systemic risk and enhance financial stability is questionable, inefficient and does not justify the 
regulatory actions taken by the SEC. 
 
  From the benefits side perspective, Part III(d) of this paper will also challenge the 
disclosure based approach of Title IV and demonstrate its inefficiency. Using financial 
regulation like Title IV to protect investors through a disclosure model may be a worthy goal, but 
this goal, in the context of private equity funds, is clearly ineffective, unnecessary and 
inconsistent with fundamental principles of U.S. securities laws, which presume that investors in 
private equity funds, who are necessarily experienced, wealthy and have extensive resources to 
conduct their own due diligence or retain professional advisors, are able to protect themselves 
without any regulatory intervention. As discussed in Part II of this paper, private equity investors 
are usually large, sophisticated institutional investors, capable of identifying, obtaining and 
processing the information necessary to evaluate an investment opportunity and make an 
informed investment decision. Additionally, Title IV and its implementing rules require private 
equity funds to disclose extensive information that is already being provided to private equity 
investors by the funds voluntarily during the process of raising capital and on a regular basis. 
Therefore, Title IV, its implementing rules and their registration, reporting and increased 
disclosure requirements may be viewed as unwarranted and inefficient to the extent that their 
purpose is to protect private equity investors who are already able to protect themselves. There is 
simply no additional benefit to investors as a result of Title IV’s implementing rules and their 
disclosure requirements. 
 
Furthermore, from the cost side perspective, Part IV(d) of this paper demonstrates the 
failure of the SEC to recognize that private equity is a major driver of economic growth and 
innovation and plays a key role in the economic recovery of the U.S. Given the importance of 
private equity as a vital engine that helps drive the American economy, this paper takes the 
position that subjecting private equity funds to excessive and unnecessary regulatory 
requirements may jeopardize the nation’s economic growth and recovery and the role private 
equity funds play in the U.S. economy. Requiring private equity funds to register with the SEC 
under Title IV will needlessly divert capital, time and effort from productive investment 
activities that could be creating jobs and drive economic growth. It will simply impose an undue 
burden on private equity funds (particularly small and mid-size funds), drain their resources and 
diminish their ability to continue their investment activities at a critical time. Part IV(d) of this 
paper will show that rather than using their resources to invest in businesses and drive growth, 
private equity funds will have to use some of their resources to build the necessary compliance 
infrastructure and comply with the new regulatory regime that imposes tremendous costs, 
seeking to solve a non-existent problem, as discussed in Parts III and IV of this paper. 
Additionally, the total cost of compliance with Title IV, a factor that was not considered by 
regulators in the rulemaking process, for all new private equity funds may reduce returns to 
private equity investors such as endowments and pension funds and may also hurt the economy 




The following section of this paper will examine the underlying economic theory of 
regulation behind the Dodd-Frank Act and Title IV and whether it supports the regulation of 
private equity funds or any government intervention in the private equity sector.  
 
C.  THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION 
 
This part of the paper will examine Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act in terms of the 
underlying economic theory of regulation and assess whether it addresses the market failures that 
led to the 2008 financial crisis and the relevant externalities. It will demonstrate that the 
economic theory of regulation underlying the Dodd-Frank Act and Title IV does not support the 
regulation of private equity funds or any government intervention in the private equity sector. 
This analysis will start with the concept of market failure which is central to regulatory theory 
and the economic analysis of financial regulation.404  
 
The underlying economic theory of regulation behind the Dodd-Frank Act is very clear 
and its primary focus is on the market failures that led to the near collapse of the entire financial 
system in 2008.405 In financial markets, market failure is one of the most important arguments 
for government regulatory intervention.406 Regulators and policymakers are concerned with the 
causes of market failures and possible means of correction through government intervention.407 
Governments usually regulate where there is a market failure and financial regulation is very 
often the reaction to a market failure. For example, the corporate accounting scandals of the early 
2000s resulted in Congress passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, creating a new regulatory 
environment for all public company boards, management and public accounting firms. The 
Securities Act of 1933 was a response to the stock market crash of 1929, which had precipitated 
the Great Depression. In the words of Professor Charles Whitehead, “new regulation seals up 
leaks in the financial system, usually following a crisis that threatens the stability of the financial 
system.”408 A leading policy analysis textbook by Professor David L. Weimar and Professor 
Aidan R. Vining asks: “when is it legitimate for government to intervene in private affairs? In 
the U.S., the normative answer to this question has usually been based on the concept of market 
failure – a circumstance where the pursuit of private interest does not lead to an efficient use of 
society’s resources or a fair distribution of society’s goods.”409 The market failure approach to 
regulation has become a tool by which policymakers and regulators learn how to objectively 
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Adam Smith argued that markets by themselves are efficient and that “in an ideal 
economic market individuals maximize the welfare of all simply by pursuing their own self- 
interest.”410 This argument has been used as the basis for “unfettered and unregulated markets 
and the era of free market capitalism.”411 However, history has shown us that the notion that 
markets can regulate themselves and lead to efficient outcomes without government intervention, 
has no theoretical or practical justification.412 Without adequate regulation, markets usually fail 
to act in an efficient and stable manner or allocate their resources efficiently.413 They fail to 
optimize social welfare and do not act in the way they are supposed to.414 In the words of 
Professor Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel prize-winning economist and former Chief Economist at the 
World Bank: “unfettered markets often fail and do not serve society well.”415   
 
Market failure is “the inability of an unregulated market to achieve allocative efficiency 
in all circumstances. In financial industries, market failure includes fraud, manipulation, 
deception, public loss of funds, and corporate collapse.”416 Market failure can occur due to 
externalities, market power (such as monopolies), asymmetric information, or common-pool 
resources/public goods. For example, without environmental regulation, a noisy factory might 
move next door to a residential area, adversely affecting property values.417 Anti-trust laws are 
necessary to prevent the creation of monopolies and anti-competitive practices.418 The sub-prime 
mortgage crisis would have been less severe had legislation or regulations to restrict predatory 
lending been adopted.419 Therefore, when markets fail to produce efficient outcomes, there is a 
strong rationale for regulatory government intervention.  
  
Professor Stiglitz argues that “nowhere are market failures more pervasive or more 
important, with such profound consequences for our economic system, than in the financial 
sector.”420 Over the past two hundred years, economic theory and financial history have 
demonstrated that “financial markets often fail to perform their key functions of managing risk 
and allocating capital well, with severe social and economic consequences.”421 These financial 
sector market failures are usually the most important justification for regulatory government 
intervention in the financial system.422 These regulatory interventions can take different forms 
including: disclosure requirements, restrictions on incentive schemes, restrictions on ownership, 
restrictions on particular behaviors and taxes designed to induce appropriate behaviors.423  
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This theory of economic regulation is based on the idea that governments must step in to 
regulate financial markets in instances when “these markets are unable to regulate themselves or 
where the price mechanism that regulates supply and demand breaks down, forcing governments 
to take action.”424 In other words, under this theory, government regulation is necessary when 
markets fail to provide the information that individuals need to protect themselves from harm or 
to correct for the negative side effects of or externalities of business activity.425 Therefore, 
regulatory intervention is critical if the public interest is to be protected and market failures are to 
be corrected. Regulating financial markets to correct market failures is sometimes referred to as 
the “public interest theory”.426 
 
The most common form of market failure, particularly in the context of the financial 
sector, is negative externalities.427 An externality or a transaction spillover is “an economic side 
effect or the effects of an economic activity on unrelated third parties, which are not captured in 
the price of the activity.”428 It is a situation where an economic transaction imposes costs (or 
benefits) on individuals who are not parties to the transaction.429 The classic example of a 
negative externality is pollution, in which the impact of a firm’s industrial activity causes harm 
to those geographically proximate to the polluting firm.430 Pollution is an unavoidable byproduct 
in many industries, and without proper regulation, most polluting companies will do very little to 
reduce their pollution levels due to the costs involved. Another example of negative externality is 
the systemic risk associated with a potential broad-based failure of the financial system.431 In the 
words of Professor Stiglitz:  
 
“We have regulations designed to mitigate the extent of externalities. These include, for instance, 
zoning restrictions and environmental regulations. We have regulations designed to maintain 
competition (restrictions on anti-competitive practices), and to ensure that natural monopolies do 
not abuse their monopoly position (utilities regulations). We have a large set of regulations aimed 
at protecting consumers (ensuring that the banks where they deposit their money are sufficiently 
sound, that food and products are safe, or that they are not taken advantage of by unscrupulous 
merchants, advertising or lenders).”432      
 
Professor Stiglitz further explains that “the recent financial crisis has highlighted the need 
for government intervention in the event of a failure of a systemically important institution, 
recognizing the existence of key externalities – the goal is to prevent the occurrence of these 
market failures in the future.”433 He further suggests that “one of the big failures that this 
financial crisis has exposed is that we allowed financial institutions to grow too big to fail. Not 
only may such large institutions be able to exploit market power, but they also pose systemic risk 
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to the economy and have perverse incentives which encourage such behavior. They know that if 
they undertake high risk activities and fail, the government will pick up the pieces, but if they 
succeed, they walk away with the gains”.434 It is these externalities which traditionally have been 
viewed as justifying regulatory intervention by the government in the financial sector. Financial 
regulations are designed primarily to remedy and mitigate the effect of these externalities or side 
effects and prevent a similar market failure in the future.  
 
In the context of the 2008 financial crisis, the externality that led to the market failure and 
the near collapse of the financial system, was the enormous buildup and emergence of systemic 
risk in the financial system, specifically the risk that large financial institutions, funded with 
short-term debt would fail all at once and cause a credit crisis and a systemic-wide collapse, if 
there is a correction in the housing market.435 The market failure here is that, although each 
financial institution may have been behaving optimally on an individual basis, the firms had no 
incentive to take into account the effect of their actions on the financial system as a whole.436 As 
a result, their actions produced external costs on the overall financial system and a failure of 
major financial institutions and the economy as a whole.437  
 
In the words of Professor Stiglitz: “the key market failure is that there is an important 
externality from the collapse of the financial system. Just like toxic wastes pollute the 
environment, America’s toxic mortgages polluted the world’s financial system.”438 These market 
failures do not always have clear solutions and much of modern financial regulation involves 
designing proper arrangements to remedy and mitigate the effects of these externalities. In the 
financial sector, the purpose of regulatory intervention is to manage systemic risk through 
regulation and requirements directed at individual firms and their behavior.439 The 2008 financial 
crisis has clearly demonstrated the need for government intervention in the financial sector in the 
event of a failure of a systemically important institution.440  
 
Like the regulatory reform of the 1930s or the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 
Dodd-Frank Act was passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis and these market failures that 
caused the near-collapse of the financial system.441 The Dodd-Frank Act is clearly well intended 
by focusing regulation for the first time on the negative externality of systemic risk in the 
financial sector.442 Additionally, the legislation introduces major reforms in other areas of the 
financial system that failed and contributed to the financial crisis, like off-balance sheet 
financing, over-the-counter derivatives, rating agencies and mortgage underwriting.443 Its 
primary purpose is to fix the negative externality of systemic risk in the financial industry, 
enhance financial stability, correct the market failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis and 
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435 See Acharya et al, supra  note 1. 
436 See Posner, supra note 179.    
437 Id. 
438 See Stiglitz, supra note 414. 
439 Id. 
440 See Acharya et al, supra  note 1. 
441 See David Skeel et al, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and its Unintended 





reduce the likelihood of a future financial crisis.444 The question however, is whether this 
underlying economic theory of regulation and the notion of market failure as a justification for 
regulatory intervention, support any government intervention in the private equity sector and are 
even relevant to the private equity industry and the pre-crisis activities of private equity funds. 
 
i)   TITLE IV AND THE MARKET FAILURE THEORY OF REGULATION 
 
Viewed using the lens of this economic theory of regulation, this paper takes the position 
that the Dodd-Frank Act and Title IV do not address any market failure in the private equity 
sector. They impose substantial new reporting and compliance burdens on all private equity 
funds, not merely those large financial institutions whose risk-taking activities have been the 
primary concerns and causes of the market failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
As Part IV of this paper will demonstrate, an analysis of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act 
in terms of the economic theory of regulation seems to suggest that unlike other areas that spread 
systemic risk across the financial system (e.g. derivatives, lending practices), the theory does not 
apply to the private equity sector at all. It does not support the regulation of private equity funds 
or any government intervention in the private equity sector. No demonstrable market failure was 
identified during the financial crisis in the context of the private equity industry to justify such 
excessive regulatory intervention and broad registration and reporting requirements. 
Additionally, there is no empirical academic literature to support any direct involvement of the 
private equity sector in the 2008 financial crisis and any regulatory intervention in the private 
equity sector. The 2008 financial crisis had very little to do with private equity funds.445 Private 
equity funds did not cause the financial crisis and did not play any part in the credit crisis. They 
did not contribute to the build-up of systemic risk that eventually led to the near-collapse of the 
financial system and were simply not part of the problem or any market failure.446 As part IV of 
this paper will show, private equity funds present none of the systemic risk factors that Congress 
was concerned about and thus should pose very little concern for regulators and policymakers 
seeking to develop a new regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and guard against a future 
market failure or financial crisis. Private equity funds and their activities prior to the crisis have 
not produced a convincing case of market failure that justifies government intervention in the 
private equity sector.     
 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act is clearly well intended by focusing regulation for the 
first time on systemic risk associated with the activities of private investment funds and the 
stability of the financial system. However, this paper takes the position that in the context of 
private equity funds, there is no market failure to correct nor is there any externality that has to 
be addressed by regulators. As private equity funds pose minimal systemic risk to the financial 
system, the case for the regulation of private equity funds under Title IV or for any government 
intervention in the private equity sector is very weak. The following section of this paper will 
examine Title IV’s reliance on disclosure as the primary method of reducing systemic risk and 
protecting fund investors as well as the inconsistent treatment of private equity funds under Title 
IV.  
 
444 See Acharya et al, supra  note 1. 
445 See Posner, supra  note 179. 
446 See Acharya, supra note 1. 
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D.  TITLE IV AND ITS UNDERLYING DISCLOSURE-BASED APPROACH 
 
As explained in Part II of this paper, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act sets out a major 
reform of the private investment fund industry and establishes a new framework for regulatory 
and supervisory oversight of private investment funds. It introduced extensive registration, 
reporting, disclosure and compliance requirements for private investment funds and their 
advisors. It requires that investment advisers to private equity funds, hedge funds and certain 
other funds with assets under management of $150 million or more register with the SEC, 
comply with certain SEC books, records and reporting requirements, and be subject to extensive 
periodic SEC examination, unless they qualify for specific exemptions.447 This new regulatory 
regime and increased disclosure requirements are designed to bring transparency and oversight to 
the activities of private investment funds, protect investors, control the build-up of systemic risk 
in the financial system and address the market failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
Using financial regulation like Title IV to protect investors through a disclosure model 
may be a worthy goal, but this goal, in the context of private equity funds, is ineffective, 
unnecessary and inconsistent with fundamental principles of U.S. securities laws, which presume 
that investors in private equity funds, who are necessarily experienced, wealthy and have 
extensive resources to conduct their own due diligence or retain professional advisors, are able to 
protect themselves without any regulatory intervention.448 As discussed in Part II of this paper, 
private equity investors are usually large, sophisticated institutional investors, capable of 
identifying, obtaining and processing the information necessary to evaluate an investment 
opportunity and make an informed investment decision. Additionally, Title IV requires private 
equity funds to disclose extensive information that is already being provided to private equity 
investors by the funds voluntarily during the process of raising capital and on a regular basis. 
Therefore, Title IV and its registration, reporting and increased disclosure requirements may be 
viewed as unwarranted and inefficient to the extent that their purpose is to protect private equity 
investors who are able to protect themselves.449  
 
This Part of the paper will examine the disclosure philosophy of Title IV and whether it is 
an effective tool to regulate private equity funds and protect their investors. It will demonstrate 
that while the disclosure philosophy in general may offer major advantages for regulating 
securities and financial markets, the reliance of Title IV on this approach, in the context of 
private equity funds, is practically unnecessary, inefficient, falls short of achieving its purpose 
and does not contribute anything substantial to the protection of private equity investors who can 
“fend for themselves”. It is also unlikely to address the risk of excessive leverage which is 
practically the main risk that Congress was concerned about and perceived as being sufficiently 
serious to merit direct regulation. Before we examine the underlying disclosure philosophy of 
Title IV and its drawbacks, it is worth pausing to consider disclosure as the primary method of 
protecting investors and regulating securities and financial markets in the U.S.  
 
447 See supra note 5. 
448 See Troy Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and 
Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 975, 991 (2006) ("[T]he notion that investors who can 'fend for themselves' do not 
need SEC protection is an animating principle of securities regulation that helps demarcate the appropriate boundary 
of SEC regulation across the federal securities laws."). 
449 See Vijay Sekhon, Can the Rich Fend for Themselves? Inconsistent Treatment of Wealthy Investors Under the 
Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of2010, 7 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 1 (2011). 
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Disclosure is the primary method of protecting investors and regulating the securities and 
financial markets in the U.S. It has always been the central focus of securities and financial 
regulations and the regulatory solution to all of the securities market problems. It represents a 
minimalist form of government intervention and preserves investors’ autonomy to make their 
own investment decisions. In the words of Professor Kathryn Judge, “disclosure is one of the 
most commonly used tools in financial regulation.”450 For the last eighty years, U.S. securities 
laws and financial regulations have consistently relied on a disclosure approach as the primary 
method for protecting investors and regulating securities and financial markets.451 In the context 
of regulating these markets the disclosure of information is said to do “everything from 
producing more transparent and efficient markets, to making corporate executives behave more 
honestly and diligently, to decreasing investor risks and protecting the public interest. The main 
goal of the securities laws is to provide sufficient disclosure to enable investors to make 
informed decisions about the securities they buy and sell.”452 For example, the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which were adopted following the 1929 stock 
market collapse are based on a philosophy of disclosure. The fundament goal of this legislation 
was to eliminate abuses, restore investor confidence and maintain the integrity of the capital 
markets. The primary method to achieve this goal was through a comprehensive disclosure 
system.453 In other words, the goal is to require issuers of securities to fully disclose all material 
information that a reasonable investor would require in order to make an informed investment 
decision. So long as corporations disclosed all material information regarding their business and 
securities, investors could make their own investment decisions.454  
 
Another example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which was adopted following the collapse of 
Enron and WorldCom and the corporate accounting scandals of the early 2000s. The goal of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws” or in other words to improve the 
disclosure of information about corporate activities and behavior to investors so they are better 
positioned to make informed investment decisions.455  
 
450 See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity and Systemic Risk 
(January 24, 2012). Stanford Law Review, Forthcoming; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 406. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1894105.  
451 See Anne Khademian, The SEC And Capital Market Regulation: The Politics of Expertise 83 (1992) (noting that 
“disclosure-enforcement was the foundation of early securities regulation and remains the main premise of the 
SEC’s regulatory activities today”).  
452 See Susanna Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive 
Approach to Securities Regulation. Baylor Law Review, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2006; Chapman University Law Research 
Paper No. 2007-08. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=936528. 
453 The legislative history of the federal securities laws makes clear that investor protection through disclosure is the 
main purpose of the laws: “The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, 
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the 
investor; . . . to restore the confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities . . . .” 
Regulation of Securities, S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of The Securities Act of 
1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973). 
454 See Ripken, supra note 452. 
455 The regulation of the stock market assumes that by disclosing all material information to investors, they can 
make informed and intelligent investment decisions. See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 22 
(5th ed. 2005) (noting that “federal securities regulation assumes that the full and fair disclosure of all relevant 
aspects of securities allows investors to evaluate the merits of investments and to fend for themselves); see also SEC 
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (describing the purpose of the securities laws as 
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Clearly, there are several rationales behind the disclosure-based system of regulation. 
First, a disclosure-based approach can cause corporate executives to behave more responsibly, 
honestly and ethically since they know that their actions and behavior will be exposed and 
subject to public scrutiny.456 The premise is that the potential of public exposure and scrutiny can 
deter corporate misconduct or fraudulent behavior. It is a tool for inducing corporate executives 
to manage and behave better.457 In the words of Justice Louis Brandeis, “sunlight is said to be the 
best disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”458 Second, the disclosure-based 
approach enables investors to make fully informed investment decisions as to whether to buy, 
sell or hold securities.459 It provides the basis for forming a judgment as to the value of the 
securities. In the words of Professor Ripken, “by reducing the information asymmetry that exists 
between corporations and investors, disclosure levels the playing field so that all market 
participants have equal access to information about corporations and their securities. Investors 
can then make informed valuation judgments about the price of securities and determine for 
themselves whether a certain piece of stock is worthless.”460 The fundamental premise behind the 
disclosure-based approach is that without it, investors would have inadequate information as to 
the risks involved with a specific investment and consequently, will not be able to make an 
informed investment decision.461  In essence, disclosure promotes fairness, enhances the integrity 
of the market, increases the transparency and efficiency of the securities market and produces 
increased price stability.462 Since there is more accurate public information about a particular 
security, the price of this security can be expected to shift less.463 The disclosure-based approach 
also increases overall investor confidence in the securities market and its integrity by virtue of 
deterring corporate misconduct and allowing equal access to information.464  Investors are more 
 
“substitut[ing] a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor . . . .”). The House Report on the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 explained the significance of providing investors with sufficient information to 
make intelligent investment decisions: “No investor . . . can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges 
without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells. . . . 
[T]he hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legislative History of The Securities Act of 1933 (J.S. 
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973). 
456 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1205, 1227 (1999) (describing the historical view of “disclosure as the regulatory means to 
ensure greater public accountability and ethical behavior in corporate management”). 
457 Id. 
458 See Louis Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It, 92 (1914); See also Louis Loss, 
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 36 (1983); see also James A. Fanto, Investor Education, Securities 
Disclosure, and the Creation and Enforcement of Corporate Governance and Firm Norms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 
15, 24 (1998). 
459 Congress relied on this rationale in adopting the federal securities laws. See supra note 455. The SEC has also 
explained this disclosure rationale as follows: “[I]f the investor had available to him all the material facts concerning 
a security, he would then be in a position to make an informed judgment whether or not to buy.” Securities Act 
Release No. 33-5223, 37 Fed. Reg. 591, 592 (Jan. 14, 1972). 
460 See Ripken, supra note 452. 
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463 See Alan B. Levenson, The Role of the SEC as a Consumer Protection Agency, 27 Bus. Law. 61, 61 (1971) 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of The Securities Act of 1933 and 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973).  
464 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 669, 692 (1984) (explaining arguments that “[d]isclosure rules both deter fraud and equalize ‘access’ to 
information, restoring the necessary confidence in the capital markets”). 
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likely to participate and invest in the capital market when they are convinced that the market will 
treat them fairly and that the relevant rules are enforced. In the words of Professor Ripken, 
“investor trust is therefore critical for the securities markets to work, and disclosure helps to 
facilitate that trust.”465  
 
Overall, disclosure reduces investor risks, protects the public interest and preserves 
investor autonomy. It is a tool to remedy “the social and economic wrongs that occur when those 
with greater information exploit those with less information”, and it achieves this goal through a 
minimalist form of government intervention.466 Therefore, the key advantage of the disclosure-
based approach is that it promotes the protection of investors and the public with minimum 
intervention in the operation of the free market.467 The following section will examine the 
inconsistent treatment of private equity investors under Title IV and demonstrate that while the 
disclosure philosophy may offer certain advantages for the regulation of securities and financial 
markets in general, it is the wrong tool for regulating the private equity sector.  
 
i)   THE INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS UNDER TITLE IV 
 
U.S. securities laws contain many exemptions for wealthy investors who are professional, 
experienced and have extensive resources to conduct their own due diligence, or retain 
professional advisors, to evaluate an investment opportunity and make an informed investment 
decision without any regulatory intervention. The rationale behind these exemptions is that 
wealthy investors can “fend for themselves” since they have the financial experience, resources, 
sophistication and other tools to make an informed investment decision or to retain the services 
of professional advisors who have the necessary experience and sophistication.468   
 
For example, under the Securities Act of 1933, (the “Securities Act”) a company that 
offers or sells its securities must register the securities with the SEC or rely on an exemption 
from the registration requirements.469 However, the Securities Act provides companies with a 
number of exemptions for experienced, wealthy and sophisticated investors who satisfy certain 
requirements. Private equity funds' securities usually fall outside the scope of this registration 
requirement since these securities are placed with wealthy investors through an exempt private 
offering under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.470 Pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation D 
promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Act, the issuance of securities to “accredited 
investors” is generally not considered a “public offering” and is therefore exempt from the 
registration requirements of the Securities Act.471  In essence, Rule 506 of Regulation D provides 
a “safe harbor” within Section 4(2) of the Securities Act for sales of securities to an unlimited 
 
465 See Ripken, supra note 452. 
466 See Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 345 (1999) (noting that the “great advantage of disclosure-based strategies is that they 
constitute a minimalist form of government intervention” because “[c]onsumer knowledge is enhanced, while 
consumer preferences are left largely undisturbed”). 
467 See Ripken, supra note 452. 
468 See Paredes, supra note 448; See also C. Edward Fletcher, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities 
Laws, 1988 Duke L.J. 1081, 1123 (1988).  
469 See Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. 77a-77mm). 
470 See Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. 77a-77mm). 
471 See Rule 506 of Regulation D promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933 (17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2010). 
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number of “accredited investors”, defined as institutional investors and individuals with a net 
worth in excess of $1 million or annual income in excess of $200,000 or $300,000 with spouse, 
and most other entities having total assets in excess of $5 million.472 The rationale behind this 
exemption is that wealthy investors who meet the “accredited investor” requirements are 
sophisticated and experienced enough and therefore can “fend for themselves”. They simply do 
not need any regulatory intervention in order to make an informed investment decision. 
 
  Another example of the federal securities laws approach to sophisticated, wealthy and 
professional investors is Rule 144A promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Act. Under 
Rule 144A, resales of minimum $500,000 units of restricted securities to “qualified institutional 
buyers” are also exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act.473 Qualified 
institutional buyers are defined in Rule 144A and include “specified institutional investors that 
own and invest at least $100 million on a discretionary basis in securities of issuers that are not 
affiliated with the entity.”474  
 
The premise underlying these exemptions (and many other exemptions under federal 
securities laws) for wealthy, sophisticated and experienced investors is the fact that wealthy 
investors can “fend for themselves” since they have sufficient financial experience, resources, 
sophistication and other tools to make informed investment decisions or to retain the services of 
professional advisors who have the necessary experience and sophistication.475 They can tolerate 
the economic risk associated with private equity investments. As explained by former SEC 
Commissioner Troy Paredes “this animating principle reflects an implicit cost-benefit analysis 
that the costs of SEC intervention in such instances exceed the benefits to wealthy investors of 
such intervention.”476  
 
As discussed in Part II of this paper, investors in private equity funds usually include 
large institutions like corporate pension funds, public retirement plans, foundations, 
endowments, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies and to a lesser extent high net worth 
individuals.477 These investors have extensive resources, experience and sophistication to “fend 
for themselves” and make informed investment decisions. They usually go through an extensive 
due diligence process, prior to making an investment decision, and use professional advisors like 
accountants, lawyers and other business consultants, as part of their evaluation process. They are 
very experienced in evaluating risk and are strong enough to absorb significant losses and 
downturns in the economy. In fact, these professional and experienced investors do not need the 
registration and reporting requirements of Title IV in order to make an informed investment 
decision. They rely on their own due diligence efforts to verify or investigate matters of 
importance and make an informed investment decision. They can simply protect themselves 
utilizing their own resources and experience.  
 
 
472 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2010). 
473 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2010). 
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475 See Paredes, supra note 448. 
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477 See Appelbaum and Batt supra note 27. 
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In essence, what Title IV has done, in the context of private equity funds, is to create a 
regulatory environment where the due diligence efforts of institutional wealthy investors in 
private equity funds are to some extent subsidized by the public through the SEC enforcement of 
unnecessary registration and reporting requirements under Title IV.478 This public subsidy of 
wealthy institutional, professional and sophisticated investors is completely unnecessary and 
inconsistent with the principles of federal securities laws and the exemptions available for 
sophisticated and experienced investors. It is contrary to the fundamental principle that such 
investors can “fend for themselves” and simply do not need the benefit of any government or 
regulatory intervention.479 It also raises the question of why the government is allocating its 
limited SEC resources in a way that benefits and protects the small number of American 
investors who can “fend for themselves”.480  
 
It is important to note that even in instances where investment funds collapsed like in the 
case of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 (which due to its highly leveraged nature and 
the 1998 financial crisis in Russia collapsed and required a $3.6 billion private bailout arranged 
by the Federal Reserve) or the collapse of the hedge funds of Bear Stearns in 2007 (which 
required Bear Stearns to incur losses of more than $1 billion), the primary issue was systemic 
risk and the potential impact of the collapse on the financial system and the economy as a 
whole.481 The issue was not investor protection or whether investors were defrauded or misled.  
 
This paper takes the position that Title IV and its registration, reporting and increased 
disclosure requirements may be viewed as unnecessary, burdensome and inefficient to the extent 
that their purpose is to protect private equity investors who are able to protect themselves and 
have the resources to conduct their own due diligence. It offers very little by way of protection 
for investors in private equity funds. The premise that these investors need protection in the form 
of regulatory intervention is a misconception and simply incorrect. While the disclosure 
philosophy in general may offer major advantages for regulating securities and financial markets 
and protecting investors, the reliance of Title IV on this approach, in the context of private equity 
funds, is practically unwarranted, falls short of achieving its purpose and does not contribute 
anything substantial to the protection of private equity investors who can “fend for themselves”. 
It is also unlikely to address the risk of excessive leverage which is practically the main risk that 
Congress was concerned about and perceived as being sufficiently serious to merit direct 
regulation. Additionally, there is nothing to suggest that private equity funds and their 
institutional investors should be subject to inconsistent investor protection regulation under 
federal securities laws. The inevitable conclusion of this analysis is that the registration and 
reporting requirements of Title IV may be necessary in order to protect other investors and the 
financial market from systemic risk that might be caused by private equity funds (since the 
investors in private equity funds do not actually need the protection offered by Title IV as they 
can ‘fend for themselves’). The following sections will examine the relationship between private 
 
478 See Sekhon supra note 449. 
479 Id. 
480 See, Daniel Gallagher, SEC Commissioner,  “Keynote Address” (speech, Investment Adviser Association 
Investment Adviser Compliance Conference, Arlington, VA, March 8, 2012 ), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech 
/2012/spch030812dmg.htm. Gallagher explains with regard to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act that “this expansion 
of our regulatory reach will not serve to protect ordinary retail investors, but rather investors who could, as the 
Supreme Court so notably said, ‘fend for themselves.’ 
481 See George, Dymally and Boss, supra note 86; See also Pierre-Louis, supra note 57. 
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equity funds and systemic risk and analyze whether private equity funds in fact create a systemic 
risk problem, what risks are truly “systemic”, in the context of private equity funds and the use 
of leveraged buyout techniques, and how (if at all) those risks should be regulated.  
 
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIVATE EQUITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
This part of the paper examines the relationship between private equity funds and 
systemic risk and analyzes the use of leverage by private equity funds as well as the risk of 
excessive leverage. It looks more closely at the question of whether private equity funds create a 
systemic risk problem (particularly through their use of leverage) in a way that justifies 
regulatory intervention. It further offers a conceptual framework for examining whether private 
equity funds create a systemic risk problem, what risks are truly “systemic”, in the context of 
private equity funds and the use of leveraged buyout techniques, how (if at all) those risks should 
be regulated and whether Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act through its registration and reporting 
requirements is the right answer.  
 
This part of the paper takes the position that from a systemic risk perspective, the 
regulation of private equity funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act is unwarranted and 
flawed. It will not accomplish the legislation’s purpose of helping identify and reduce systemic 
risk in the financial system and will not make the financial system more stable or less risky. This 
part of the paper further demonstrates that i) private equity was neither a cause nor a contributing 
factor to the 2008 financial crisis which had its roots in the unsound lending practices of the U.S. 
housing market; ii) private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk to the stability of 
the financial system and the failure of a private equity fund would be highly unlikely to trigger 
cascading losses that would lead to a financial crisis; iii) for regulatory purposes and from a 
systemic risk perspective, there is no distinction between private equity funds and venture capital 
funds and therefore, both should benefit from the same exemption from registration under the 
Dodd-Frank Act (currently available to venture capital funds only); and iv) from an economic 
policy perspective, private equity funds are a major driver of economic growth and play a key 
role in the economic recovery of the U.S. Therefore, requiring private equity funds to register 
with the SEC and be subject to extensive reporting requirements will needlessly divert capital, 
time and effort from investment activities that could otherwise be creating jobs and drive 
economic growth.  
 
This part of the paper argues that in the context of private equity funds, Title IV is simply 
an unnecessary and inadequate legislative response to the 2008 financial crisis and goes beyond 
the ways in which private equity funds operated prior to the financial crisis. It is based on 
fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of private equity funds and how they operate. It 
tries to prevent the rise of systemic risk in investment vehicles that are not a major source of 
systemic risk problems.  
 
This part of the paper concludes that since private equity funds are not a major source of 
systemic risk, they play a critical role as a driver of economic growth and their investors have the 
resources and sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, these funds and their advisers should be 
subject to a reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC registration and reporting 
requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. The concerns associated with the use of 
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leverage by private equity funds and the risk of excessive leverage should be addressed through 
more substantive rules like leveraged lending regulation and tighter underwriting practices, 
standards and policies. Before we examine the complex relationship between private equity 
funds and systemic risk, it is worth pausing to briefly analyze the 2008 financial crisis and the 
near-collapse of the entire financial system which took the concept of systemic risk to a different 
level and brought it to the attention of regulators and policymakers.  
 
A. PRIVATE EQUITY AND THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Although the causes of the 2008 financial crisis are many and complex (and largely 
beyond the scope of this paper), the general background of the crisis will help shed light on 
private equity regulation under Title IV and the relationship between private equity and systemic 
risk.482 While regulators and scholars have different views regarding the causes of the 2008 
financial crisis, it is widely recognized that the primary causes of the financial crisis were the 
unsound lending practices of the U.S. housing market, the use of securitized products and the 
build-up of systemic risk associated with derivatives that were the financial tool that enabled the 
risk to spread, exacerbating the condition of global financial markets.483 In particular, credit 
default swaps, financial derivatives that operate like insurance for bondholders, and other related 
swap instruments played a significant role in creating systemic risk essentially allowing the 
consequences of the collapse of the U.S. housing market to spread throughout the global 
financial system.484 It is now widely accepted that the unregulated multi-trillion dollar over-the-
counter credit default swap market helped drive and expand a mortgage crisis485, then a credit 
crisis, and finally a once-in-a-century systemic financial crisis that, without a government 
bailout, would have led the world economy into a major depression.486 While the financial crisis 
started due to the unsound practices of the U.S. mortgage lending industry and excessive 
 
482 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman Fed. Reserve, Speech at Morehouse College: Four Questions About the 
Financial Crisis, (Apr 14, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke200 
90414a.html (“what caused our financial and economic system to break down to the extent it has? Not surprisingly, 
the answer to this question is complex, and experts disagree on how much weight to give various explanations.”). 
483 See Mark Jickling, “Causes of the Financial Crisis,” Congressional Research Service (Jan 29, 2009) available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40173_20090129.pdf (offering twenty-six causes for the financial crisis, including 
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foreclosures resulting from the collapse of the housing market, over-the-counter derivatives and 
particularly credit default swaps created unwarranted risks that fueled the financial crisis.487 The 
massive use of these financial instruments shook the foundation of the most prominent financial 
institutions that were heavily invested in these markets and took large positions in over-the-
counter derivatives in order to hedge or speculate on mortgages.488 These events exposed the 
interconnectedness and linkages between financial institutions and the potential such linkages 
and interconnectedness had for causing extreme damage to the financial system and the economy 
as a whole.489 Financial innovation in the form of mortgage securitization, derivatives and other 
financial engineering products increased the systemic vulnerability to financial shocks that could 
be spread throughout the entire financial system and create a major financial crisis. 
 
The 2008 financial crisis is a powerful example of systemic risk becoming a major threat 
to the stability of financial markets. As homeowners defaulted on their subprime mortgages 
(following the collapse of the U.S housing market), this created a ripple effect through the 
previously flourishing asset backed security market.490 Institutions that had purchased protection 
against mortgage defaults in the form of credit default swaps demanded more capital to back up 
their contracts, and the undercapitalized investment banks and insurers that had sold this 
protection were increasingly unable to meet collateral demands.491 Additionally, the 
collateralized debt obligation contracts (CDOs) in which these credit default swaps sellers had 
heavily invested stopped making payments and plummeted in value.492 As a result, the CDS 
insurers came under tremendous pressure to compensate banks and other protected buyers for the 
loss of value in their CDO portfolios from mortgage defaults.493  However, they were not 
adequately capitalized to perform their obligations and thus the CDO and CDS markets were 
completely destroyed.494 This chain of events caused a major liquidity crunch and led to the near-
collapse of the global financial system.  
 
Additionally, there was an overall lack of transparency in the financial market which 
clearly enhanced the threat of systemic risk. These derivatives transactions were largely invisible 
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to regulators and market participants.495 This regulatory environment created a situation where 
neither market participants nor regulators had accurate knowledge of the full range of the 
exposures and interconnections of the various market participants.496 Because of this limited 
transparency it was unclear which banks were exposed and to what degree.497 Banks and 
financial institutions as well as regulators did not understand the magnitude of aggregate 
derivatives exposures in the system and had no basis to measure the risks embedded in their 
derivatives exposure.498 Additionally, due to the large derivatives positions the major Wall Street 
financial institutions like AIG held, there were concerns that if one major financial institution 
were to default on its credit default swaps, its counterparties would go bankrupt and, as a result, 
the entire financial system could collapse.499 This chain of events, combined with tremendous 
uncertainty and fear in the marketplace, led to the unfortunate failure and near-collapse of the 
global financial system.500 It forced the government to step in with a massive bailout program to 
keep the major banks and financial institutions afloat during this crisis, bring stability to the 
market and prevent a total collapse of the financial system.501  
 
However, these events had very little to do with the private equity industry.502 It is 
universally accepted that private equity funds did not cause the financial crisis and did not play 
any part in the credit crisis.503 They did not contribute to the build-up of systemic risk that 
eventually led to the near-collapse of the financial system and were simply not part of the 
problem.504 In fact, private equity funds are helping to mitigate the damage of the financial crisis 
and drive long-term economic growth through their investment activities. As will be discussed in 
the following sections, the factors which brought down Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG 
and caused a major systemic crisis in financial markets, are simply not present in the private 
equity sector.505 Private equity funds did not incur direct losses in the subprime mortgage crisis 
since they do not invest in asset based securities or the derivatives based on them, nor do they 
invest or lend funds to other institutions trading in those securities and derivatives.506 While 
private equity was a major consumer of cheap debt and created an intense demand for loans (like 
many other industries), the private equity sector itself did not create or spread systemic risk in 
the financial system.507 On the contrary, the structure of most private equity funds and their ring 
fenced investments actively restricted the spread of risk from excessive borrowing by any of the 
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target companies. In essence, this paper takes the position that the private equity sector did not 
play any role in the problems and failures that caused the 2008 financial crisis. The leverage ratio 
of the companies in which the private equity sector invests has averaged 3-to-1, compared to up 
to 32-to-1 in the financial institutions whose failures triggered the crisis. As will be discussed 
later in this paper, the banking markets and the lenders were the source of the systemic risk, not 
the borrowers.508 This desire to borrow inexpensive capital from banks or other lenders in order 
to fund leveraged buyout transactions was the only form of involvement private equity funds had 
in the 2008 financial crisis.509 This involvement is no different than any other sector or industry 
using debt in the ordinary course of business. 
 
And yet, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act completely ignores the fact that private equity 
funds were not part of the problem and subjects these firms to extensive SEC registration, 
compliance and reporting requirements. Title IV therefore raises the inevitable question, which is 
the essence of this part of paper: what, if anything, did Congress see about the risk associated 
with private equity funds that warranted regulatory intervention in the private equity sector, 
while at the same time granting an exemption to venture capital funds? In other words, given the 
original exemption from registration under the Advisers Act,510 what was the change about 
private equity funds that generated concerns about the exemption of the private equity industry 
from registration and ultimately drove the decision to regulate these funds? After all, there were 
no failures of private equity funds that had a systemic effect or caused damage to the financial 
system and required any regulatory intervention.  
 
When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, its primary objective was to identify and  
manage threats to the stability of the nation’s financial system, protect investors and control the 
buildup of systemic risk.511 In the context of private equity funds, the main concern that drove 
Congress to regulate these funds was the use of leverage and the risk that too much leverage 
contributes to the buildup of systemic risk that can potentially lead to a major credit crisis.512 The 
premise was that lending connects financial institutions to one another and the failure of a 
leveraged institution to repay its debt obligations causes risk to spread among the financial 
institutions that lend capital.513 Therefore, a failure of a private equity fund could, in theory, 
trigger cascading losses that would ultimately lead to a financial crisis. Congress operated on the 
assumption that private equity funds cause systemic risk by virtue of using leverage and 
therefore should be regulated and subject to SEC oversight. This paper takes the position that 
these concerns are unfounded and based on fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of 
private equity funds and the way they operate. In the word of Professor John W. O’Brien of the 
Haas School of Business at the University of California - Berkeley: “I don’t think private equity 
and venture capital have been an important part of the problem. It’s mainly been the leverage and 
rapid-trading strategies, and those strategies are primarily housed in hedge funds. I don’t think 
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Congress has a clear understanding of the problem so they wrap everybody into the net.”514 
Private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk to the financial system and present 
no threat to the financial stability of the market or the economy as a whole. Therefore, the 
registration and reporting requirements of Title IV are unwarranted, unnecessarily costly and 
inconsistent with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act. The following section examines 
the relationship between private equity funds and systemic risk and whether private equity funds 
create a systemic risk problem (particularly through their use of leverage) in a way that justifies 
regulatory intervention. 
 
B. PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
i)   SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis regulators and policy makers started to focus 
on the concept of systemic risk and the potential for systemic failure of the entire financial 
system. Systemic risk became the primary concern of legislators all over the world.515 In fact, 
one of the primary objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act is to reduce and control systemic risk in the 
financial system, enhance financial stability and thus prevent or reduce the likelihood of a future 
financial crisis.516 Nonetheless, there is still a great deal of confusion and academic debate as to 
the meaning of the term systemic risk, what types of risk are actually systemic, what types of 
systemic risk should be regulated and whether the concept is even relevant to the private equity 
sector.517 Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve Chairman, explained the confusion as to the 
definition of the term systemic risk and stated that “Although it is generally agreed that systemic 
risk represents a propensity for some sort of financial system disruption, one observer might use 
the term ‘market failure’ to describe what another would deem to have been a market outcome 
that was natural and healthy, even if harsh. As a result, the very definition of systemic risk is still 
somewhat unsettled.”518 
 
Systemic risk is the risk that financial problems in one institution or market will spread to 
other institutions and markets with the result that the losses from a seemingly isolated market 
event might threaten the entire economy.519 It refers to the linkages and interdependencies 
between participants in the financial market, such that “a significant loss initially touching only a 
small number of participants can spread and threaten the entire system.”520 The essence of 
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systemic risk is a chain of failures or losses. It is a “market shock” that triggers institutional 
failures which in turn lead, or can lead, to a chain of institutional or market failures.521 In other 
words, it is “a failure in the functioning of the financial system that imposes significant 
externalities, adversely affecting persons removed from the financial institutions at the core of 
the crisis.”522 It is usually created by counterparty credit risk and spreads through the 
interconnections between financial institutions, for example, in the context of derivatives 
trading.523  
 
Some commentators define systemic risk as “the probability that cumulative losses will 
occur from an event that ignites a series of successive losses along a chain of financial 
institutions or markets comprising….a system.”524 Other scholars define it as “the potential for a 
modest economic shock to induce substantial volatility in asset prices, significant reductions in 
corporate liquidity, potential bankruptcies and efficiency losses.”525 Alternatively, other scholars 
and regulators define the concept of systemic risk as “the risk that a default by one market 
participant will have repercussions on other participants due to the interlocking nature of 
financial markets. For example, Customer A’s default in X market may affect Intermediary B’s 
ability to fulfil its obligations in Markets X,Y and Z.”526 In the words of Professor Katheryn 
Judge the concept of systemic risk can be understood as “the risk that the financial system will 
fail to function properly because of widespread distress.”527 Despite the different views as to the 
concept of systemic risk and the meaning of the term, the essence of the different definitions is 
very similar. In the words of Professor Steven Schwarcz, the common feature is a “triggering 
event, such as an economic shock or institutional failure, that causes a domino effect or a chain 
of detrimental economic consequences like losses, decrease in credit availability, increase in cost 
of capital or liquidity crisis.”528 It is the risk of a “potential breakdown in an entire financial 
system as opposed to the collapse of individual participants in the financial system.”529  
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It has been noted by regulators and academic scholars that the most severe consequences 
of systemic risk are “the increase in the cost of capital and decrease in its availability.”530 
Accordingly, the concept of systemic risk is usually associated with banks and other financial 
institutions, as these institutions are providers of capital, and therefore the “failure of such 
institutions can adversely affect the cost of capital and its availability as well as the entire 
financial system.”531     
 
Historically, the main source of systemic risk was a banking failure and the classic 
example of systemic risk is a “bank run” in which the inability of a bank to satisfy withdrawal-
demands causes its failure, in turn causing other banks or their creditors to fail.532 As more 
people withdraw their deposits, the likelihood of default increases, thus triggering further 
withdrawals. This can bring the bank to the point where it runs out of cash. A bank run can lead 
to a chain of failures very quickly because “banks are closely intertwined financially as they lend 
to and borrow from each other, hold deposit balances with each other and make payments 
through the interbank clearing system.”533 A good example of a bank run causing systemic risk is 
the great depression and the crash of October 1929 when bank depositors tried to convert their 
bank deposits into cash. Many banks were simply unable to satisfy these demands causing them 
to fail, therefore leading to a major financial crisis.534 In the words of Professor Katheryn Judge: 
 
“Historically, the paradigmatic source of systemic risk was a banking crisis. This is 
because of the central role banks play in moving capital from savers to productive  
undertakings and because of instability inherent in their structure. Banks tend to use 
short-term liabilities like demand deposits, to fund long-term assets, like loans to 
businesses, so even a solvent bank may lack the requisite funds if too many depositors 
demand their money back at the same time; and because of the interconnectedness of 
banks and the potential for problems at one bank to signal problems at others, a run on 
the bank can lead to the failure of other banks and an overall contraction of the financial 
system.”535  
 
While bank failures are still the classic example and a major source of systemic risk, 
changes in the roles played by banks, the relationship between banks and capital markets and 
other developments in the financial system have “created an environment in which the potential 
sources of systemic risk have become much more diverse.”536 
 
As the 2008 financial crisis demonstrated, extensive speculation in derivatives markets is 
dangerous for the financial system due to the systemic risk that arises from the complex linkages 
and interdependencies between participants in the global financial market.537 For example, if a 
bank defaults on a derivatives contract, it could cause its transactional counterparty to default on 
its own outstanding derivatives contracts with third parties (assuming the counterparty was 
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relying on income from the derivatives contract to meet its obligations to third parties).538 
Therefore, massive derivatives losses at one firm leading to defaults could quickly lead to a chain 
reaction of defaults among other firms and as a result spread systemic risk throughout the 
financial system.539 This is the reason why derivatives have been described by legendary investor 
Warren Buffet as “financial weapons of mass destruction carrying dangers that, while now latent, 
are potentially lethal.”540 As evidenced by the 2008 financial crisis, the combined threats of lack 
of transparency, lack of regulatory oversight and massive systemic risk in the financial system, 
can be extremely dangerous and jeopardize the entire economy.  
 
In laying out its financial regulatory reform, following the 2008 financial crisis, the 
Obama administration articulated “three fundamental factors that trigger systemic risk concerns:  
i) the impact that a firm’s failure would have on the financial system and economy; ii) the firm’s 
combination of size, leverage (including off-balance sheet exposures) and degree of reliance on 
short-term funding; and iii) the firm’s criticality as a source of credit for households, businesses, 
and state and local governments and as a source of liquidity for the financial system.”541 This 
paper takes the position that private equity funds present none of these systemic risk factors and 
thus “should pose very little concern for regulators and policymakers seeking to develop a new 
regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and guard against a future financial crisis.”542  
 
When applying these systemic risk factors to private equity funds, it is hard to see how 
any particular private equity fund could be considered a major source of systemic risk that 
justifies regulatory intervention.543 It is important to note that the factors which brought down 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG and caused a major systemic crisis in financial markets, 
are simply not present in the private equity sector.544 Bear Stearns’ crisis and later the failure of 
Lehman Brothers and AIG began with funds these firms formed for the purpose of trading 
mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives.545 Private equity funds did not incur direct 
losses in the subprime mortgage crisis since they do not invest in asset based securities or the 
derivatives based on them, nor do they invest or lend funds to other institutions trading in those 
securities and derivatives.546 Additionally, private equity funds “occupy a place in the U.S. 
capital market that is simply too small to trigger the elements of systemic risk and a potential 
financial crisis” (despite the risk of excessive leverage that will be discussed below).547 The 
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sections that follow examine the connection and relationship between private equity funds and 
systemic risk and further explain why private equity is not a major source of systemic risk. They 
illustrate that these systemic risk factors have very little to do with private equity funds and the 
way they operate.  
 
ii)  THE USE OF LEVERAGE BY PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 
 
The first misconception that drove Congress (and the lobbyists promoting Title IV of the 
Dodd-Frank Act) to regulate the private equity sector relates to the use of leverage by private 
equity funds and the risk that too much leverage contributes to the buildup of systemic risk that 
can potentially lead to a major financial crisis.548 Congress operated on the assumption that 
private equity funds cause systemic risk by virtue of using leverage and therefore should be 
regulated and subject to SEC oversight under the Dodd-Frank Act. The concern was that lending 
connects financial institutions to one another and the failure of a leveraged institution to repay its 
debt obligations causes risk to spread among the financial institutions that lend capital.549 The 
premise is that leverage amplifies systemic risk in the financial system as a result of connections 
and linkages among financial institutions.550 Therefore, a failure of a private equity fund could, 
in theory, trigger cascading losses that would ultimately lead to a financial crisis.  
 
As high levels of leverage have been a major factor in other instances of systemic 
financial failures, including the subprime mortgage crisis, high leverage raises legitimate 
concerns about systemic risk and a potential financial crisis.551 This is especially true when 
leverage is used to speculate on highly volatile instruments like derivatives and credit default 
swaps. The collapse of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and other financial institutions heavily 
invested in mortgage backed securities and subprime mortgage derivatives involved extremely 
high levels of leverage. On February 29, 2008, the leverage ratios for Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers were nearly 33-to-1.552 With such levels of leverage and extensive speculation on 
volatile instruments, major losses that occur suddenly can trigger a chain of systemic failures as 
the use of leverage amplifies losses well beyond a financial institution’s capital resources.553  
 
Nonetheless, these conditions for systemic financial failures are simply not present in the 
private equity sector. The leverage ratio of private equity transactions is substantially lower, 
usually 3-to-1.554 The business and nature of private equity funds (as will be discussed below) 
are very different and do not fit this pattern of systemic financial failures. Also, private equity 
funds “occupy a place in the U.S. capital market that is simply too small to trigger the elements 
of systemic risk and a potential financial crisis.”555 The failure of private equity portfolio 
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companies is simply not large enough to jeopardize the viability of the financial system and the 
economy as a whole.556  
 
Private equity funds almost never use debt or leverage at the fund level.557 This is a 
fundamental premise in the way private equity funds operate. Where debt is used in private 
equity transactions, it is taken on by the target companies that are acquired, not by the fund 
itself.558 Also, the institutional investors who are the limited partners in private equity funds are 
not highly leveraged themselves. In fact, it is common for private equity fund managers to 
commit to their investors that the fund will not incur any debt at the fund level. This is due to the 
requirements imposed by tax-exempt investors like pension funds, endowments and foundations 
that are nevertheless, required to pay taxes on income from debt financed investments.559 Thus, 
the target companies, those in which private equity funds invest, are responsible for the debt 
obligations.  
 
Additionally, the debt used in private equity transactions is secured against the assets or 
cash flow of the target companies. Therefore, if a target company defaults on its debt obligations, 
the banks or lenders can look only to the assets of the target company not the fund or its 
investors for recourse.560 The default is contained and losses are absorbed by the fund 
investors.561 This is a very isolated and non-systemic exposure as losses do not compound 
beyond the amount of capital committed by each investor in the fund.562 Thus the risk of debt 
used in private equity transactions is on the portfolio companies, not the economy as a whole. As 
a result, there is no systemic risk concern that interconnections or linkages between financial 
institutions, resulting from the use of leverage, could spread systemic risk throughout the 
financial system, cause a chain of failures and eventually lead to a financial crisis.563 In essence, 
the risk with private equity funds is limited entirely to the operational success or failure of the 
target companies in which the private equity funds invest. The investment is based on a long-
term relationship and partnering with the management team of the target company with the 
objective of building or restructuring a company as discussed in Part II of this paper. This risk is 
very different from the systemic risk that was the basis for the 2008 financial crisis and the 
Dodd-Frank legislation.564  
 
For example, a million dollar mortgage can create a multiple of assets flow because of 
derivatives and bets regarding interest rates of that mortgage pool.565 In the context of private 
equity funds, the exposure associated with a million dollar investment is limited to a million 
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dollars.566 There is no multiplier effect because there are no side bets or other unmonitored 
derivative securities based on the transaction. When a portfolio company fails the investment is 
gone but the losses end there and the financial exposure is self-contained. No outside parties are 
betting on the success or failure of the private equity industry and hence cannot be affected. 
Additionally, the potential losses of a private equity fund are known with some degree of 
certainty and the underlying assets (the portfolio companies) are much less affected by sharp and 
sudden shifts in value or fluctuations like in the case of highly speculative investments. The 
value of the investments made by private equity funds in various target companies is much less 
volatile and much more limited and certain than those seen in cases of systemic financial failures 
like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.567   
 
Therefore, the concern about systemic risk associated with the use of leverage by private 
equity funds and a potential chain of financial failures is simply unwarranted and unfounded. 
There is a complete lack of direct nexus between private equity investments and the systemic 
risk concerns underlying the enactment of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. There is nothing 
unique about a lender’s loan to private equity portfolio companies that would make them more 
risky than a wide range of other types of loans made by a bank or other lender, in the ordinary 
course of business, to other companies owned by public shareholders, public companies or other 
institutional investors.568 The way in which private equity portfolio companies use leverage is no 
different from the way in which companies backed by private or public investors use leverage in 
the ordinary course of business. In case a private equity portfolio company defaults on its debt 
obligations, lenders and investors in the private equity fund may not be repaid in full but this is 
no different than any other company defaulting on its debt, which is addressed as a regulatory 
matter through federal bankruptcy law.569 Also, there is no modern instance of a financial crisis 
or a major systemic failure triggered by the failure of a private equity fund or a failure of its 
portfolio companies. Therefore, the SEC registration and reporting requirements of Title IV seem 
misplaced and disproportionate in the absence of evidence showing that private equity portfolio 
companies are more likely to default on their debt obligations and create systemic financial 
failures. 
 
This paper takes the position that private equity funds are not a major source of systemic 
risk and do not present a threat to the financial system or the economy as a whole. Unlike the 
2008 financial crisis where the potential losses were virtually unlimited due to the use of 
excessive leverage and highly speculative financial instruments, the losses that could arise from 
the failure of private equity portfolio companies are self-contained, non-systemic and limited to 
the amount of capital committed by these funds. Private equity funds, however, do present 
certain concerns with regard to the use of excessive leverage which will be discussed in the 
following section.   
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Private equity funds and their leveraged buyout activities have been the subject of some 
controversy and extensive criticism due to their use of leverage and the risk of excessive 
leverage. This paper recognizes the concerns associated with the use of leverage by private 
equity funds and the risk of excessive leverage which are valid and legitimate concerns, although 
unlikely to cause cascading losses and systemic failures in the US financial system. Nonetheless, 
this paper suggests that the regulatory approach of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank is not the right 
answer to address these risks and concerns.570 Perhaps a better approach to control the risk of 
excessive leverage is to enhance leveraged lending regulation and foster an environment in 
which the discipline of banks and other lenders constrains excessive leverage and risk-taking by 
private equity funds.571 
 
The 2008 financial crisis clearly underscores the risk of excessive leverage and how 
leverage can amplify systemic risk in the financial system as a result of connections and linkages 
among financial institutions. The notion that excessive leverage by financial institutions was one 
of the key contributing factors to the 2008 crisis financial is widely accepted and has generated 
widespread support.572 In the words of Professor Steven L. Schwarcz: “excessive leverage can 
increase the likelihood of a general breakdown in the functioning of financial markets by 
increasing the likelihood of transmitting problems.”573 He further explains that “high leverage, 
however, can cause institutions to absorb losses exponentially in the sense that losses beyond a 
certain level—depending on the institution’s size and leverage—will precipitously degrade an 
institution’s ability to pay its debts. Default in paying debts might well cause the institution’s 
failure, as well as trigger a potential chain of defaults as other institutions are not paid amounts 
owed to them (and in turn, if highly leveraged, such other institutions might then be unable to 
pay amounts owed to yet other institutions).”574 The risk of excessive leverage is well illustrated 
by the collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, which had a leverage 
ratio of twenty five to one shortly before it was bailed out with the assistance of the Federal 
Reserve of New York. The fund had $125 billion of investments financed with $5 billion of 
assets under management.575 This is clearly not the case with private equity funds and their use 
of leverage in the context of leveraged buyout transactions. Private equity portfolio companies 
use significantly less leverage than the financial institutions that collapsed in the 2008 financial 
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crisis. The average gross leverage ratio of private equity deals is usually about 3:1 while Lehman 
Brothers was leveraged at approximately 32:1.576 With such levels of leverage, major losses that 
occur suddenly can quickly trigger a chain of systemic failures as the use of leverage amplifies 
losses well beyond a financial institution’s capital resources. 
 
Private equity owned buyout companies have significantly higher levels of debt than 
other comparable publicly traded companies.577 As discussed in Part II above, the use of leverage 
in private equity transactions is a key element to enhance the potential return for investors.578 
Financial leverage magnifies the potential positive or negative impact that any change in the 
Company’s earnings has on the return on equity. Therefore, high levels of leverage “increase the 
risks of financial distress, debt restructuring, bankruptcy, or even liquidation, particularly in 
economic downturns and periods of slow growth such as the 2008 financial crisis.”579 The risk of 
financial distress associated with high levels of leverage is well known in finance and 
economics. Greater leverage increases the odds of financial distress, high default levels and even 
insolvency by magnifying lenders losses relative to equity. In the words of Professor 
Appelbaum: “as the debt ratio rises, the probability of bankruptcy rises and the expected value of 
bankruptcy costs increase. Even companies that are able to restructure their debts and avoid 
insolvency bear costly expenses – legal fees and other costs associated with restructuring debt as 
well as higher borrowing costs in the future.”580 The less equity invested in any given private 
equity buyout transaction, and the higher the amount of debt, the greater the risk of losing the 
equity.581 Furthermore, the less equity that a company has, the smaller the cushion against 
banking problems, adverse market conditions, economic downturns and insolvency or failure. 
Therefore, high leverage increases both the risk of losing the equity invested and the risk that a 
company becomes unable to repay its lenders and therefore becomes insolvent.582  
 
In the context of leveraged buyout transactions, portfolio companies are under pressure to 
continue to service high levels of debt, which makes them very vulnerable to changing market 
conditions and even defaults during economic downturns. The actual benefits of using debt to the 
balance sheet, as discussed in Part II of this paper, diminish as debt rises to an excessive level 
thereby making borrowers very vulnerable to interest rate rises, unexpected business events, 
economic downturns or adverse market conditions. A financial crisis affecting target companies 
that are carrying high levels of debt on their balance sheet could have serious repercussions for 
investors, many of whom are themselves highly leveraged hedge funds or pension funds seeking 
higher returns. In other words, leverage creates an externality and the stakeholders who usually 
bear the costs of this externality are the creditors.583 The concern associated with the use of 
leverage is also the fear that excessive leverage might lead to costs that have to be borne by the 
rest of the economy.  
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Additionally, the effect of financial distress and bankruptcy resulting from excessive 
leverage and the failure of a portfolio company may be devastating for other stakeholders in the 
leveraged buyout environment like managers, employees, customers, suppliers and bond holders 
of the affected company. For the individual portfolio company, bankruptcy and financial distress 
usually mean a disaster for managers, employees, creditors and suppliers whose jobs and 
livelihood depend on the success or failure of the company.584 Many private equity portfolio 
companies also struggle with high levels of leverage and debt-financed dividend payouts to 
private equity investors that put tremendous pressure on cash flow and limit the ability to adapt 
during economic downturns.585 Clearly, excessive leverage used by private equity funds can 
leave the portfolio company in a weaker financial position. Net worth is lower since the target 
company has not retained the proceeds of the loans. Profits are reduced by the burden of the new 
interest payments and cash flow is down even further due to the payments of principal on the 
leveraged loans. Also, funds for new developments, business growth or investments may be 
unavailable. 
   
It is important to note that leverage plays an important role in financial markets. Former 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner explained that “stripped of its complexities, the purpose of 
a financial system is to let those who want to save…save and let those who want to borrow – 
whether to buy a house or build a business – borrow. The use of significant amounts of debt to 
finance the acquisition of a company has a number of advantages, as well as risks. The most 
obvious risk associated with a leveraged buyout is that of financial distress. Unforeseen events 
such as recession, litigation, or changes in the regulatory environment can lead to difficulties 
meeting scheduled interest payments, technical default (the violation of the terms of a debt 
covenant) or outright liquidation.”586 
 
This paper takes the position that the possibility of financial distress and even bankruptcy 
is built into the business model of private equity funds. The primary goal of private equity funds 
is to maximize returns for investors through investments in underperforming, undervalued and 
undermanaged companies and the turnaround and restructuring of their business and 
operations.587 In the words of Professor Appelbaum: “The expectation that some portfolio 
companies may need to restructure their debt or even default on their debt obligations is inherent 
in the private equity model whereby funds hold a portfolio of companies, some of which may 
yield spectacular gains when sold and some of which will not succeed. The high risks faced by 
highly leveraged firms are more than offset by the very large payoffs from successful portfolio 
companies.”588 Occasional bankruptcies of portfolio companies have little effect on the overall 
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Additionally, as discussed above, this paper takes the position that private equity 
investors are in fact protected from the effects of financial distress, default or bankruptcy of 
companies in the fund’s portfolio.  When a portfolio company fails the investment is gone but 
the losses end there and the financial exposure is self-contained. The potential losses of a private 
equity fund are known with some degree of certainty. The legal structure of private equity funds 
limits their investors losses to the equity capital invested in the portfolio company. The financial 
exposure associated with private equity owned companies is very different from the unlimited 
risks associated with the pre-crisis activities of Bear Stearns, AIG, Lehman Brothers and other 
major financial institutions prior to the 2008 financial crisis. The value of investments made by 
private equity funds is much less volatile and much more limited than those seen in the cases of 
systemic capital market failures. 
 
This paper argues that the risk in private equity leveraged buyout transactions and their 
use of leverage is not the systemic risk regulators were seeking to control through Title IV of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. The default, bankruptcy or failure of a private equity portfolio company (which 
may be devastating for different groups of stakeholders) are unlikely to cause cascading losses, 
present a threat to the financial system or shake the economy. Also, there are no modern 
instances of a systemic failure or financial crisis triggered by a bankruptcy or failure of a private 
equity fund or its portfolio companies. 
 
In the final analysis, as this paper argues throughout, the regulatory environment has to 
change and constrain the kind of financial engineering and excessive leverage by private equity 
funds that raises the probability of financial distress and bankruptcy. This approach will protect 
the different groups of stakeholders whose interests may be adversely affected by financial 
distress, default and bankruptcy of a portfolio company. Nonetheless, this paper takes the 
position that Title IV fails to achieve this purpose and is not the right regulatory approach. 
Regulating the source or providers of debt capital is much more likely to reduce the externality 
associated with the use of leverage and control the risk of excessive leverage in leveraged buyout 
transactions.     
 
iv)  FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTIONS OR LINKAGES 
 
Financial interconnections or linkages among financial institutions are a key feature of 
modern financial systems and systemic risk. They facilitate risk sharing, investment 
opportunities and access to capital by financial institutions and market participants. They are the 
result of a wide range of transactions and relationships between banks, financial institutions and 
other market participants. They are also the mechanism through which systemic risk spreads over 
the financial system and subsequently creates a financial crisis. These financial interconnections 
of the modern financial system are generally viewed as a key contributing cause of the 2008 
financial crisis. Due to the complex network of connections between market participants and 
financial institutions, failure of one financial institution can spread to other financial institutions 
very quickly through these interconnections and lead to a system-wide threat to the financial 
system and the economy as a whole.589  
 
589 See Paul Glasserman and H. Peyton Young, The Office of Financial Research, How Likely is Contagion in 




In 2000 Professor Franklin Allen and Professor Douglas Gale developed an important 
model of financial networks that explains how complex financial networks and interconnections 
can influence systemic risk and lead to a financial crisis.590 In their analysis “systemic risk arises 
through liquidity shocks that can have a domino effect, causing a problem at one bank to spread 
to others, potentially leading to failures throughout the system.”591 They further explain that 
“interbank deposits and interconnections between financial institutions are the primary 
mechanism for the transmission of liquidity shocks and systemic risk from one financial 
institution to another.”592 In essence, financial shocks and systemic risk are magnified and spread 
rapidly through the economy via financial interconnections, linkages and a complex network of 
financial connections between participants in the financial system. 
 
This paper takes the position that private equity funds do not pose systemic risk because 
they are not interconnected with other financial institutions or market participants and have no 
counterparty exposure.593 Although there are different lines of interconnections in the financial 
system, interconnectedness usually refers to “institutions’ connections by virtue of derivatives 
positions, brokerage relationship, counterparty exposure relating to, for example, swaps or 
securities lending, reliance on short-term credit for operations, or the provision of credit to 
financial system participants.”594 Private equity funds simply do not use these financial 
instruments or strategies and therefore are not interconnected with other financial institutions or 
market participants. They do not hold derivatives positions, do not have counterparty exposure 
and do not rely on short-term credit for their operations.595 As discussed in Part II of this paper, 
private equity funds usually acquire a majority interest in mature operating companies. 
Therefore, private equity portfolio companies that fail are very unlikely to be interconnected to 
other financial institutions or market participants so as to cause systemic failures and a potential 
financial crisis.  
 
Interconnectedness is a critical element of systemic risk. It creates the risk of “spillover” 
namely, that the failure of one financial institution will have cascading negative effects on other 
financial institutions or market participants and the entire financial system.596 In the absence of 
this interconnectedness between financial institutions (like in the case of private equity funds), 
there is no element of spillover risk that can lead to a systemic failure and eventually a financial 
crisis. Furthermore, private equity funds are not interconnected with each other, because they 
neither pledge their assets as security for, nor do they guarantee, each other’s obligations. 
Therefore, a failure of a private equity fund could not create cascading losses that would lead to a 
systemic failure and eventually a financial crisis.597 A highly leveraged financial firm that is 
interconnected with other financial firms is less likely than an unleveraged firm to be able to 
absorb massive losses and the spillover effects if another financial system participant fails.598 
However, this is not the case with private equity funds as they are not interconnected with other 
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financial institutions. Additionally, they do not lend to financial system participants and are not 
operationally linked to other financial institutions. Unlike hedge funds which generally rely on 
derivatives, leverage and short-term credit, private equity funds do not use these financial tools 
and therefore, pose no systemic threat to the financial system. The links or “channels of 
contagion, by which one financial institution’s failure spreads to other financial institutions”, are 
simply not present in the context of private equity transactions.599  
 
Private equity funds are also organized and structured in such a way that the funds 
owning the portfolio companies are limited partnerships, with no interconnections even between 
other portfolio companies managed by the same private equity firm.600 Furthermore, private 
equity investments are not cross-collateralized. Neither private equity investors nor debt holders 
can force a fund to sell unrelated assets or another portfolio company to satisfy debt obligations 
resulting from the default of a portfolio company.601 In essence, private equity investments in 
portfolio companies are protected and separated from one another so that a non-performing 
investment does not affect any other investment in the portfolio of the fund. The failure of one 
portfolio company does not impact the fund’s other portfolio companies. Losses are limited to 
the underlying value of the original capital investment.602 Thus in the context of private equity 
funds, the concern about systemic risk resulting from financial interconnections or linkages 
between financial institutions and the potential for systemic-wide failure are simply nonexistent.   
 
v)  LONG-TERM ILLIQUID ASSET CLASS 
 
Liquidity, which is a major component of systemic risk and a potential financial crisis, is 
not a practical concern in the context of private equity funds. Liquidity generally refers to how 
quickly and cheaply certain assets can be converted into cash. Generally, institutions that offer 
highly liquid investments, such as banks, pose more systemic risk because they are more 
susceptible to runs during times of financial distress.603 However, liquidity is not a systemic risk 
concern in the context of private equity funds because they require long-term capital 
commitments from investors and do not offer their investors redemption or withdrawal rights 
that could force the fund into liquidation.604 Private equity investors usually cannot exit a fund 
without giving considerable notice, even when major losses occur. Also, the pension funds, 
endowments and other institutional investors that invest in private equity funds are much less 
susceptible to selling pressure resulting from sudden financial losses or failures. Therefore, 
private equity funds don’t have to sell assets to fund investors’ redemptions. Additionally, 
private equity funds invest in long-term illiquid assets that are typically the equity securities of 
operating companies, as opposed to highly speculative financial instruments, like in the case of 
hedge funds.605 They rely on long-term, stable financing in the form of capital commitments 
from their investors and do not normally invest in short-term securities such as derivatives, 
options or swaps.606 In the word of the economist Dr. Robert Shapiro “In good and bad times, the 
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core business of private equity funds is to identify firms with long-term potential for higher 
productivity, sales and profits, secure the capital to purchase these firms, and inject additional 
capital, improve their strategies and reorganize their operations, to achieve higher returns.”607 
The investment focus of private equity funds on undervalued operating companies simply limits 
the fund’s downside exposure and largely precludes a systemic failure or systemic-wide financial 
crisis.     
 
Also, private equity funds do not rely on short-term financing that can dry up and 
therefore a lender’s liquidity shortage will not affect the operations of a private equity fund. 
Rather private equity investors commit their capital for approximately 10-12 years thus making 
the risk of a run on the bank (the same risk that forced Bear Stearns into a desperate fire-sale in 
March 2008) impossible.608 Private equity funds simply cannot be forced to rapidly unwind their 
portfolios and sell assets to satisfy investor or other claims, thus driving down investment values 
and potentially adversely affecting other financial institutions, creating a systemic financial 
crisis.609 The risk of systemic failure resulting from a liquidity crisis, in the context of private 
equity funds, is therefore non-existent. 
 
vi)  MARKET CONCENTRATION AND DIVERSIFICATION 
  
Market concentration and the potential of creating systemic risk are also not a practical 
concern in the context of private equity funds. Market concentration refers to the extent to which 
a given institution is concentrated within a given industry or geographic region.610 The failure of 
such an industry or geographic region would signal a near-certain failure of an institution that is 
concentrated in such an industry or geographic industry. However, this is not generally a concern 
for private equity funds as they are diversified geographically and across multiple sectors and 
industries.611 Private equity funds pursue a variety of investment strategies (e.g., growth capital, 
venture capital, buyout, real estate, distressed and mezzanine investing) and invest in a broad 
range of industries and geographic regions.612 While a specific private equity fund may hold a 
limited number of investments, and while some private equity funds have an industry or 
geographic focus, private equity funds in general are diversified across different industries and 
geographic regions and thus lack concentrated exposure in any single region or sector.613 If the 
investment in a particular region or sector becomes unattractive or fails, only a portion of the 
private equity sector will be adversely affected, because private equity investments are not 
concentrated in any one sector or region and most importantly, private equity funds are not 
interconnected with other financial institutions or market participants, as discussed above.614 
Therefore, as there is no over-exposure to any single sector, the concern about systemic risk or a 
systemic-wide failure associated with market concentration is simply non-existent.     
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As described above, this paper takes the position that private equity funds do not pose 
systemic risk and present no threat to the financial stability of the economy as a whole because: 
i) they do not use leverage at the fund level; ii) losses do not spread throughout the financial 
market but are contained and handled by the fund investors; iii) their activities are not 
interconnected or linked with the financial system; iv) they offer long-term illiquid investments; 
and v) they are not concentrated in any one market. It is simply hard to see how any particular 
private equity fund or its failure could be considered a systemic threat that justifies regulatory 
intervention. The organization of private equity funds and the nature of their investments and 
operations are fundamentally different from the circumstances and conditions that led to the 
2008 financial crisis and the near-collapse of the entire financial system.615 The diversified 
portfolios of private equity funds make it extremely unlikely that problems or failures with some 
portfolio companies could trigger systemic failures in the financial system. The diversification of 
private equity funds and their portfolios provides another barrier to broad, systemic and 
cascading losses or financial failures that can create a major crisis. Therefore, this paper argues 
that private equity funds should pose very little concern for regulators and policymakers seeking 
to develop a new regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and prevent the next financial 
crisis.616 The following section examines the regulatory distinction between private equity and 
venture capital funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, from the perspective of systemic 
risk, and argues that both should enjoy the same exemption from the SEC registration and 
reporting requirements and be subject to a reduced regulatory regime.  
 
C. THE REGULATORY DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL 
 
As noted in Part II of this paper, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing 
rules amended the Advisers Act to exempt from SEC registration advisers that only manage 
venture capital funds.617 The implementing rules adopted by the SEC in order to give effect to 
the provisions of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, among other things, defined the term “venture 
capital funds” for purposes of the new Investment Advisers Act exemption available for advisers 
to venture capital funds under Title IV. Venture capital fund advisers who satisfy the exemption 
must still comply with certain SEC reporting and recordkeeping requirements. This Part of the 
paper argues that for regulatory purposes, there is no distinction between private equity and 
venture capital funds and therefore both should be treated in the same way, enjoy the same 
exemption from registration and be subject to a reduced regulatory regime.  
 
The exemption granted to venture capital funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act 
appears to be motivated by the lack of systemic risk posed by venture capital funds.618 Congress 
was operating on the assumption that venture capital funds do not present the same risks as the 
large private funds whose advisers are required to register with the SEC under Title IV of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.619 This is because venture capital funds do not use leverage or borrowed 
capital, their activities are not interconnected with the global financial system, they offer long-
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term illiquid investments, and they generally rely on equity funding so that losses that may occur 
are born by the fund investors and do not spread throughout the world financial markets.620 
Unlike hedge funds, venture capital funds do not trade complex financial instruments such as 
credit default swaps and do not utilize short-selling strategies. Therefore, they present no threat 
to the financial stability of the economy as a whole. Additionally, venture capital funds had very 
little to do with the 2008 financial crisis.621 It is universally accepted that venture capital funds 
did not cause the financial crisis and did not play any part in the credit crisis. They had no 
involvement in the mortgage-backed securities market, either directly or indirectly, and did not 
contribute to the build-up of systemic risk that eventually led to the near-collapse of the financial 
system.622 They were simply not part of the problem.623 The exemption granted to venture capital 
funds under the Dodd-Frank Act and the logic behind it, as described above, clearly validate and 
strengthen the argument presented in this paper that private equity funds should also be exempt 
from SEC registration and should be included within the scope of the venture capital exemption. 
  
Venture capital is a subset of private equity and the key difference between the two types 
of funds lies in their investment focus.624 Whereas venture capital funds usually invest in early-
stage startup companies, private equity funds invest in companies along all stages of a 
company’s life-cycle (usually more mature companies with an established business model). In all 
other respects, however, private equity funds and venture capital funds are not so different and 
share the same characteristics. The primary goal of both venture capital and private equity funds 
is to build and develop companies for an initial public offering or an acquisition. They have 
virtually the same business model, skill set and compensation structure.625 In essence, private 
equity and venture capital funds are two sides of the same coin. Both made no contribution to the 
2008 financial crisis, do not use leverage at the fund level, are not interconnected to other 
financial institutions or market participants, offer illiquid long-term investments and are typically 
funded by equity.626 They contain none of the systemic risk factors that led to the 2008 financial 
crisis and pose no viable threat to the financial system. The risk associated with both private 
equity and venture capital funds is non-systemic, contained and limited entirely to the 
operational success or failure of the portfolio companies in which these funds invest.627 
Therefore, these funds should pose very little concern for regulators seeking to develop a new 
regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and guard against cascading losses that can lead to a 
financial crisis. The ability of private equity and venture capital funds to contribute to systemic 
financial risk or systemic failure is simply non-existent.628  
 
Given these similarities between private equity and venture capital funds, this paper takes 
the position that there is no justification for the regulatory distinction between the two under 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.629 Private equity and venture capital funds should be regulated 
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in the same manner and enjoy the same exemption from the SEC registration and reporting 
requirements. The fact that private equity funds usually invest in more mature and developed 
companies while venture capital funds invest in early stage startups, is irrelevant for regulatory 
purposes and from a systemic risk perspective. The distinction that the Dodd-Frank Act makes 
between private equity and venture capital funds, for regulatory purposes, is simply artificial, 
inadequate and inconsistent with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank legislation, given the 
similarities discussed above. In the words of Douglas Lowenstein, former President and CEO of 
the Private Equity Growth Capital Council: “Twin brothers, both productive and contributive to 
the common good, unjustly subjected to different standards. Why should Abel’s gifts be 
accepted, while Cain’s gifts are rejected?”630 It is important to note that these similarities have in 
the past caused the SEC and other regulators to focus regulation on hedge funds and to exempt 
private equity funds for the same reasons discussed above.631  
 
Furthermore, on June 22, 2011, the SEC adopted final rules implementing the private 
fund registration requirements and exemptions under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.632 These 
final rules define the term “venture capital” as a fund that: i) invests primarily in “qualifying 
investments” (generally, private operating companies that do not distribute proceeds from debt 
financings in exchange for the fund’s investments in the company); may invest in a “basket” of 
non-qualifying investments of up to 20 percent of its committed capital; and may hold certain 
short-term investments; ii) does not incur leverage apart from a limited amount of short-term 
borrowing; iii) does not offer investors non-extraordinary redemption rights; iv) represents itself 
as a venture capital fund to investors; and v) is a private fund.633 This definition is designed to 
clearly distinguish such investment vehicles from other types of private funds, such as hedge 
funds and to address valid concerns about systemic risk.  
 
The distinguishing features of the SEC definition, which qualify venture capital funds for 
the exemption from SEC registration under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, are primarily the 
non-use of leverage and the lack of redemption rights. The premise behind this definition is that 
these features eliminate any potential systemic risk to the stability of the financial system and the 
risk that a failure of a venture capital fund could trigger cascading losses that might lead to a 
financial crisis. Given the similarities between venture capital and private equity funds, as 
discussed above, the same logic applies to private equity funds too and therefore, they should 
qualify for the same exemption from the SEC registration and reporting requirements. This paper 
argues that from a regulatory perspective and for the purpose of monitoring systemic risk, there 
is no difference between private equity and venture capital funds that justifies the different 
regulatory treatment under the Dodd-Frank Act.    
 
Unfortunately, the failure of regulators to recognize the similarities between venture 
capital and private equity funds from a regulatory perspective, has led to overly broad, 
unwarranted and costly regulations and registration requirements that try to prevent the rise of 
systemic risk in investment vehicles (private equity funds) that do not pose any systemic risk 
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problem.634 They try to protect investors whom the system of securities laws views as capable of 
protecting themselves. This is counterproductive since both private equity and venture capital 
funds are helping to mitigate the damage of the financial crisis and drive long-term economic 
growth and innovation through their investment activities. The following section examines the 
role of private equity as a major driver of economic growth and argues that requiring private 
equity funds to register with the SEC and subjecting them to extensive and unnecessary reporting 
requirements will needlessly divert capital, time and effort from investment activities that could 
be creating jobs and drive economic growth.  
  
D.   POLICY CONSIDERATIONS - PRIVATE EQUITY AS A DRIVER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH  
Private equity funds are a major driver of economic growth and job creation and play a 
key role in the economic recovery of the U.S. They are an important source of capital for 
companies undertaking restructuring or operational changes and a major component of a 
dynamic and efficient capital market. They have a long track record of preserving and generating 
jobs by providing capital and management resources to small and mid-size American businesses 
(that otherwise might have gone into bankruptcy).635 They simply deliver the capital necessary 
for companies to compete, succeed, and grow. In the words of Professor Eileen Appelbaum 
“private equity is an integral part of the everyday lives of millions of Americans. When you buy 
coffee in the morning at Dunkin’ Donuts, you are interacting with private equity; when you see a 
movie produced by MGM Studios and buy a pizza at Domino’s afterwards, you are interacting 
with private equity. When you shop at Toys R Us for the hottest new video game or the latest 
“must have” doll or when you buy a new outfit at J. Crew, you are touching private equity.”636 
By creating stronger companies and businesses “private equity funds create an economic ripple 
that flows through the economy, saving and creating jobs and driving long-term growth.”637  
 
Between 2002 and 2012, 2,400 U.S.-based private equity funds invested more than $1.6 
trillion in 15,200 U.S.-based companies which employ more than eight million people.638 By 
investing in promising companies and those needing a turnaround, private equity has helped 
grow key sectors of the economy including manufacturing, technology, health care, automotive, 
energy and retail. In 2011 alone, the private equity industry invested more than $150 billion in 
U.S. companies, creating jobs and driving long-term economic growth.639 Throughout 2013 
2,830 private equity-backed buyout deals were announced with an aggregate value of $274 
billion, the highest value since $661 billion worth of deals were announced in 2007.640 North 
America experienced its strongest year in 2013 since 2007 in terms of total value of buyout 
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635 See Testimony of Andrew M. Bursky, Chairman of Atlas Holdings LLC, before the House Committee on 
Financial Services, Washington DC, January 26, 2011, available at www.financialservices.house.gov/media 
/pdf/012611abursky.pdf.   
636 See Appelbaum and Batt, supra note 27. 
637 See Laffer et al, supra note 38.  
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deals, with 1,516 deals valued at $171 billion, a 10% increase compared to the total value of 
private equity-backed buyout deals in 2012.641 
   
The business model of private equity funds is based on long-term investments in 
businesses and people (not publicly traded securities) with the objective of building and growing 
companies.642 As discussed in Part II of this paper, private equity funds raise capital from 
institutional investors such as pension funds and university endowments to invest in 
underperforming, undermanaged or undervalued companies.643 The fund managers work to 
increase the value of the companies they buy through capital investment and managerial 
expertise. With infusions of capital, talent and strategy, private equity funds improve the 
productivity, performance and financial strength of the companies in which they invest with the 
objective of turning these companies around. Among other things, they improve business 
strategy, purchase more efficient machinery and equipment, commercialize new technologies, 
streamline the operations, cut costs and expand product distribution in an effort to strengthen 
companies and build shareholder value.644 Within several years after the initial investment, 
private equity funds usually look to sell the portfolio companies or take them public with the 
objective of generating superior returns to their investors.645  
 
Private equity funds only make money for their investors and partners when the 
companies they acquire grow, increase earnings and become more successful.646 This business 
model is clearly beneficial for the companies in which private equity funds invest, their 
employees, the communities in which they operate and, of course, the economy as a whole. 
Despite the common perception that most of the earnings and growth of private equity come 
from cutting costs and eliminating jobs, it is important to note that most of these target 
companies might have gone into bankruptcy without the capital infusion of private equity funds 
and the restructuring and reorganization efforts of the fund managers. The long-term focus of the 
private equity business model aligns the interests of private equity funds with the portfolio 
companies they buy and ensures that these companies have lasting success.647 Professor Josh 
Lerner of Harvard Business School and Professor Jerry Cao of Boston University reported that 
“based on an analysis of 496 acquisitions between 1980 and 2002—companies that went public 
again after being acquired by private equity firms and operated by them for more than a year 
consistently outperformed the market and other IPOs.”648 Additionally, private equity funds 
provide their institutional investors various investment opportunities that otherwise would be 
unavailable to most institutions, as well as high net-worth individuals, namely, the opportunity to 
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A real life example of how private equity funds turn around and restructure 
underperforming operating businesses is Commonwealth Laminating and Coating (CLC), a 
small company based in Martinsville, Virginia. CLC manufactures, sells and distributes solar 
control window films that help shield cars, houses and commercial properties from the sun’s 
heat. Its products are sold all over the world.650 In 2006 CLC needed additional capital to fund its 
continued growth and operations. However, the company’s existing shareholders were not able 
or willing to provide the necessary capital and the company’s future was at risk. CLC then 
approached the Riverside Company, a major private equity fund and over time Riverside 
acquired a majority ownership interest in CLC and invested an additional $16 million to improve 
the company’s production capacity. Through various restructuring efforts, investments in 
equipment and reorganization measures, the company improved its product quality and 
strengthened its market position and customer base. By the time Riverside sold CLC 4 years 
later, the Company had grown its earnings by 277%.651 Together, Riverside and CLC grew jobs 
by 73%, adding 61 jobs in Martinsville, Virginia and provided a major return to the teachers, 
firefighters and government employee pensions funds that invested through Riverside. With the 
help of Riverside’s capital, management expertise and restructuring and reorganization 
experience, CLC became a great success.652  
 
Another example of how private equity funds restructure, reorganize and turnaround 
operating companies is Burger King. In 2002 several major private equity funds acquired Burger 
King, seeing an opportunity to restructure and turnaround the world’s second largest fast-food 
chain.653 At the time of the transaction, Burger King was struggling and its financial performance 
was weak due to various operational and business challenges. Despite these tremendous 
challenges, the private equity funds recognized an opportunity to reorganize the company 
and revive the brand through various investments, operational and restructuring measures. 
Following a major infusion of capital, the private equity funds recruited a new management 
team and developed a new strategic plan for the business. The company implemented major 
cost reductions, large-scale operational improvements, restructuring measures and invested 
heavily in sales and marketing. These restructuring efforts resulted in reversing the decline in 
overall restaurants and opening nearly 1,000 international stores.  Over time these measures 
drove outstanding financial results and profitability across the business.654 As a result of 
these efforts, the chain performance and customer experience improved significantly. 
Revenues grew considerably, increasing earnings by 37%. The chain had a successful public 
offering in 2006.  
 
Additionally, through superior investment returns, private equity funds deliver important 
financial support for universities, research institutions and pension funds that benefit tens of 
millions of Americans.655 The private equity investor base is dominated primarily by pension 
funds of such household names like GM, GE, IBM and Boeing as well as private and public 
universities. Public pension and retirement funds also invest heavily in private equity funds. In 
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short, the largest beneficiaries of private equity returns are the millions of Americans who rely 
on pensions, college endowments, and other charitable foundations as well as leading 
universities and other foundations.656 In the words of economist Dr. Robert Shapiro, “in good 
and bad times, the core business of private equity funds is to identify firms with long-term 
potential for higher productivity, sales and profits; secure the capital to purchase these firms; and 
inject additional capital, improve their strategies and reorganize their operations, to achieve 
higher returns. Public policy should support these activities, especially during the current crisis 
and refrain from imposing additional burdens that could hamper these activities or redirect them 
to other economies.”657    
 
 Given the importance of private equity as a vital engine that helps drive the American 
economy, this paper takes the position that subjecting private equity funds to excessive and 
unnecessary regulatory requirements may jeopardize the nation’s economic growth and recovery 
and the role private equity funds play in the U.S. economy.658 Requiring private equity funds to 
register with the SEC under the Title IV of the Dodd Frank Act will needlessly divert capital, 
time and effort from productive investment activities that could be creating jobs and drive 
economic growth. It will simply impose an undue burden on private equity funds (particularly 
small and mid-size funds), drain their resources and diminish their ability to continue their 
investment activities at a critical time.659 Rather than using their resources to invest in businesses 
and drive growth, private equity funds will use some of their resources to build the necessary 
compliance infrastructure and comply with the new regulatory regime that imposes tremendous 
costs, seeking to solve a non-existent problem, as discussed in Parts III and IV of this paper. 
Additionally, the total cost of compliance with Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act for all new 
private equity funds is estimated to be as much as $500 million (at least $500,000 per year for 
each private equity fund that has to comply with Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act).660 These costs 
may reduce returns to private equity investors such as endowments and pension funds and may 
also hurt the economy in the long run. According the Congressional Budget Office, the SEC is 
expected to expend approximately $140 million from 2010 through 2015 to implement Title IV 
and private investment funds are expected to expend approximately $130 million per year to 
comply with the requirements of Title IV.661 It seems that these resources can be put to a much 
better use. 
 
Therefore, this paper takes the position that from an economic recovery perspective, there 
is no compelling argument to justify the excessive regulation of private equity funds and their 
advisers under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, particularly since Title IV does not add anything 
from an investor protection standpoint and does not solve a systemic risk problem. The 
regulatory approach adopted by Congress is clearly detrimental to the U.S. economy and may 
decrease the capital available to drive economic growth and job creation. This over-regulation of 
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private equity funds is expected to slow down the funding activities of the private equity industry 
and adversely affect long-term economic growth.  
 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. LEVERAGED LENDING STANDARDS - AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE REGULATION  
  OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 
 
The essence of the discussion to this point has been the problems associated with Title IV 
of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules, the SEC registration and reporting 
requirements and the overall approach to the regulation of private equity funds. This paper has 
taken the position that the decision of Congress and the SEC to regulate private equity funds and 
subject them to extensive SEC registration and reporting requirements is inadequate, 
unnecessarily costly, inconsistent with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and its 
underlying theory of regulation, too disclosure-focused, based on fundamental misconceptions as 
to the nature of private equity and does not properly address the potential risk of too much 
leverage. It does not add anything substantial to the protection of private equity investors and in 
fact, tries to prevent the rise of systemic risk in investment vehicles that do not pose systemic 
risk problems. Since private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk, they play a 
critical role as a driver of economic growth and their investors have the resources and 
sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, this paper takes the position that these funds and their 
managers should be subject to a reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC 
registration, reporting and disclosure requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. For 
purposes of Title IV, there is a compelling argument why private equity funds should be lumped 
together with venture capital funds and benefit from the same exemption from SEC registration 
available for venture capital funds.662  
 
The concerns associated with the use of leverage by private equity funds as discussed in 
Part IV of this paper and the risk of excessive leverage (which are valid and legitimate concerns, 
although unlikely to cause a systemic-wide failure of the financial system) should be addressed 
through more substantive rules like leveraged lending regulation and tighter and prudent 
underwriting practices, standards and policies. This paper takes the position that by setting new 
standards for underwriting of leveraged loans by banks and other lenders engaged in leveraged 
financing activities, regulators and policymakers can ensure that private equity firms will have to 
meet higher standards when seeking buyout loans, therefore, reducing the risk of high leverage 
and the remote probability of a systemic financial crisis. This approach will: i) eliminate the 
unnecessary, costly and burdensome compliance requirements of Title IV; ii) reduce and 
mitigate the potential risk posed by private equity funds and their use of leverage; and iii) protect 
and preserve the benefits that private equity funds offer the financial system and the economy. 
This approach is already being implemented by regulators in the form of leveraged lending 
guidelines.663 It is actually causing banks and other lenders to tighten the underwriting of 
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leveraged loans, be more cautious about leveraged lending and change the decision making 
process as to leveraged lending transactions.664  
 
For example, in May 2014, three major banks for the private equity fund KKR & Co., 
(formerly known as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and one of the largest and most prominent 
private equity funds in the world) denied a request for a $725 million buyout loan due to 
concerns that the loan was too risky and inconsistent with leveraged lending standards and 
guidelines issued by regulators.665 The same banks had actually funded a similar transaction six 
months earlier. In December 2013, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs were 
among the banks that helped finance KKR’s $1.6 billion leveraged buyout of landscaping 
company Brickman Group Ltd. Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse acted as the lead bankers in 
this leveraged buyout transaction.666 The leverage component of the transaction was based on 6.8 
times the Company’s annual earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA).667 However, under the recently issued leveraged lending regulatory guidelines, 
leverage in excess of six times EBITDA should raise concerns and be subject to additional 
scrutiny.668 Accordingly, the same three banks decided to deny KKR’s request for a similar 
buyout loan as it is inconsistent with the latest leveraged lending guidelines. The decision by 
these three major banks not to back one of their largest, most profitable and most prominent 
private equity clients clearly demonstrates how leveraged lending regulation implemented after 
the 2008 financial crisis is in fact reshaping the leveraged lending environment and how banks 
and lenders are becoming more cautious about leveraged lending. This paper supports this 
regulatory approach and recommends that the primary mechanism for regulating the risk of 
excessive leverage by private equity funds should be tightening underwriting practices and 
fostering an environment in which the discipline of banks and other lenders constrains excessive 
leverage and risk-taking by private equity funds. 
 
Prompted by the concerns about increasing leveraged lending volumes over the last 
decade and deterioration of prudent underwriting practices, on March 21, 2013, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued joint guidance on leveraged lending, replacing the 
regulatory interagency guidance in effect since 2001.669 This guidance seeks to establish a risk 
management obligation or framework for banking institutions and lenders engaged in leveraged 
lending activities. The guidance specifically identified: “i) debt agreements that included features 
that weakened lender protection by excluding meaningful maintenance covenants and included 
other features that could limit lenders’ recourse in the event of weakened borrower performance; 
ii) aggressive capital and repayment structures for some transactions, whether originated to hold 
or to distribute; and iii) less than satisfactory management information systems that were unable 
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to aggregate exposure on a timely basis.”670 Under the guidance banks are required to define 
leveraged lending in their policies and procedures to ensure consistent application across all 
business lines using criteria appropriate to the lending institution.671 The guidance further 
provides the following examples for a bank to consider in developing its definition of leveraged 
lending activities: “i) proceeds used for buyouts, acquisitions, or capital distributions;  
ii) transactions where the borrower’s total debt divided by EBITDA or senior debt divided by 
EBITDA exceeds 4.0X EBITDA or 3.0X EBITDA, respectively, or other defined levels 
appropriate to the industry or sector; iii) a borrower recognized in the debt markets as a highly 
leveraged firm, which is characterized by a high debt-to-net-worth ratio; and iv) transactions 
when the borrower’s post-financing leverage, as measured by its leverage ratios (for example, 
debt-to-assets, debt-to-net-worth, debt-to-cash flow, or other similar standards common to 
particular industries or sectors), significantly exceeds industry norms or historical levels.”672 
 
The guidance includes key areas to be addressed by banks and other financial institutions 
engaged in leveraged lending, such as: 
 
• Establishing a sound risk-management framework: The regulators expect that 
management and the board of directors of the lending institution will identify the institution’s 
risk appetite for leveraged finance, establish appropriate credit limits, and ensure prudent 
oversight and approval processes.673 
 
• Underwriting standards: An institution’s underwriting standards should clearly define 
expectations for cash flow capacity, amortization, covenant protection, collateral controls, 
levels of due diligence and the underlying business premise for each transaction, and should 
consider whether the borrower’s capital structure is sustainable, regardless of whether the 
transaction is underwritten to hold or to distribute.674 
 
• Valuation standards: An institution’s standards should concentrate on the importance of 
sound and clear methods in the determination and periodic revalidation of enterprise value.675 
 
• Pipeline management: An institution should be able to accurately measure exposure on a 
timely basis, establish policies and procedures that address failed transactions and general 
market disruptions, and ensure periodic stress tests of exposures to loans not yet distributed 
to buyers.676 
 
• Reporting and analytics: An institution should ensure that management information 
systems accurately capture key borrower characteristics and aggregate them across business 
lines and legal entities on a timely basis, with periodic reporting to the institution’s board of 











borrower within the context of the borrower’s industry, and integrate that information into 
both general risk and stress assessments. This analysis should include: cash flow analysis, 
liquidity based upon metrics in the industry; merger and other corporate transactions; 
variations in the borrower’s business and operating plans (performed on a quarterly basis); 
collateral shortfalls; changes in the debt and equity markets; and interest and foreign 
exchange risk. 677 
 
• Risk rating leveraged loans: An institution’s risk rating standards should consider the use 
of realistic repayment assumptions to determine a borrower’s ability to de-lever to a 
sustainable level within a reasonable period of time.678 
 
• Participations: An institution that participates in leveraged loans should establish 
underwriting and monitoring standards similar to those for loans underwritten internally.679 
 
• Stress testing: A lending institution should perform stress testing on leveraged loans held 
in a portfolio as well as those planned for distribution, in accordance with existing 
interagency guidelines.680  
 
Under the guidance, financial institutions engaged in leveraged lending must review and 
revise their leveraged lending policies and procedures, underwriting standards, and management 
processes to ensure they address the specific areas covered in the guidance and required by 
regulators. Failure to follow these standards could result in a finding that “a bank or lending 
institution is conducting lending activities in an unsafe and unsound manner.”681  
 
While the full implications of this guidance and the changes that will be made by banks 
and other lenders remain to be seen, it seems that this regulatory approach is already starting to 
reshape the leveraged lending environment and how banks underwrite leveraged loans. It shows 
“a clear intention by regulators to control and constrain aggressive and risky leveraged lending 
practices” which is in line with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act.682 The main policy 
recommendation of this paper is for regulators to continue to tighten underwriting practices and 
foster an environment in which the discipline of banks and other lenders controls excessive 
leverage and risk-taking. Going forward, financial institutions engaged in leveraged lending will 
clearly have to reevaluate their internal procedures and tighten their underwriting standards to 
ensure that they are in compliance with the new leveraged lending requirements imposed by 
regulators. The following section of the paper explores some of the recent challenges of 













B. THE CHALLENGES OF LEVERAGED LENDING REGULATION 
 
While the guidance on leveraged lending discussed above is definitely a step in the right 
direction in terms of regulating leveraged lending and reducing the risk of excessive leverage, it 
seems that the implementation process is still in its early stages. Now, almost two years after the 
initial implementation of the guidance, we continue to see robust leverage markets and highly 
leveraged mergers and acquisitions. A combination of vague and inconsistent regulations, 
creative banking practices and a wide range of alternative non-bank lenders have slowed down 
and to some extent inhibited regulators’ ability to control and manage leverage levels. In essence, 
banks and other lenders continue to try to retain the profitable business of leveraged lending and 
meet demands from clients and investors as leveraged lending is one of the most lucrative forms 
of loans for banks. 
 
 As discussed above, the fundamental purpose of the guidance on leveraged lending was 
simple: “to promote safe-and-sound leveraged activities by providing restrictions on credit and 
underwriting policies, institutional risk appetite, stress testing, approval processes and internal 
management and reporting.”683 However, it appears that over the past two years, banks have 
been selectively ignoring the restrictions, and using the guidelines themselves to find loopholes 
for funding non-compliant deals.684 For example, the new regulations state that transactions in 
excess of 6X total debt/EBITDA raise concerns for most industries.685 However, the term “most 
industries” has never been defined or clarified in this context. Also, it has never been determined 
who makes the decision as to which industries are regulated and how are banks supposed to 
know which industries are considered exempt.  
 
  Banks and lenders are also becoming more creative in their lending strategies in order to 
circumvent the new restrictions entirely. Reuters recently reported on banks looking into 
arranging Paid-in-Kind (PIK) bonds that would split overall debt between the holding company 
and its operating subsidiaries.686 Some banks are even exploring partnerships with Business 
Development Companies (BDCs) and participating in “unitranche” deals, whereby the banks 
hold the senior loan and the BDC issues the subordinated debt, thereby allowing the banks to 
hold less leverage.687 It is clear that as leveraged lending is an extremely lucrative business for 
banks and lenders, these institutions are starting to think outside the box in order to maintain 
their market share and prevent alternative lenders from entering the lucrative market of leveraged 
loans.   
 
  Also, non-bank lenders have always been a viable alternative for obtaining leveraged 
financing, but with the new guidelines in place, their value has increased. In fact, non-bank 
players handled 83% of total middle-market volume in 2013, up from 77% in 2012 and 70.6% in 
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2011.688 It is very likely that as leveraged lending restrictions continue to increase and banks pass 
on more and more deals, non-banks such as finance companies, hedge funds and insurance 
companies among others, will become the alternative lenders for mid-market firms to secure 
leveraged financing.  
 
  The Federal Reserve is now increasing its oversight of high-risk leveraged loans, shifting 
to a deal-by-deal review after its previous guidelines were largely ignored by banks. The Federal 
reserve is now examining leveraged loans as they are made, demonstrating a sense of urgency in 
avoiding the kind of overly risky lending that was one of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis. 
In the event this regulatory approach does not work, regulators have other options. They can 
change supervisory ratings on banks, which could limit leveraged transactions and they could 
also resort to fines or other sanctions for failure to comply with the guidance. However, despite 
the efforts of regulators, it remains to be seen how the new leveraged lending regulations will 
reshape the leveraged lending environment and regulate the risk of excessive leverage. Thus far, 
these regulations do not seem to have a major effect on banks and lenders and big leverage deals 
are still being funded. It is anticipated that Wall Street banks will continue to play “cat-and-
mouse” with regulators over leveraged lending rules as they try to retain a very profitable 
business and meet demands from clients and investors. 
 
C.  RECENT LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES 
 
It is interesting to note that there is a recent legislative initiative to amend the Advisers 
Act and exempt private equity funds from the SEC registration and reporting requirements under 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.689 The Small Business Capital Access and Job Preservation Act, 
H.R. 1105, was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Jim Himes, a 
Democrat from Connecticut, and Congressman Robert Hurt, a Republican from Virginia in 
March 2013. The bill has 12 cosponsors: seven Democrats and five Republicans. It seeks to 
expand the scope of the venture capital exemption under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and 
include private equity funds within the same category.690 Private equity funds that have 
outstanding debt or leverage in excess of two times their invested capital commitments would 
not be able to benefit from this exemption and would still be required to register with the SEC. 
The bill further requires the SEC, within six months of enactment, to publish rules defining the 
term “private equity fund” and requiring exempted fund managers to “maintain records and 
provide reports that the SEC determines are necessary and appropriate in the public interest and 
for the protection of investors.”691 In establishing these rules, the SEC will take into account 
factors like “fund size, governance, investment strategy and risk.”692 
 
This bill is designed to reduce the regulatory burden of Title IV in order to facilitate 
access to capital, economic growth and job creation. It is expected to help private equity funds by 
 
688 See Kelly Thompson, Leveraged Loans: Banks’ Share of Middle Market Pie Shrinks Further in 2013, Forbes 
(January 29, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2014/01/29/leveraged-loans-banks-share-of-
middle-market-pie-slips-further-in-2013/.   
689 See H.R. 1105 (113 Congress 2013-2015), The Small Business Capital Access and Job Preservation Act, 






removing costly and unnecessary regulatory requirements that tie up financial resources and may 
even waste investor capital that would otherwise be used to grow and develop small businesses. 
This proposed legislation (which is consistent with the arguments presented in this paper) is 
based on the premise that i) private equity funds did not contribute to the 2008 financial crisis, ii) 
these funds are not a major source of systemic risk, iii) the risk associated with private equity 
funds is very different from the systemic risk that was the basis for the 2008 financial crisis and 
the Dodd-Frank legislation, iv) many of the rules and requirements of Title IV have no relevance 
for the private equity sector, and v) the registration and reporting requirements of Title IV 
interfere with the flow of capital and do not provide any protection to investors in private equity 
funds, who can fend for themselves. This proposed legislation confirms the position taken in this 
paper that private equity funds pose no systemic risk to the U.S. economy nor do they raise 
investor protection concerns that justify regulatory intervention.  
 
Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-Texas), Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee 
said after the House vote in favor of the bill in December 2013 that “many of us would argue on 
a bipartisan basis that part of the Dodd-Frank Act that requires small-business investors who are 
private equity advisors to register with the SEC is perhaps one of those provisions that is in need 
of reform. This is a provision that many of us believe was aimed at Wall Street but it ends up 
hurting Main Street.”693 Nonetheless, the prospects of the bill are still uncertain. On December 3, 
2013, President Obama released a statement strongly opposing the bill and threatening to veto it. 
Also, the bill was never passed by the Senate. It remains to be seen whether Congress is going to 
accept the idea that private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk and therefore, 
should be exempt from the SEC registration and reporting requirements and subject to a reduced 
regulatory regime.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Douglas Lowenstein, the former President of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council 
indicated in his Congressional testimony in 2010 that “private equity investments do not create 
systemic risk. Private equity firms invest in companies, not exotic speculative securities and their 
investors are long-term investors, eliminating the ‘run on the bank’ type of risk that helped create 
the 2008 financial crisis.”694 As this paper demonstrates, the decision of Congress to regulate 
private equity funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the implementation of Title IV 
through the SEC rules are  inadequate, unnecessarily costly and inefficient. Title IV and its 
implementing rules follow the traditional post-crisis legislative pattern which is usually 
excessive, burdensome, flawed and populist in nature. They are based on fundamental 
misconceptions as to the nature of private equity and the alleged systemic risk associated with 
private equity funds. They try  to prevent the rise of systemic risk in investment vehicles that do 
not pose any systemic risk problems. Additionally, they fall short of achieving the objectives of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and are inconsistent with the underlying theory of regulation. They are is too 
disclosure-focused and do not add anything significant to the protection of private equity 
investors who are financial institutions who can fend for themselves. Like any other excessive 
post-crisis financial reform, Title IV and its implementing rules may have satisfied a political 
need, but they will not benefit the financial market or the economy as a whole and will not 
improve investor welfare. This government intervention in the private equity sector was simply 
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driven by the political pressure on Congress to quickly launch a comprehensive reform of the 
financial system, and reflects a poor public policy decision. It has gone beyond the concerns that 
led to the 2008 financial crisis and the measures necessary to address and control the risks 
associated with private equity funds. It seems to fall within the definition of “quack law” or 
“bubble laws” in the words of Professor Romano and Professor Bainbridge.695  
 
As a matter of economic theory and history the activities of private equity funds to turn 
around, restructure and reorganize existing operating companies are very unlikely to pose 
systemic risk to the financial system and the economy as a whole. As discussed throughout this 
paper, the business of private equity funds is simply very different from the patterns of cascading 
losses and failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
Additionally, Title IV’s implementing rules do not meet the economic analysis and cost 
benefit justification standards set by the D.C. Circuit Court in the Business Roundtable decision. 
The SEC, in implementing Title IV, had failed to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis and 
to consider the impact of this legislation on efficiency, competition and capital formation. It 
failed to articulate a satisfactory and reasoned explanation for its regulatory actions, including a 
rational connection between the pre-crisis conduct and failures it was trying to address and the 
regulatory choices made. In essence, Title IV’s implementing rules are not supported by any 
substantial cost benefit analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after the decision in 
Business Roundtable or any other compelling argument demonstrating that the benefits of Title 
IV’s implementing rules are greater than its costs.  
Since private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk, they play a critical role 
as a driver of economic growth and their investors have the resources and sophistication to ‘fend 
for themselves’, this paper takes the position that these funds and their managers should be 
subject to a reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC registration, reporting and 
disclosure requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules. The 
concerns associated with the use of leverage by private equity funds and the risk of excessive 
leverage, which are valid and legitimate concerns, should be addressed through more substantive 
rules like leveraged lending regulation and tighter underwriting practices, standards and policies. 
This is especially true since there is nothing unique about a lender’s loan to private equity 
portfolio companies that would make them more risky than a wide range of other types of loans 
made by a bank or other lender, in the ordinary course of business, to other companies owned by 
public shareholders, public companies or other institutional investors. By setting new standards 
for underwriting of leveraged loans by banks and other lenders, regulators and policymakers can 
ensure that private equity funds will have to meet higher standards when seeking buyout loans, 
therefore, reducing the risk of high leverage and the remote probability of a systemic financial 
crisis. 
  
The alternative approach suggested in this paper, namely exempting private equity funds 
from the SEC registration requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its 
implementing rules, is supported by precedents. On October 26, 2001 President Bush signed into 
law the USA Patriot Act in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.696 The 
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primary purpose of this legislation was to combat terrorism and money laundering activities. 
Among other things, the legislation imposed anti-money laundering compliance obligations on 
financial institutions, including broker-dealers, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool 
operators and investment companies.697 Although the term “investment companies” was not 
specifically defined, most legal opinions concluded that the term was intended to include both 
registered investment companies and private investment funds.698 In addition to compliance with 
the new anti-money laundering regime, the new legislation imposed significant and costly new 
obligations, including designating a compliance officer, establishing training programs and 
arranging independent audits to ensure compliance. However, as the regulatory process unfolded, 
legislators recognized that private equity and venture capital funds did not meet the requirements 
for money-laundering risks and concluded that funds which do not permit investors to redeem 
the investment within two years, would not be required to comply with the anti-money 
laundering regime of the Patriot Act.699 Thus the regulations were adjusted to address the fact 
that there was no money-laundering risk involved in the investment activities of private equity 
and venture capital funds. This is exactly the position this paper takes with regard to the 
regulation of private equity funds. U.S. regulators should use the same approach in the context of 
Title IV of the Dodd Frank Act and its implementing rules. They should recognize that private 
equity funds pose no systemic risk to the stability of the financial system and therefore, should 
be exempt from the SEC registration and reporting requirements and subject to a reduced 
regulatory regime. The potential risks of excessive leverage should be regulated through 
leveraged lending regulations as discussed above.    
  
From a financial regulation perspective, this paper has argued that overall financial 
regulators should ground their rulemaking in rigorous cost benefit analysis and standards, 
consistent with the Business Roundtable decision, to arrive at more rational decision-making and 
efficient regulatory actions that advance the public interest. This legislative approach, unlike 
Title IV’s implementing rules, will avoid hasty regulation that fails to achieve its goals and 
imposes costs that exceed its benefits. It will ensure that society and the economy gain enough 
from the regulation to justify its costs. In the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, “rigorous cost 
benefit analysis creates confidence in the ability of regulators to craft effective and appropriate 
solutions to market problems. It also deters regulators from proceeding with rules that promise to 
impose big economic burdens without corresponding gains.”700   
 
The ultimate effect of Title IV and its SEC registration and reporting requirements is 
difficult to predict at this point and it is impossible to determine with certainty whether 
regulators made the right decision to include private equity funds within the scope of Title IV. 
Nonetheless, it still seems that until Congress eliminates or reduces this unnecessary and costly 
regulatory burden, these registration and reporting requirements are expected to have an adverse 
impact on the private equity sector and possibly the U.S. economy in the long run. 
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